




# AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTIES

THOMAS HODGKIN

Penguin African Series 3/6





Born in 1910, Thomas Hodgkin went to school at Winchester and read Classics and Philosophy at Balliol College, Oxford. He worked for several years in Palestine, first as an archaeologist and later in the administration. Resigning on political grounds he took up adult education in Cumberland and afterwards as Oxford Staff Tutor in cooperation with the W.E.A. in North Staffordshire. From 1945 to 1952 he was Secretary to the Oxford University Delegacy for Extra-Mural Studies, and a Fellow of Balliol; during this period he was responsible for initiating extra-mural classes in Ghana and Nigeria.

Latterly he has led a nomadic life and travelled in many parts of Africa. He has written for journals and held visiting lectureships at Northwestern University, McGill University, and University College of Ghana. He published *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* in 1956 and *Nigerian Perspectives* in 1960. He is at present engaged on a study of Islam and modern political movements in Africa south of the Sahara.

Thomas Hodgkin married in 1937 Dorothy Crowfoot, Fellow and Tutor of Somerville College, Oxford, now Wolfson Professor in X-ray crystallography. They have three children and a grandchild.

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AFRICAN  
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AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE

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*Thomas Hodgkin*

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## FOREWORD

THE writing of this book has been made possible by the help of innumerable Africans – party members and leaders especially – who have taught me a great deal in the course of the past dozen years. Though there is not room here to thank them all by name, I wish at least to record how deeply I am in their debt.

I have also benefited enormously from frequent discussions and correspondence with a small group of friends, who have studied the political parties of particular African territories far more closely than I, and on whose writings and ideas I have constantly drawn: above all, Dr Ruth Schachter, of the African Research and Studies Program, Boston University; Mr Dennis Austin and Professor Kenneth Robinson, of the London University Institute of Commonwealth Studies; Dr James Coleman, of the University of California in Los Angeles; and Dr David Apter, of Chicago University.

Professor Asa Briggs of the University of Leeds, Dr Martin Kilson of Harvard University, Mr Jeffrey Butler and Mr Howard Walker of Boston University, among others, have read part or all of the typescript and made valuable criticisms and suggestions. There are many others with whom I have discussed the various topics dealt with here and who have helped me with their specialized knowledge: in particular, Dr Anthony Low, Dr Bernard Chidzero, M. Alioune Diop, M. Abdoulaye Ly, M. Alexandre Adandé, Mr Richard Sklar, Dr Gray Cowan, Dr Carl Rosberg, Mr J. H. Price, Dr Peter Lloyd, Professor Georges Balandier, Professor St Clair Drake, Dr Okoi Arikpo, M. Philippe Decraene, Mme Eve Paret, M. Muhammad Kellou, Mr Nevill Barbour, M. Claude Tardits, Mr Michael Crowder, Mr Dennis Phombeah, Dr Cranford Pratt, Mr David Williams, Dr Kalu Ezera, Mr George Bennett, Professor Kenneth Kirkwood, and Mr Basil Davidson. I remember with especial gratitude the stimulus and criticism of Professor Sa'ad-ed-din Fawzi, of the University of Khartoum, whose early death has been a great loss to Sudanese and African studies. Like other wandering *marabouts*, I have been happy, while I have been working on this book, to enjoy the hospitality and



encouragement of kindly patrons – Professor Melville Herskovits, Director of the Program of African Studies, Northwestern University; Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal; Professor Theodore Monod, Director of the Institut Français d'Afrique Noire, Dakar; Professor W. O. Brown, Director of the African Research and Studies Program, Boston University; and Professor I. I. Potekhin, Director of the African Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Two others on whom I have depended a great deal are Mrs Audrey Martin, of the Oxford University Institute of Commonwealth Studies, a perfect librarian, and Elizabeth Hodgkin, a perfect daughter, who was responsible for compiling most of the material used in the Appendix.

Since I have drawn rather heavily on a limited range of sources – including a number of unpublished papers – I have avoided cluttering up the text with footnotes. Instead I have followed the fairly normal practice of giving a numbered list of all the main sources used at the end of the book, and citing these sources simply by their numbers in the text. Though this has meant not giving page references, it will not, I hope, cause serious problems for those who wish to go back to the sources and consult the works that I have used.

I hope too that the general reader and the student, for whom this book is intended, will not be bothered by the various combinations of letters which have come to stand as party labels. I have tried always to mention a party by its full name when it first occurs in the text, while normally using the accepted abbreviations on later occasions – but I have not been entirely consistent over this. In any case the reader who is stuck over a party label will find an alphabetical index to the Appendix, in which all these abbreviations are listed, together with the full names of the parties to which they refer, and the territories in which these parties operate.

T. L. H.

**MAP OF AFRICA**



## *Chapter 1*

# INTRODUCTION

FOR some time I have thought it would be worth while to write a short account of African political parties: not in order to say anything new, but simply to pull together what is already known and what can reasonably be conjectured. By now there is a good deal of material dealing with this subject – in the form both of party documents of various kinds, and of studies of particular parties and territories. But much of it is hard to come by. And there has been little attempt so far to look at the evidence in a connected or systematic way.

The familiar Argument from Unripe Time might, of course, be urged against attempting anything of this kind at the moment. Admittedly the data are fragmentary: African parties and inter-party relations are in a fluid state, there are as yet few biographies or autobiographies of party leaders; detailed field studies of party organization in a given area have only recently begun to be undertaken; there is no agreed method of inquiry, no accepted formula regarding the questions to be asked. None the less, I hope that this attempt to summarize the present state of our knowledge may save students a certain amount of time and trouble, and suggest possible lines of investigation to those who wish to explore the subject more thoroughly.

This is then simply an introductory essay on African parties. It is intended especially for the use of Africans, whose interest in these parties is practical as well as academic. My main source of information and ideas has naturally been the Africans who have built, managed, and participated in these parties at various levels. My hope is that this effort to pull together the threads of political history from many different territories will seem to them to be justified, and will in a small way contribute to the growth of communications and the breaking down of barriers between the various African peoples.

The term 'African political parties' also needs some explanation.

First, I am concerned only with parties whose leaders, members, and supporters are predominantly Africans; not with the predominantly or exclusively European parties which are to be found in southern Africa, Kenya, or Algeria. Second, I have taken most account of those territories in Africa north of the Equator in which fully-fledged, as contrasted with infant or embryo, parties have emerged: Morocco, Tunisia, the States of former French West and Equatorial Africa, Togo, Cameroons, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. But I have tried to pay some attention also to territories – such as Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, and the Belgian Congo – in which organizations of a party type became established during the late 1950s. On the other hand, I have made little reference to southern Africa – including the Union of South Africa, the Central African Federation, Angola, and Moçambique – where the institutional framework has been such that African national movements, in so far as they have enjoyed any legal form of existence, have taken the form of ‘congresses’ rather than parties. There remains a final category, of territories in which parties have existed in the past but are, at the time of writing, prohibited: Libya, the United Arab Republic, and the Republic of the Sudan. Their parties are historically important, especially in the Sudan. Third, this study is limited in time as well as in space. Contemporary African political parties are, in almost all cases, products of the period since the Second World War – though one or two, like the Tunisian Neo-Destour, can trace a continuous history back to the 1930s. Hence relatively little will be said here about the forerunner organizations, the nationalist pressure-groups and proto-parties of the ‘colonial epoch’, from the late nineteenth century until about 1945.

Whether it is reasonable to try to paint with such a broad brush and on such a large canvas may well be disputed. Even those who admit the value of this comparative approach to the political institutions of Africa south of the Sahara may question the usefulness of including North Africa, with its predominantly Arab culture, in such a general survey. This is not the place to discuss the ties – religious, cultural, commercial, and political – which have linked North Africa with the Sudanic belt of Africa south of the Sahara during the past millennium, though these seem to me in themselves

a good reason for avoiding the customary dichotomy. More immediately relevant is the resemblance, from the point of view of structure, objectives, and ideologies, between the political parties which have developed in the territories north and south of the Sahara during the recent period of decolonization. Of course the diversities are also very important. The various African States in which parties have emerged differ widely from one another in their histories, ethnic composition, types of economic and social system, dominant religious beliefs, and the like. In some cases, Nigeria for example, they also contain within themselves a rich variety of peoples and cultures. Any attempt at a general discussion of African parties needs constantly to take these diversities into account.

The fact remains that, over a large region – from Morocco to Nyasaland, from Senegal to Somalia – with a population of well over 100 million, political parties have become an integral part of the political system, for the time being at least. They have developed their specific types of institutions, rituals, and symbolism – their branches and congresses, membership cards and subscriptions, flags and slogans, demonstrations and rallies. In most of this region it is the parties which provide the main mechanism for the selection of political leaders – ministers, members of legislatures, local councillors. Those who play an active part in the management of these parties, the *militants*, whether they express themselves in English, French, or Arabic, Bambara, Hausa, or Somali, speak and understand, in a political sense, a common language.

There is nothing to be gained by attempting a precise definition of the term 'party' at this stage. Part of the purpose of an essay of this kind is to try to clarify what one means by 'parties' in the contemporary African context. It is, however, possible to draw some rough and ready distinctions between parties and other types of political or semi-political organization, such as clubs, committees, 'movements', revolutionary fronts, *mafias*. In general, one might say, political parties possess some discernible structure, basic units of some kind linked, however loosely, with a central directorate; they advocate certain policies and make public from time to time some form of party programme; they are interested in using the mechanisms of representative institutions to

achieve political power, or at least an extension of their political influence; and to this end they compete with other parties (where these exist) and appeal to an electorate for allegiance and votes. But even such a loose working definition raises various problems which must be discussed. For the moment it is probably most convenient to consider as 'parties' all political organizations which regard themselves as parties and which are generally so regarded.

One special difficulty which occurs in the study of African political parties arises from the sheer rapidity of social and political change. This is perhaps the reality which lies behind all the mythology about Africans being 'transported from the Dark Ages into the twentieth century'. There is, of course, no reason why African history should in the least resemble European history. But it is true that, superficially at any rate, there appears to be taking place in many African territories a kind of telescoping of phases which those who are most at home with European, and more particularly British, history tend to think of as distinct. Societies in which relations based upon kinship, tribal sentiment, and chiefly power seem sometimes as strong as in the Highlands of Scotland before the Union may at the same time generate a national consciousness and loyalties as compelling as in Ireland before the Easter Rising. They may throw up popular agrarian movements that remind us of the Rebecca Movement in early nineteenth-century Wales, and contain a nascent proletariat whose protests against the established social order take the kind of militant forms that were familiar in Chartist England. In these same societies the introduction of universal suffrage may have brought into being what we are accustomed to regard as an essentially twentieth-century phenomenon, the mass electorate, and with it the political leader whose power in part depends upon the use of modern techniques of propaganda.

Hence the types of social context within which contemporary African political parties operate are highly complex. We have to be careful not to expect them to behave in at all the kind of ways in which contemporary Western European or North American parties behave. We have to seek to understand them as they are, avoiding any rigid application of categories and schemata derived from a study of Western political history and institutions. And we have to recognize that, given the tempo of political change, state-

ments made now, even if they give a reasonably correct account of the present state of affairs, may cease to be relevant in a few years', or a few months', time. At best they may continue to have a certain historical interest.

Important developments have indeed taken place since the writing of this book was substantially completed in mid-1960: the post-Independence struggle for power in the Congo; the emergence from their former obscurity of organized national movements in the Portuguese territories, associated in Angola with a major revolt against the colonial regime; the appearance of independent Somalia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and a pleiad of formally independent French-speaking states; the rapid advance towards independence of the states of former British East Africa; a strengthening of the trend towards one-party systems in independent states; and new alignments in inter-state relationships, associated in part with the conferences at Brazzaville, Casablanca, and Monrovia. If I were to set out to write this book again, I would certainly want to write it somewhat differently taking account of these and other new facts. But in essentials the argument remains, I hope, valid.

The purpose of this essay then is to ask, and try to give provisional answers to, certain basic questions about African political parties. First, in what circumstances have these parties emerged? What forces in modern African society have especially influenced their growth? Second, how have particular parties originated? Third, what broad distinctions can be drawn between various types of African party? Fourth, what can be learned about the organization, structure, and leadership of parties? Fifth, what activities do parties undertake, and what techniques do they employ? Sixth, what objectives do the various parties pursue? By what ideas are they mainly influenced? The book ends with some tentative hypotheses about parties and party relationships in modern Africa. In addition, in order to avoid overloading the text with a quantity of detailed factual material, I have included an appendix containing brief notes about the main political parties operating in the various African territories during the period 1945 to 1960.

## Chapter 2

### THE SETTING

#### THE IMPACT OF PRE-COLONIAL SOCIETY

It might seem unnecessary to begin by emphasizing that African political parties have their roots in the African past. In the case of European and American political parties, the need to understand the historical context within which they have evolved is taken for granted. This should be equally clear in the African case but for 'the myth that the African had no history or culture in pre-colonial times, as well as the belief that his culture could not – indeed ought not to – survive the disintegrative effects of the slave-trade, modernity, and colonialism'.<sup>85</sup>

Naturally, the structure, programmes, and ideologies of African parties have been much influenced by Western models. But they have also to be understood in their relations with pre-colonial political systems. The Parti Démocratique de Guinée, for example, derives part of its effectiveness from the fact that it stresses its connections with Samory Touré's empire, just as the Union Soudanaise in Mali (formerly Soudan Français) looks back to the empire of Hajj 'Umar al-Tāl.<sup>21</sup> The links between pre-colonial state and modern party operate at the level of both organizations and ideas. 'The descendants of Samory's *sofa*, or warriors, took the initiative in the forest villages in the formation of the PDG.'<sup>22</sup> Sékou Touré, the party leader, derives part of his prestige from the fact that he is a grandson of Samory. The anti-colonial, reforming, egalitarian ideas that influenced Samory's system have been given a new interpretation by the party in a new historical context. Unfortunately this process, whereby African parties have adapted pre-colonial ideas and institutions to meet modern needs, has so far been little investigated. It can, I would suggest, be looked at in the following ways.

First, in societies of a highly stratified type, where a broadly feudal type of structure has survived with relatively little modification through the colonial period, political parties have tended at

the outset to reproduce the traditional pattern of authority – working alliances of the fief-holders, supported by their clients and vassals. The Union Progressiste Mauritanienne in Mauretania and the Northern People's Congress in the Northern Region of Nigeria are good examples of this type; though in both cases, particular in that of NPC, the part played by the 'new men', educated commoners, limits the extent to which the party can be used simply to further the interests and maintain the power of the old ruling class.

In both cases the massive support which the party has hitherto obtained in elections based on a wide franchise is evidently connected with the successful use which it has made of the traditional relationships between ruling and subject castes, nobility and serfs, patrons and clients, for electoral purposes. Parties of this type, reflecting the traditional social structure, and mainly led by representatives of a pre-colonial aristocracy, are sometimes referred to as 'chiefs' parties': this is convenient, provided it is remembered that, since the meaning of the term 'chief' varies from society to society, 'chiefs' parties' may be of various types.

Second, parties of a quite different kind have developed as a consequence of what is sometimes called a 'tribal renaissance'. But the term 'tribe' is not really appropriate to describe the comprehensive and internally differentiated communities among which such movements have conspicuously taken place: the Yoruba, the Ibo, the Ashanti, the Ewe, the Bakongo, the Kikuyu. They can perhaps most simply be described as 'peoples',<sup>106</sup> having certain common ties of culture, including language, social institutions, and history. Some of them have been united in the past within a single political system (e.g. the Yoruba under the Oyo Empire), while others, like the Ibo or the Ewe, have enjoyed looser forms of political association. Professor Balandier has analysed this renaissance, or *regroupement* – the effort to reconstruct the pre-colonial community as a reaction to the disintegrating effects of colonial rule – among the Fang of Gabon, and among the Bakongo, divided between French Moyen-Congo, the Belgian Congo, and Portuguese Angola.<sup>10</sup> (In the case of such peoples as the Bakongo and the Ewe, colonial partition has clearly been one of the main disintegrating factors stimulating the movement for reintegration.)

Balandier describes how the popular movement for the reconstruction of Fang society, organized through the Alar Ayog, provided an impetus to the formation of two major Gabon parties – the Comité Mixte Gabonais and the Union Démocratique et Sociale Gabonaise. Similarly, the effectiveness of the Abbé Fulbert Youlou's party, the Union Démocratique de Défense des Intérêts Africains, in Moyen-Congo after 1956 was partly a consequence of the shifting of Bakongo messianic hopes, and the organization built up around them, from the plane of prophet movements to that of party politics.<sup>76</sup> The Action Group, the dominant party in the Western Region of Nigeria, although it has tried, with some success, to overcome its original ethnic limitations, was constructed around the nucleus of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, which was founded 'to unite the various clans and tribes in Yorubaland and generally create and actively foster the idea of a single nationalism throughout Yorubaland'.<sup>18</sup> In what were formerly the British and French Trust Territories of Togoland, the parties seeking Togoland unification, the Togoland Congress, the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, and JUVENTO, the youth organization formerly associated with CUT, were partly products of the vigorous Ewe renaissance which has taken place since the Second World War.<sup>86</sup> Such parties, while they derive much of their dynamic from the sense of unity which membership of a common pre-colonial culture generates, and often (as in the case of the Action Group) secure the support of representatives of the pre-colonial ruling classes, are generally led by 'modernists' and members of the intelligentsia.

Finally, it is clear that parties which are in no sense 'chiefs' parties' or 'tribal parties', but build their organizations on a territorial or superterritorial basis, appeal to, and seek to attract, groups which have their roots in pre-colonial society. The two major parties of the Sudan provided a particularly clear example of this type of relationship. The 'Umma Party had its links with the Ansar – in its origins a revolutionary Muslim organization of the 'helpers', or supporters, of the Mahdi which during the period of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium acquired the characteristics of a religious order, directed by the late Sayyid 'Abd al-rahmān al-Mahdi, the Mahdi's posthumous son. On the other hand, the

Ashiqqa Party and until 1956 its successor, the National Unionist Party, were closely associated with the Khatmiyya, a well-organized and powerful Muslim order introduced into the Sudan early in the nineteenth century, whose present political head is Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani.<sup>40</sup> And the opposition between the 'Umma and the Ashiqqa-NUP, over the period 1945-56, in part reflected the much older conflict between Anṣar and Khatmiyya.

Similar links between Muslim religious orders and political parties can be found elsewhere, for example, in Senegal. The strength of the Convention People's Party in Ghana also depended partly upon its successful appeal to the 'young-men', or commoners, whose semi-military organization, the Asafo companies, had tended to lapse during the colonial period, and who had lost their traditional right of representation within the Ashanti system when the restored Ashanti Confederacy Council abolished the office of Nkwankwaahene in 1935.<sup>8</sup>

#### THE COLONIAL SITUATION

African parties are essentially products of a 'colonial situation' – in the sense of a situation in which an indigenous society is politically, economically, and culturally subordinate to a dominant European group.<sup>10</sup> Parties have largely been built up around this issue: they have sought in one way or another to transform or modify this relationship of subordination and dominance between Africans and Europeans. So long as the colonial situation continues it is difficult for any African party, however conservative, to take up a position of unquestioning collaboration with the European authorities. At the same time, it is difficult for any party, if it wishes to remain legal, to press its opposition to the colonial relationship to a point which would involve the total and immediate withdrawal of the colonial power from all positions of dominance, military and economic, as well as political. Thus the slogan which the CPP successfully put into circulation in 1949-50, 'Self Government Now', expressed an attitude of mind rather than a programme of action.

In practice African parties have operated between these two poles, revolutionary and conformist – between the demand for the

total elimination of the colonial power, and the complete acceptance of the *status quo*, subject only to such modifications as the Administration is willing to approve. Examples of parties which have passed through a revolutionary or near-revolutionary phase have been the CPP in Ghana during 1949 and 1950; the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons in southern Nigeria from 1945 to 1947; the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain in French West Africa from 1947 to 1950; the UPC in the French Cameroons in the period before and after its suppression in 1955; and Istiqlal in Morocco and Neo-Destour in Tunisia, especially in 1954-5, the period immediately preceding independence. Parties of a predominantly conformist type have been the NPC in the Northern Region of Nigeria in the years immediately following 1951, and what were known as *partis de l'administration* in former French Africa – for example, UPM in Mauretania, the Bloc Africain de Guinée in Guinea, and in Togo the Parti Togolais de Progrès and the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo.\*

Up to a point the 'colonial situation' is liable to promote one-party dominance. So long as the ending of the status of subordination appears as the main political issue, there is a tendency for a single party to emerge – CPP, RDA, Istiqlal, Neo-Destour – which enjoys mass support and symbolizes national aspirations. In this situation the leadership of the mass party is seen as the nucleus of a future national government, the only practical alternative to the existing colonial government, enjoying popular loyalty of a kind that is denied the colonial government. Hence other parties find it difficult to escape the charge that, by their mere existence, they are weakening national unity and postponing liberation. The more repressive the policy pursued by the colonial power, the stronger the pressures on the indigenous population to sink internal differences and establish some form of united national party or 'front' – until finally, in a situation of actual revolution, to remain outside the 'national front' may come to be regarded as a kind of treason (as illustrated by the attitude of the Front de Libération Nationale to the Mouvement National Algérien in Algeria). But even where tensions are less sharp, as in French West Africa during 1956-8,

\* See pp. 59-60, below.

opposition to the multiplicity of parties, and the effort to achieve a *parti unique* or *parti unifié*, as a means to more effective bargaining with the colonial power, may become a dominant theme.\*

At the same time the 'colonial situation' may actually stimulate the multiplication of parties. A colonial Administration may find it convenient to encourage the formation and growth of 'opposition' parties, based upon a communal, or religious, or chiefly interest. Moreover, as the 'colonial situation' becomes modified, and the prospect of a transfer of power to some form of African government grows imminent, or even begins to take place, particular minority communities and interests, anxious to safeguard their own future autonomy and strengthen their future bargaining position, are moved to create their own parties in opposition to what they often regard as the 'totalitarian' or 'dictatorial' tendencies of the dominant party. Examples of such sectional parties have been the Liberal Party in the southern Sudan; the National Liberation Movement, the Moslem Association Party, and the Northern People's Party in Ghana; and the various minor parties which have developed around the demand for the creation of new Regions in Nigeria.<sup>63</sup> It might indeed be argued that, once the unifying force which opposition to colonial rule generates has exhausted itself, the multiplication of parties is a logical outcome of the idea of self-determination which underlies all colonial nationalism. Once the principle of self-government is recognized, a number of ethnic 'selves' are liable to advance their claims.

#### THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS

Before modern political parties can operate effectively, an adequate system of communications must be established. In the case of archaic or aristocratic parties, this is less necessary, since the strength of the party is measured in much the same way as the strength of a medieval army, by the number of voters which the 'barons' and their principal vassals can lead into the polling stations. But mass parties depend for their effectiveness on regular contact between the central, regional, and local leadership. Policy directives have to come down from the central committee

\* See pp. 57-9, below.

to the branches with reasonable rapidity; branches have to submit their resolutions to the centre; electoral campaigns have to be organized; party leaders and officials have periodically to visit the branches, to address meetings, raise funds, and explain party policy; at intervals national conferences have to be held, attended by delegates drawn from centres which may be a thousand miles or more distant. While, as will be seen, even in the mass parties the actual mechanism of communications varies widely, the influence of the leadership is bound to depend upon maintaining relations of confidence with the lower levels of the party hierarchy; and this implies the mobility which modern methods of transport make possible. The railway, the motor-car, the lorry, the propaganda van, the bicycle, and (for at least the national leadership) the aeroplane are indispensable tools of African mass parties: postal, telegraph, and telephone services are hardly less essential.<sup>31</sup>

One must avoid the tendency to exaggerate the deficiencies of communications in pre-colonial African societies. They were adequate for the purposes for which they were designed. Indeed, there is a good deal of evidence suggesting that communications between the various corporate bodies and persons involved in the process of decision-making in the old kingdom of Oyo, or the Ashanti confederacy, or the Fulani Empire, were remarkably well developed. But it remains true that one basic characteristic of the setting within which African parties have been organized has been the availability of a mechanized system of communications. The substitution of a road network for forest paths, automobiles for horses and camels, and postmen for runners, has broken down the relative isolation of the pre-colonial village, and made possible a new kind of mobility. There is clearly some correlation between the level of development of physical communications in territories such as Mali, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, southern Nigeria, the northern Sudan, Tunisia, and Morocco and the level of organization of political parties; while in regions such as northern Nigeria, Chad, or the southern Sudan, in which communications are still rudimentary, mass parties have been faced with special difficulties in extending their organization beyond the main towns. The Northern Elements' Progressive Union in northern Nigeria is a case in point. There seems also evidence that parties tend,

naturally, to develop along the major routes; for example, the main strength of the UPC in the French Cameroons, at the time of its suppression in 1955, appeared to lie along the Cameroons railway.

#### THE DECLINE OF CHIEFLY POWER AND THE RISE OF NEW ÉLITES

One factor contributing to the growth of African parties has been the weakening of the authority of 'chiefs' and the appearance of a leadership of a new type. But who are the 'chiefs'? The term is, admittedly, a loose one; but three broad types stand out. There are the hereditary kings of pre-colonial States – whether Muslim, like the Fulani Sarkis in northern Nigeria, or pagan, like the Kabaka of Buganda or the Bami of Ruanda and Urundi – where the dynasty enjoyed a considerable measure of centralized power. There are the elected rulers – like the Yoruba Obas in western Nigeria, or the Akan chiefs in Ghana – operating within a constitutional framework which, in pre-colonial times, provided a variety of checks and balances, and in some cases procedures for the removal as well as the selection of rulers. And there are chiefs who may be – or have been – little more than appointees of the colonial government, with a status lacking roots in the pre-colonial system, like the former 'Warrant Chiefs' in eastern Nigeria, the *chefs de canton* in most of the former French West Africa, or the 'official headmen' in Kenya.

That chiefly power – in these and in other intermediate senses – is on the wane in contemporary Africa is not in dispute, though there are naturally large variations in the rate of decline. 'Although ... their position differs in many respects from that of a landed aristocracy in Europe, it is equally vulnerable to the forces of modern economic development.... Leadership ... must remain in the hands of people who can organize their following over wider areas than those to which the chiefs are confined by the nature of their position.'<sup>101</sup> The position of chiefs is vulnerable also, in many territories, on account of their tendency to collaborate with the colonial administration. But what is important for our purposes is that the new leadership, deriving its power primarily from its status within the party, and the strength of the party within the State, can

hardly establish itself until it has made progress towards displacing the older 'chiefly' leadership – whether this derives its authority from its status within the pre-colonial or colonial system, or from some combination of the two. Until this stage has been reached the emergent party leadership is liable to find itself described by the colonial regime in the terms applied by Sir Hugh Clifford, a former Governor of Nigeria, to the leaders of the National Congress of British West Africa in 1920:

... a self-selected and self-appointed congregation of educated African gentlemen ... whose eyes are fixed, not upon African native history or tradition or policy, nor upon their own tribal obligations and the duties to their Natural Rulers which immemorial custom should impose upon them, but upon political theories evolved by Europeans....<sup>15</sup>

Nothing, however, is simple in politics. Various forms of accommodation and cooperation for limited purposes are possible between the old élite – the chiefs, or kings, and the hierarchies associated with them – and the new élite from which the leaders of modern nationalist parties are drawn. Even where chiefly authority is in decline, it remains true that 'every hereditary ruler is the supreme symbol of the unity of his people, and therefore, also, of their opposition to outsiders ... an attack on him ... is an offence against national sentiment which cannot be tolerated....'<sup>16</sup> Hence, where a hereditary ruler is attacked by a colonial administration, it is normal that the nationalist leadership should move in to support the throne, appealing to popular indignation against this violation of the sanctity of kingship. Thus Istiqlal strongly supported Sidi Muḥammad ben Yusuf, Sultan of Morocco, and the Uganda National Congress supported Mutesa II, Kabaka of Buganda, when each was deposed in 1953. Even in the absence of a major precipitant of this kind, a recognition of common national or regional interests may promote more or less stable alliances between the old élite and the new: for example, the alliance between the Yoruba bourgeois and the Yoruba Obas (with the latter in a subordinate role) around which the Nigerian Action Group was originally built;<sup>17</sup> or the merger in Haute-Volta in 1956 between the nationalist RDA (under the local title of Parti Démocratique Voltaïque), with its main strength among the Bobo, and the

traditionalist Parti Social d'Éducation des Masses Africaines, to form the Parti Démocratique Unifié, with the Mogho Naba, hereditary ruler of the ancient Moshi kingdom, as its honorary president.<sup>88</sup> Even the centralizing CPP in Ghana, which regards chiefs in general as vestiges of 'feudalism', has found it expedient to make alliances with certain chiefs, as in favouring Brong traditionalists against Ashanti.<sup>73</sup>

But these variations in the pattern should not obscure the basic fact that the assumptions on which kingship or chiefly rule is founded – whether the ruler be hereditary or elected, absolute or constitutional, Animist, Muslim, or Christian – are in conflict with the assumptions on which party government is founded. The authority of the chief depends primarily upon his status within the traditional order, his capacity to perform ritual functions; the authority of the party leader depends upon his achievements within the modern order, his capacity to realize desired political change.

Who, on the other hand, are the 'new élite'? From what sections of the community are they drawn? I think they can reasonably be described as belonging to 'the middle class', though certain problems are raised by the use of this term in the African context.<sup>25, 94</sup> Clearly there is some correlation between the rapid development during the post-war period of associations of a modern type, including political parties, and other familiar processes of social change – economic expansion, the growth of towns, the spread of Western education; and, as a consequence, the emergence of new social groups, ranging from professionals, administrators, and the larger entrepreneurs, through minor civil servants, teachers, clerks, traders, and contractors, to the wage-earning class.<sup>24, 114</sup>

Certainly the territories where some of the most effective parties have been organized – Senegal, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, southern Nigeria, the southern Cameroons, and under somewhat different conditions the States of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) – are also territories where the pre-colonial economic and social order has undergone a radical transformation, and a fair-sized Western-educated élite has established itself. True, one must be able to account for the retarded development of parties in an economically dynamic society, like the Belgian Congo, and their exuberant growth in a relatively static

society, like Somalia; but the almost total lack of opportunities for higher education and of essential civil liberties in the former Belgian Congo – as contrasted with the existence of these pre-conditions for the rise of parties in Somalia – provides a partial explanation.

Part of the difficulty in deciding whether the new social groups from which the leadership of African parties is mainly drawn should be described as a 'middle class' arises from doubts about the meaning of the term in the African context. Membership of the middle class may be thought of in various ways, as related to (a) educational level – those who have reached a given stage of formal education, say the post-primary;<sup>27</sup> (b) occupation – those holding posts which carry recognized social status and prestige, e.g. doctors, lawyers, teachers, clergy, civil servants; (c) economic function – those who operate as entrepreneurs, substantial traders, transport owners, capitalist farmers and the like; (d) living standards and social habits – those who exhibit certain external signs of belonging to the middle class, e.g., living in a European-style house, 'equipped with a variety of manufactured articles'.<sup>28</sup>

Obviously there is some overlapping between these various categories. But if an attempt is made to combine the criteria, it must be admitted that the African middle class possesses great internal diversity – including wealthy lawyers from Dakar or Lagos with near-proletarian Native Authority clerks, and university professors with Hausa traders who may once have attended a Koranic school. Moreover, there is ample evidence to show how important ties of kinship remain for those who – on the basis of educational, occupational, economic, or social-habit criteria – would clearly be classified as middle-class. The graduate civil servant may have illiterate uncles and cousins on the compound. In most situations extended-family solidarity remains a powerful force checking the development of a sense of class solidarity. One major function of tribal unions, in their multiplicity of forms, has been to express 'the persistent feeling of loyalty and obligation to the kinship group and the town or village where the lineage was localized', and to provide institutions through which the new tendencies towards economic and social differentiation could be counteracted.<sup>29</sup> Hence African writers in particular have often stressed the need to

avoid applying Western class categories uncritically to the study of African politics. Many would agree with Assane Seck's generalization: 'the class-struggle shows itself, not in the relationships between [the African middle] class and the African mass, but in the relationships between the whole body of Africans and Europeans'.<sup>25</sup>

One way of trying to give clearer definition to this 'African middle class', from which those who have achieved, or are attempting to achieve, political power through the mechanism of parties are mainly drawn, is by considering the actual membership of elected assemblies. For example, the Gold Coast (Ghana) House of Assembly, immediately after the 1954 election, included among its 104 members the following: 30 school-teachers; 18 clerks, commercial workers, accountants, retired civil servants, etc.; 18 members of the liberal professions (lawyers, academics, clergy, journalists, etc.); 18 entrepreneurs, i.e. merchants, contractors, petty traders, etc.; 7 'professional politicians'; 4 farmers; and 3 chiefs. Among these, 14 were university-educated, 28 were certificated teachers, 16 had obtained the 'Senior Cambridge' certificate or its equivalent, 10 had had some form of post-primary education, and 31 had received only primary education.<sup>109</sup>

The data for the occupations of the Legislative Assembly members in the eight territories of the former French West Africa, immediately after the 1957 elections, tell a somewhat similar story.<sup>114</sup> Twenty-two per cent of the total were teachers, rising to as high a proportion as thirty-three per cent in Senegal and Dahomey. Twenty-seven per cent were *fonctionnaires*, i.e. government officials of various kinds (a consequence of the French system which, unlike the British, permits civil servants to become members of Legislative Assemblies). Twenty per cent were members of the liberal professions (fifteen per cent doctors, *vétérinaires*, and pharmacists, and five per cent lawyers and magistrates). Fourteen per cent were drawn from commerce and industry – whether as entrepreneurs or employees – with the highest proportion, twenty-one per cent, in the Ivory Coast. Three per cent were farmers, rising to eleven per cent in the Ivory Coast. Seven per cent were 'chiefs', rising to ten per cent in Niger, eleven per cent in Haute-Volta and twenty-five per cent in Mauretania. One per cent

were trade unionists, which leaves a balance of six per cent drawn from miscellaneous occupations. These figures reflect some of the differences in the level of economic, educational, and political development of the territories concerned. Only in the Ivory Coast – economically the most advanced of the eight territories – did the commercial and agricultural bourgeoisie provide as many as one-third of the assemblymen. The percentage of teachers was naturally highest in the two territories – Senegal and Dahomey – where the educational system was furthest developed. The representation of 'chiefs' was substantial only in Mauretania, Haute-Volta, and Niger, where the new middle class had not yet succeeded in neutralizing the authority of the pre-colonial ruling class, reinforced by the support of the French Administration.

Complete figures for the educational background of members of these Assemblies are not, unfortunately, available. Data for the period 1952–7 indicate that, except in Senegal, the proportion of university-educated assemblymen was extremely small – far smaller than in Ghana. In most territories there was a substantial body of members who had received a secondary education, the great majority of whom were in fact graduates of the *École Normale William Ponty* at Dakar – much the most important of the French West African schools in the period before the Second World War, and the main educational source of the élite that initially organized and led the post-war parties.<sup>38</sup> But at least half of the assemblymen, and in some territories much more than half, had not received more than an upper primary education.

The conclusion which these data suggest is that the leadership of modern African parties – in so far as it can be identified with the party representatives in elected assemblies – is drawn from certain fairly well defined social groups: teachers; administrative, clerical, and commercial workers (including, in the former French territories, civil servants, mainly those employed in the intermediate and lower grades); members of the liberal professions; entrepreneurs, including capitalist farmers; professional politicians and trade union leaders. A minority of these are university-educated, and there is a sizeable layer of the secondary-educated, including, of course, those who have been through teacher-training colleges. But a large and important section of this élite has not passed beyond

the primary school stage: the 'Standard VII boys', or their equivalent, who have played a major part in the organization and management of mass parties like the CPP and RDA.

While the actual composition of the middle class naturally varies a great deal from territory to territory, in its broad outlines it can be distinguished from the imported European oligarchy and the representatives of the pre-colonial ruling class on the one hand, and the mass of peasants and the emergent wage-labouring class on the other. Thus, looked at from one point of view, the rise of parties has tended to be associated with the displacement of the old chiefly élite – for whom the British system of indirect rule provided, on the whole, security of tenure and emoluments – by this new intellectual-professional-commercial-administrative élite.

#### THE GROWTH OF A POPULAR PRESS

For African parties to be created it was not only necessary that new social groups, lacking access to political power, should come into being: but also that these groups should become conscious of themselves, of their lack, and of the possibility of altering existing power-relationships on lines favourable to themselves. It was here that the contribution of African-controlled popular newspapers was of special importance.<sup>29</sup> There is point in emphasizing the word 'popular'. In what was formerly British West Africa, African newspapers have at least a hundred years of history behind them. In Ghana the *West African Herald*, edited by Charles Bannerman, started publication in 1858.<sup>28</sup> In Nigeria the basic ideas of modern nationalism were developed by John Payne Jackson, from 1891 on, in his journal, the *Lagos Weekly Record*.<sup>15</sup> James Brew during the 1870s and 1880s, and J. E. Casely Hayford a generation later, worked along similar lines in Ghana through a succession of newspapers. But this was essentially, like the press of nineteenth-century Britain on which it was modelled, written for and limited in its circulation to a small intelligentsia in a few, mainly coastal towns. Inevitably so, since in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was only this restricted literate public to whom newspapers could appeal. As in nineteenth-century Britain, the situation has

been transformed – in varying degrees in different territories – by the development of primary education.

The number of children attending primary schools in Ghana rose from about 15,000 in 1902 to about 50,000 in 1924 and 65,000 in 1935; then, more steeply, to 185,000 in 1945, 301,000 in 1951, and 456,000 in 1957. In Nigeria the number increased from about 150,000 in the mid-1920s to about 1,100,000 in the early 1950s. By the mid-1930s the literate population of Ghana and southern Nigeria had increased to a point at which the new techniques of popular journalism, which Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe introduced from the U.S.A. and perfected in West Africa could be successful. From the beginning of 1935 until 1937, when he was convicted of sedition for an article appearing in his paper, Dr Azikiwe edited the *Accra African Morning Post*. Thereafter he returned to Nigeria, and in 1938 founded the *West African Pilot*, building up around it a chain of provincial daily newspapers, based on Ibadan, Onitsha, Port Harcourt, and Kano. Dr Azikiwe's genius lay – as James Coleman has pointed out – in combining business efficiency as a newspaper proprietor with 'the sensationalism and pugnacity of American yellow journalism ... and ... the race-consciousness of American Negro newspapers'.<sup>15</sup>

There is evidence of the development of a popular anti-colonial Press in other African territories during the 1930s. In French West Africa the obstacles were much greater than in the adjacent British territories, notably the lower literacy rate, stricter censorship, and the pre-war requirement that journals should be directed by French citizens. None the less in the Ivory Coast the first effectively African newspaper, *L'Eclaireur de la Côte d'Ivoire*, appeared in 1935, of which Amon D'Aby says:

This journal had an immense success in African circles. It led a campaign against senior Chiefs and against the Police; it demanded measures of social reconstruction; it urged the cause of the unemployed and of African farmers who had been hit by the economic crisis.<sup>7</sup>

In the Maghreb, where political conditions were in some respects more favourable, popular French-language newspapers were established in the early 1930s. *L'Action Tunisienne* was launched by Habib Bourguiba and a group of his friends in the Destour movement in November 1932;<sup>20</sup> and in Morocco, *L'Action du*

*Peuple*, edited by Muḥammad Ḥasan el-Ouezzani, first appeared in August 1933.<sup>37</sup> (At a later stage, the popular press of the Maghreb moved over to the national language, Arabic.)

This popular press, and the new journalism associated with it, contributed to the rise of parties in a variety of ways. First, it helped forward the process which Dr Azikiwe has called 'mental emancipation' – the process whereby a subject people, which has hitherto been exposed to colonial symbols and categories of explanation, through the schools, the courts, Government pronouncements, contacts with the Administration, etc., has its attention redirected towards an alternative set of nationalist symbols and categories. This process, while it mainly affects the literate minority, certainly penetrates also to the illiterate mass, since it has been estimated that, for every one literate who reads a nationalist newspaper, as many as ten illiterates may have its contents read or retailed to them. Second, the African press – like the radical press of Chartist England – made it its function to fasten on the specific grievances of particular sections of the community and localities – farmers, clerks, teachers, ex-servicemen, unemployed, market-women, railway workers, miners, secondary school pupils – and, by relating these grievances to a reasonably coherent body of anti-colonial doctrine, to stimulate the kind of political awareness that leads to action.

Third, nationalist newspapers have frequently provided a point of departure for the launching of a new political movement, or indeed an actual party. A group which has had experience of collaboration over a period in the production of a newspaper, criticizing colonial policies and challenging colonial authority, is liable to develop a common standpoint and build up a popular following, so that it becomes a relatively simple matter at a later stage to shift the focus of activity from agitation to organization. Thus the editorial committee of *L'Action du Peuple* contained the nucleus of the leadership of Morocco's first political party, the Comité d'Action Marocaine – established, after the suppression of the newspaper, in 1934.<sup>37</sup> In the same year the continued criticism of the older leadership of the Destour by Bourguiba and the group associated with *L'Action Tunisienne* contributed to the split out of which the Neo-Destour was born.<sup>20</sup> In a somewhat similar way

Dr Azikiwe's *West African Pilot* prepared the ground for the NCNC – in which, from its establishment in 1944, Dr Azikiwe was the moving spirit.<sup>15</sup>

In more recent history newspapers have sometimes provided a platform which an emerging radical – or relatively radical – leadership has used to expound its own standpoint, discredit an older, more conservative leadership, and create a favourable climate for the launching of a new party. Thus, in 1948–9, Léopold Senghor's *Condition Humaine* in Senegal, and Kwame Nkrumah's *Accra Evening News* in Ghana – the one emphasizing 'African Socialism' and the other 'Self Government Now' – became organs of the rebels against the Establishment, and served as rallying-points around which the BDS and CPP were eventually constructed.<sup>38, 55</sup>

#### REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS AND THE FRANCHISE

On the whole I agree with Dr James Coleman that:

The really decisive factor – the precipitant – in the formation of political parties has been constitutional reform providing for (1) the devolution by the imperial government of a sufficiently *meaningful* and *attractive* measure of power to induce or to provoke nationalist leaders to convert their movements into political parties, and (2) the introduction or refinement of institutions and procedures, such as an electoral system, which would make it technically possible for parties to seek power constitutionally.<sup>83</sup>

This generalization certainly seems to apply to the parties of what was formerly British West Africa, of Afrique Noire, the Sudan, Somalia and, within limits, Uganda and Tanganyika. The absence until 1959 of Dr Coleman's two pre-conditions is surely the main reason why only embryonic parties emerged in the former Belgian Congo: why nationalist demands were expressed until recently through 'congresses' rather than parties in the Central African Federation: and why only underground political organizations have come into being in the Portuguese territories.

Another obvious point should, however, be added: that the right to organize national parties seeking political power by constitutional means must be admitted. Where, as in Algeria since the end of 1954, this right is lacking, there may be representative

institutions, an electoral system, and even (as in Algeria) universal suffrage, while legal or political conditions – or both – make the organization of African parties impossible. Another type of precipitant which needs to be taken into account is the existence of a critical issue, or issues, of the kind that provokes widespread national feeling and resentment: e.g., the Government's campaign for the cutting out of cocoa trees affected by swollen shoot in the Gold Coast, the *Dahir Berbère* in Morocco, the scheme for Central African Federation in Nyasaland. Hence it has been suggested that the relative weakness of Uganda parties has been connected with an absence of big issues – apart from the exile of the Kabaka in 1953, itself a Buganda issue rather than a national one.<sup>100</sup>

In the case, however, of two major mass parties which we have to consider – Istiqlal in Morocco and Neo-Destour in Tunisia – the two pre-conditions to which Dr Coleman refers seem scarcely to have been present. Both parties developed under conditions of semi-legality, semi-clandestinity. And, though both made use of such limited representative institutions as existed, and sought power by constitutional means where these were available, they belong to a special category, having come a good deal closer, during the colonial period, to a revolutionary model than most of the parties in Africa south of the Sahara. In their case the precipitant of constitutional reform played only a minor part, at least until the actual phase of the transfer of power in 1954–5; and by that time Istiqlal had ten, and Neo-Destour twenty, years of history behind them.

In those African territories south of the Sahara, on the other hand, in which parties have established themselves since the Second World War, there has clearly been a two-way relationship between this process and the development of representative institutions, evolving towards some form of parliamentary and cabinet system. Constitutional reform – especially the use of elections as a mechanism for the selection of rulers, and the progressive widening of the franchise – has stimulated the growth of parties, while the new parties have pressed for further instalments of reform and for the logical working out of the principles of parliamentary democracy. Here it is worth asking how the parties have been affected by the new political framework.<sup>32</sup>

First – and most obvious – the need to contest, and if possible win, elections has been a factor stimulating parties to build up an effective machine through which to appeal to the new mass electorates. This has been all the more necessary, given the frequency of elections in many territories, e.g. in former French Africa, where parliamentary, territorial, and eventually local council elections – not to mention occasional referenda – occurred at short intervals, putting heavy demands upon party organizations. How the different parties have dealt with this problem of organization at the constituency level – and, below that, at the village or ward level – naturally varies. Some, like the Action Group in western Nigeria, tend to work through the chiefs – the Obas – and local men of property; some, like the NCNC in eastern Nigeria, make special use of tribal unions; some, like the National Unionist Party in the Sudan before 1956, have intimate links with a religious order that possesses its own local network; some, like the CPP in Ghana, the PDG in Guinea, or the Union Soudanaise in Soudan, rely primarily upon their own tried *militants*. But in this matter African parties, like parties anywhere else in the world, are to some degree opportunist. Even a mass party with an essentially modern outlook, like the CPP, RDA, or Somali Youth League, will make local use of traditional authority, or religious allegiance, or the ties of clanship, where this seems expedient.<sup>72, 98</sup>

Second, elections have involved the parties in educational, as well as propagandist, functions. 'Elections made it the task of the educated Africans who ran for office to explain the vote, the choice which the vote implied, and the concept of representation.'<sup>98</sup> Parties have had to try to ensure that their supporters and possible supporters are registered as electors; that on election day they know how to reach the polling-station, which may in rural areas be several miles from their homes; that they can be identified by the returning officer; and that they are acquainted with the party symbol, since the system of voting for symbols has come into general use.<sup>32</sup> Hence parties have tended to build up meanings and associations around the particular symbols which they have adopted: 'Vote for the elephant [the RDA symbol]; he is wise and he never forgets'; 'Vote for the camel [the symbol of the Union Démocratique Nigérienne], and you will be as free as he.'<sup>98</sup> At

election times parties – like the government information services – include among their activities what is in effect a form of mass education.

Third, the need to appeal to a mass electorate, interested in the problems that immediately affect them, has obliged parties of all types – from the most radical to the most traditionalist – to concern themselves in some degree with local issues. This may mean water-supplies, roads, schools, clinics, or even telephones; it may also mean local disputes, including chieftaincy disputes. Dr Peter Lloyd has emphasized this point in regard to elections in the Western Region of Nigeria during the period 1951–4:

The individual sees ... his elected M.P. as a man de legated to get as much for his town as possible – if he fails here he will be rejected however important his contribution to the whole region has been.... Where wards in Ijebu Remo Division were contested, the division appears to have been along the lines of a recent dispute over the succession to the throne of the Oba. In Shagamu the NCNC was led by a son of the late Oba who had recently unsuccessfully claimed the throne, but who was highly popular.<sup>29</sup>

Another aspect of the same process has been the way in which parties have been obliged to take account of local interests; to attach to themselves as many as possible of the influential local 'connexions' – dynastic (or anti-dynastic), ethnic, religious, commercial, trade union, etc.<sup>32</sup> This has meant as a rule a certain strengthening of the constituency party, and the local interests upon which it is based, as against the party headquarters, the professional politicians, the capital.

Fourth, there is no doubt that one effect of the introduction of electoral systems has been not merely to stimulate the growth of parties, but also to give them a new legitimacy. It is interesting how in territory after territory – the Belgian Congo was one of the more recent examples – a colonial Government has expressed the view that the granting of the right to vote need not, or should not, involve the development of party politics or party government; yet elections have in fact been contested on a party basis, and often have established the dominance of a particular party. Even where, as in the elections for the Nigerian Regional Houses of Assembly in 1951, party organizations were in many areas relatively weak – or, in the North, non-existent – there has been a clear

tendency for the dominant party to attract to itself after the elections non-party men who owed their success to personal achievements or family connexions. The system of voting for symbols – while it does not exclude the independent candidate – gives the party a definite status: the voter may often vote for the party symbol rather than the candidate. And, as the revolt of the 'Independent CPP' candidates in the 1954 elections in Ghana showed, the question which candidate is authorized by party headquarters to use the party symbol may be an issue of the first importance.

Finally, as Dr Ruth Schachter pointed out in relation to French West Africa, 'elections synchronized political development among territories where political pressure was unequal. For example ... Mauretania, Niger, and some parts of Haute-Volta could have been, and in some respects were, ruled in the old paternal way for another few years after 1945.'<sup>38</sup> The same could be said of most of northern Nigeria. Thus, whereas in territories like Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, or southern Nigeria elections stimulated mass movements to transform themselves into political parties – and tended to check the growth of semi-clandestine revolutionary organizations, like the Zikist movement in Nigeria – in most of the northern belt, from Mauretania to Chad, the initial effect of elections was to 'encourage the formation of small electoral groups, aiming at little else than filling the relatively lucrative new offices'.<sup>38</sup> In such territories parties grew by contagion rather than spontaneous generation.

#### EXTERNAL STIMULI

There is probably a tendency for outside observers to overstress the importance of external influences – whether Western European, American, Soviet Communist, or Asian – upon the organization and ideas of African parties. None the less these influences have to be understood as one aspect of the total setting within which parties have emerged.

During the period before the Second World War the contacts between the nascent African political movements and the outside world were relatively restricted – partly on account of the restrictions on movement imposed by the colonial regimes; partly

because in most territories nationalist ideas had not yet penetrated beyond the circle of a small intellectual élite. This is less true of the Maghreb, which from the end of the nineteenth century had been exposed to the influence of the Salafiyya, the reformist movement within Islam having its origins in Egypt and deriving its main inspiration from the teachings of Sheikh Muḥammad 'Abduh.<sup>27</sup> The dominant idea of the Salafiyya, the defence of Islam, implied the development of the critical powers of individual Muslims, the struggle for national self-determination, and, as means to these ends, the construction of 'modern organizations', including political parties; it thus provided an intellectual basis for the Moroccan national movement, expressed initially through the Comité d'Action Marocaine.<sup>43</sup> Another important formative influence in the Maghreb was the Lebanese intellectual, Shakiḥ Arslān (himself a former pupil of Sheikh Muḥammad 'Abduh), who, from 1921 on, made his home in Geneva the centre of a private system of Pan-Arab and Pan-Maghreb communications.<sup>27</sup>

Africa south of the Sahara was little affected at this period by these currents of thought from the Arab-Muslim world – apart from the continuing intellectual stimulus which the Sudan received from Egypt, and which contributed to the formation of the Sudan General Graduates Congress in 1937.<sup>34</sup> Afrique Noire was fairly effectively sealed against the intrusion of nationalist or reformist ideas from the East. Only the 'Four Communes' of Senegal (in practice reduced to three – Dakar, St Louis, and Rufisque), whose inhabitants enjoyed the privileges of French citizens, provided a channel of communication with the outside world, and primarily with France.<sup>110</sup> Helped by his contacts with French Socialists, M<sup>e</sup> Lamine Gueye was able to establish a Senegalese Socialist Party in the late 1920s – the germ from which later developed the Senegalese *fédération* of the French SFIO, founded in 1936, in the early days of the Popular Front government in France. This period of the Popular Front was significant for the later development of French African political parties for two reasons: it stimulated moves towards organization, particularly in the trade union field, in other territories besides Senegal; and it made possible, for the first time, the appointment of a certain number of Socialists, and even Communists, to official positions in French Africa, especially

as teachers.<sup>38</sup> It was in this way that the new French African élite learned to adapt a theoretical framework derived from Jaurès or Lenin to their own demands and problems.

The British – or former British – African territories, especially West Africa, have an old tradition of connexions with reforming or radical organizations in Britain – the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, for example. From such bodies African politicians who visited London could acquire a grasp of the techniques of pressure-group activity. But at the level of basic ideas the sources of inspiration lay elsewhere – among organizations of non-Europeans resident in Britain, like the League of Coloured Peoples (before 1931, the Union of African Peoples), and above all wasu, the West African Students Union, founded in 1925 by Ladipo Solanke, a Nigerian barrister. For successive generations of West African students wasu (and, after 1937, its house in Camden Square) provided a valuable forum in which the weaknesses of 'indirect rule' could be debated, the great international issues of the day viewed in a West African setting, and friendly relations established with leaders of the British Labour Party. Through it members could achieve 'a sense of the worthwhileness of taking part in an historical movement which is seeking to change the world'.<sup>40</sup>

But of all the formative influences perhaps the most important at this stage of history was that of the American – and included within that, the West Indian – Negro world. Two tendencies which came into sharp conflict with one another in the United States during the early 1920s – the militant, plebeian 'Black Zionism' of the Garvey movement, and W.E.B. Du Bois's 'Pan-African' idea, with its much more limited appeal among Negro intellectuals – combined to shape the thinking of the generation of African nationalist leaders who studied in American universities between the two wars.<sup>41</sup> Dr Nkrumah, writing in his autobiography of his American period, says that, of all the literature that he studied, 'the book that did more than any other to fire my enthusiasm was *Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey* published in 1923'.<sup>42</sup> The Pan-African idea germinated slowly, expressed initially through the succession of congresses which Du Bois organized: at Paris in 1919 (designed to influence the Peace Conference

in its attitude to African problems), London in 1921, Lisbon in 1923, and New York in 1927.<sup>35, 17</sup> Though at this stage, as Du Bois admitted, the idea was still 'American rather than African', the notion of inter-African cooperation as the pre-condition of African independence began to be more widely diffused – particularly through the little informal group of militant Pan-Africanists around the West Indian, George Padmore. Associated with this group was Jomo Kenyatta, the Kenya nationalist leader, later President of the KAU, who, like George Padmore, visited the U.S.S.R. in the early 1930s, though like him rejecting the rigid formulae of international Communism.

The period of the Second World War and the early post-war years was one in which these channels of communication between Africa and the outside world were deepened, multiplied, and diversified. The general question of the ways in which war-time developments stimulated the rise of African nationalism has been sufficiently discussed elsewhere.<sup>61, 15</sup> Here it is only necessary to mention the particular external stimuli which influenced the growth of parties.

Unquestionably one such stimulus was the return of African ex-servicemen from the various theatres of war – often to unemployment, or at least a lowered standard of life in their villages. The part played by ex-servicemen in the promotion of nationalist organizations, especially in the French territories, is a topic which deserves fuller investigation for earlier periods also: e.g., the case of André Matswa, who served in the *Infanterie Coloniale* in the First World War and the Rif War against Abd el-Krim, and who founded in 1926 the *Société Amicale des Originaires de l'A.E.F.*<sup>10</sup> Both world wars disseminated ideas of self-determination, and assisted African leaders in relating their specific demands to an international frame of reference. What was especially significant about the Second World War was the scale of African involvement. More than 100,000 Nigerians, for example, served in the forces, of whom more than 30,000 had experience in the Middle East, East Africa, Burma, and India, where they came into contact with other nationalisms and resistance movements.<sup>15</sup> The mutiny of an African battalion of the Belgian *Force Publique* at Luluabourg in the Congo in February 1944, the clash between the Ex-Service-

men's Union and the police at the Christiansborg crossroads in Accra in February 1948, the occupation of Umuahia in eastern Nigeria by the Unemployed Ex-Servicemen's Union in 1951, were all expressions of a new revolutionary attitude. 'It is therefore not surprising to find ex-servicemen among the more militant leaders of the nationalist movement during the post-war period.'<sup>15</sup>

There was also a marked increase in the political activities – and, after 1945, in the sheer numbers – of African students in European and American universities. Thus, side by side with the returned ex-servicemen, the returning students supplied another new élite from which the leadership of the post-war parties could be drawn. In London, WASU tended increasingly to function as a political pressure group, organizing a Parliamentary Committee which met M.P.s twice a month, cooperating with the Fabian Colonial Bureau, and submitting in 1942 a memorandum to the Colonial Office which urged the British Government 'in view of the lessons of Malaya and Burma ... to grant to the British West African Colonies and Protectorates Internal Self-Government Now, with a definite guarantee of complete self-government within five years after the war'.<sup>16</sup>

Dr Nkrumah, who became Vice-President of WASU, has given a lively personal history of the ferment of activities in which, while nominally a student at the London School of Economics, he took part during 1945–7: the Fifth Pan-African Congress, held at Manchester in October 1945; the publication of the journals, *The New African* and *Pan-Africa*; the first contacts with the French African deputies in Paris; and the launching of the West African National Secretariat and the Coloured Workers' Association of Great Britain.<sup>17</sup>

Comparable developments took place among the relatively small body of African students in the U.S.A. – estimated at twenty-eight during the war period. In 1941 they organized the African Students' Association of the United States and Canada; published a monthly journal, *African Interpreter*; held conferences and symposia to educate American opinion; published books; and went on lecture tours. James Coleman has stressed the importance of Dr Azikiwe's influence in steering this generation of politically minded young West Africans towards the U.S.A., and particularly

to Lincoln, his own University – among them future leaders of the NCNC and CPP, including, of course, Nkrumah.<sup>15</sup> In the early post-war years the flow, dammed during the war, increased tremendously; there were 175 Nigerian students in the U.S.A. in 1946–8, as compared with twelve during 1938–45. Though the two environments – American and British – were clearly stimuli of quite different kinds, both provided valuable training in the use of the political techniques of organization, diplomacy, agitation, and journalism.

This was also a period when new types of connexion came to be established between the African élites and the outside world. Hitherto few had had the opportunity to explore beyond the limits of Western Europe and North America, or to question the assumptions of parliamentary or presidential democracy. During the later war and early post-war years, communications between the Communist and non-Communist worlds became, for a time, more open. One consequence of this development was the increased influence of Marxist modes of thought, and increased interest in Communist methods of organization, among the new generation of African nationalists – illustrated by Kwame Nkrumah's pamphlet, *Towards Colonial Freedom*, written in the U.S.A. but published in London.<sup>54</sup>

It was naturally in French Africa that the contacts between the African élite and Communist intellectuals and politicians were closest – where the part played by French Communists in the Resistance gained African respect, and where 'Communists won the trust of Africans by behaving in ways that Africans had never seen Europeans behave; they were personal friends and comrades, rather than superiors'.<sup>58</sup> At the same time the French Communist Party's participation in the tripartite Government from 1945 to 1947 gave the ideas and representatives of Communism equal respectability, and equal opportunity of access to French Africa, with those of Social Democracy and Christianity reformism. The main agency through which these ideas were diffused was the Groupes d'Études Communistes, which had been established by the end of 1943 in Dakar, Abidjan, Conakry, and Bamako, and existed for a short time in Bobo-Dioulasso.<sup>58</sup> It was through these GECs that many of the post-war leaders of the mass parties of

French Africa, above all the RDA, received their initial political education. While in very few cases did they produce actual Communists, as Dr Ruth Schachter has pointed out, they influenced African parties in various ways:

The GECs left an imprint on African terminology. By teaching the duties of the vanguard of the revolution, the Communists deepened the sense of mission to lead the masses which many educated Africans already had. By familiarizing Africans with developments elsewhere, through press, missions, courses, discussions, conferences, and opportunities for travel, the Communists increased African awareness of international events. By teaching about Communist forms of organization and political action, [they] influenced the structural forms of the African parties, especially the RDA. By ... urging identical policies, [they] hastened the process of consolidation ... of the geographically scattered modern African associations.<sup>38</sup>

Finally, through service abroad, through the proliferation of post-war international conferences of trade unions, students, youth, etc., in which African delegations took part, through the beginnings of a new movement of African students to the universities of Egypt and India, a section of the African élite received a new stimulus from the Middle East and Asia, from Gandhism and Muslim reformism.

### Chapter 3

## THE ORIGINS OF PARTIES

THE question – In what conditions did African political parties emerge? – leads on to a further question about origins: How did the various parties come into being? Origins influence contemporary structure, especially in the case of parties that are in few cases more than fifteen years old. Moreover, to belong to a given party means for an African *militant* to belong to a party which came into being – or is believed to have come into being – in a particular way. The Bamako Conference of October 1946, which gave birth to the RDA, the meeting held, on the initiative of the Nigerian Union of Students, at the Glover Memorial Hall, Lagos, on 26 August 1944, which led to the setting up of the NCNC, these historic events have significance for party members – more, probably, than the 1899 resolution of the Trades Union Congress, which led to the establishment of the Labour Representation Committee, has for the average active member of the British Labour Party. But the mere fact that party origins are felt to be important is a reason why they have already tended to become semi-legendary.

In some cases one is dependent upon oral tradition, without even – as in the States of pre-colonial Africa – an official chronicler whose function it is to record and transmit the tradition. However, for certain parties there is a reasonable body of evidence in the writings of the actual founders, or of political historians who have gone to the sources, or both. For Istiqlal there is R. Rézette's study;<sup>37</sup> for RDA there is a good deal of official party literature,<sup>122, 123</sup> and the 1952 Houphouët-Boigny D'Arboussier controversy, which probed origins;<sup>124</sup> both RDA and BDS in Senegal have been studied in detail by Dr Ruth Schachter;<sup>38</sup> Dr Kwame Nkrumah has given his first-hand account of the origins of the CPP;<sup>55</sup> Nigerian party origins have been examined by Dr James Coleman<sup>15</sup> and Dr Azikiwe has described the events leading up to the birth of the NCNC.<sup>47</sup> For other parties and territories the evidence is less adequate.

All these, indeed most, African parties have an extra-parliamentary origin: that is to say, they have been constructed out of pre-existing associations and groups as instruments to achieve political power (or, in the case of minor parties, to 'influence ... the personnel and policy of government').<sup>72</sup> While, except in the case of the Moroccan and Tunisian parties, they have in general made use of electoral and parliamentary processes, for them – as for other extra-parliamentary parties – the electoral and parliamentary struggle has been 'only one of the elements in the general activity of the party, one of the means, among others, that it uses to realize its political ends'.<sup>1</sup>

It is true that, as M. Duverger points out, this distinction between parties which originate within and those which originate outside the parliamentary framework is not rigorous. Some African parties – particularly those which have been created in regions where there was little in the way of a pre-existing national movement, like the former NPP in northern Ghana or the NPC in northern Nigeria – have initially had some of the characteristics of 'clubs' of assemblymen, and have later taken the step of setting up branches which in practice have been little more than local electoral committees. Even the Nigerian Action Group – a clear case of a party with extra-parliamentary roots – included among its supporters in the Western Region House of Assembly after the first (1951) elections 'a large group of almost non-political members interested only in the welfare of their own towns', who had to be welded into a parliamentary party and instructed in party discipline by the leaders.<sup>99</sup> None the less, the general point remains valid: to understand African political parties it is necessary to understand the pre-party forms of organization from which, in most cases, they arose.

There is by now quite a substantial literature dealing with African associations – one might say 'modern' associations, were it not that the term suggests an unsound distinction between 'modern' and 'traditional' aspects of African social life. What is labelled 'modern' – a trade union, for example – has always some roots in tradition; and what is 'traditional' – such as a Muslim religious order, a *tariqa* – is always partly modernized. The associations which have mainly contributed to the rise of parties are

'modern' simply in the sense that they have specialized functions, that membership is voluntary, and that their leaders, however traditionalist they may be in outlook, are drawn for the most part from the new élites. Some examples of these party-generating types of association have already been mentioned: ex-service-men's associations, which in Europe have tended to foster parties of the extreme Right, but in Africa have assisted the formation of radical mass parties; students' organizations; old boys' societies and groupings; sports associations; tribal unions and 'improvement associations'; and religious bodies and movements, like the Salafiyya in Morocco, or the Matswanist Church in the Republic of the Congo.

There are other types of organization that have had a formative influence. The trade union impact has been important in some territories, particularly in Guinea, where during 1954 a group of young trade union leaders around Sékou Touré transformed the PDG-RDA into an effective mass party.<sup>38</sup> A farmers' union, the Syndicat Agricole Africain, provided the nucleus around which PDCI-RDA in the Ivory Coast was organized in 1946.<sup>38, 7</sup> Youth associations and movements have also played a part, for example in Ghana, where the CPP grew out of the Committee on Youth Organizations.<sup>55</sup> Literary societies, study circles, and research groups have been another source of stimulus: the special relationship between the Groupes d'Études Communistes and the RDA in some French African territories is a case in point;<sup>38</sup> and in a somewhat similar way Dr Azikiwe's Nigerian Reconstruction Group of 1942-3 helped to prepare the ground for the NCNC.<sup>15</sup>

The proliferation of associations of these and other types during the inter-war period and after assisted the growth of parties in three main ways. First, 'many of the leaders of these associations, which were primarily non-political in origin, became leaders of formal nationalist organizations. Thus the associations were training grounds for the new nationalist élite.'<sup>16</sup> Second, the associations provided new focuses of loyalty – not necessarily national in character, but certainly wider than those of kinship or village – and thus 'enabled nationalist leaders to mobilize and manipulate important segments of the population'.<sup>16</sup> Third, to a varying extent in different territories, associations have formed the basic

blocks of popular support out of which the mass parties have initially been constructed. This is clear, for example, in the case of the original organization of BDS in Senegal in 1948. Here the party's founders, Léopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia, 'drew into the party's direct or indirect hierarchy' the leaders of ethnic and regional associations, such as the Union Générale des Originaires de la Vallée du Fleuve, the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance, and the Association des Toucouleurs du Fouta Toro pour la Défense de la Condition Humaine.<sup>38</sup>

Likewise in the towns the party was built around popular groupings, frequently drawn from sections of the population regarded as socially inferior, on account of their caste, occupation, or 'stranger' origin: for example, the Section des Bijoutiers de Dakar; the Comité des Jeunes Griots de la Guêlle Tapée; the Section BDS des Chauffeurs de Taxis à Dakar; or the Union pour la Défense des Intérêts du Quartier de Guet-n-Dar et des Pêcheurs, 'who founded their organization because they had no market for their salted fish, no stable prices; because they felt forgotten, their streets were ugly and unlit, their water supply was short'.<sup>38</sup> Most of the mass parties could tell a similar story.

It is possible to attempt a rough classification of African parties on the basis of the various ways in which they have been brought into being. These distinctions must not be regarded too schematically, since the origins of every party are complex: no party conforms neatly to a single type, and in the origins of some parties one can find traces of two or more types.

#### ADAPTATION OF PRE-EXISTING ASSOCIATIONS

In some cases a party seems to have come into being through the simple process of taking some already existing association and attaching to it a party label and party functions, without any significant changes – initially, at any rate – in structure, leadership, or ideology. One clear illustration of this process is the Northern People's Congress in Nigeria. The Congress (in Hausa, Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa) was founded in December 1949, as a pan-northern cultural organization of predominantly conservative Malams, interested in securing cautious reforms imposed from above

by benevolent autocrats, and at the same time in stimulating a sense of northern identity. The Congress later became moribund; but 'in the middle of the general elections of 1951 ... it was revived and declared a political party by an alliance hastily formed by conservative nationalists and the Filanin gida [the traditional ruling class within the former Fulani Empire], in order to meet the threat posed by the remarkable victories of the radical NEPU in the Kano elections'.<sup>15</sup> Since then the NPC has developed more of the structure of a political party; but it still bears the marks of its origin. In somewhat the same way the Sierra Leone People's Party developed out of the Sierra Leone Organization Society, whose main concern was the promotion of agricultural cooperation.<sup>32, 75</sup>

The Nigerian Action Group is a rather more complicated case. There was certainly a parental type of relationship between the Yoruba cultural association, Egbe Omo Oduduwa, effectively founded in 1948 on Obafemi Awolowo's return to Nigeria from England, and the Action Group, publicly inaugurated as a political party under Awolowo's leadership in March 1951. Indeed, the Action Group seems to have had a period of embryonic, pre-natal existence as the Action Committee of Egbe Omo Oduduwa. It is true that other influences entered into the prehistory of the Action Group, in particular the Western Regional organization of the Nigerian Youth Movement, and its newspaper, the *Daily Service*; and, from the first, its founders and leaders took pains to prevent it from appearing to be a purely Yoruba ethnic party. None the less there was a strong family resemblance, as regards leadership, basis of support, and political philosophy, between the Egbe and the Action Group in its initial phase.<sup>32, 15, 47</sup>

This tendency for a formally non-political type of association to transform itself into a political party seems most marked in the case of associations, like the two Nigerian examples cited, with a definite ethnic or regional basis. ABAKO in the former Belgian Congo evolved in a somewhat similar way. Originally founded in 1949 as 'Association of the Bakongo people for the Unification, Conservation, and Propagation of the Kikongo Language', it politicized itself about the time of its 1956 manifesto,<sup>126</sup> and acquired some of the characteristics of a party, with its main strength in Leopoldville and the surrounding region; its appeal is still limited

in practice to the Bakongo.<sup>87</sup> In other cases a party, without strictly arising out of an association, may at an early stage in its history form the kind of working alliance with an association that helps to determine its structure and behaviour. I have already referred to the way in which the Ashiqqa party in the Sudan and its successor, the NUP, were allied with the Khatmiyya order during the period 1945-6, with the result that the *zawāya* (cells) of the order tended to take on the functions of branches of the party.\* Indeed it was sometimes difficult to tell where the religious organization left off and the political organization began.

Parties which in this way have emerged out of, or become structurally linked with, pre-existing ethnic, regional, or religious associations start with the advantage that they can command, for electoral purposes, a readily mobilizable body of popular support. Thus it was partly the solid support of the Khatmiyya that enabled the NUP to win the 1953 election in the Sudan; partly the backing of Obas associated with the Egbe Omo Oduduwa that enabled the Action Group to win the Western Regional elections in Nigeria in 1951. But with this goes the corresponding disadvantage, that the party is liable to be attacked as 'sectarian', 'tribalist', or 'feudal', by those who oppose the interests on which it is based.

#### EVOLUTION OUT OF 'CONGRESSES'

At this point it will be as well to try to clear up a question of terminology. The terms 'national movement', 'congress', 'party', 'front', are liable to be confusing, since they are used in different senses by different people. Most African politicians and outside observers are, I think, in broad agreement about the distinctions to be drawn, but they do not always use the same language to describe the phenomena which they distinguish. Lengthy linguistic discussions are tedious, so I propose simply to explain the senses in which these four terms are used here.

The term 'national movement' is used for the most part in a very general sense – to refer to the effort of a colonized people, in the course of its history, to liberate itself from colonial rule in all its aspects.<sup>24</sup> A 'national movement' in this sense can exist without

\* See pp. 20-1, above.

any determinate type of organization. It is, so to speak, the raw material which can take on a wide variety of institutional forms, including 'congresses', 'parties', and 'fronts'.

By a 'congress' I mean a political organization of a specific type, whose principal characteristics are (a) a broad nationalist objective, the elimination of the existing colonial system; (b) looseness of structure – taking the form, often, of local and functional associations, grouped around a central junta which has entire control over policy; (c) emphasis on the idea of representing 'all the people', the national will made articulate; (d) an aggressive strategy, associated with the lack of constitutional mechanisms for the realization of the nationalist objective. This is the kind of organization to which Dr Coleman and others apply the term 'national movement';<sup>83, 84</sup> and the term 'movement' is sometimes used in this secondary, more specialized sense here.

The problem of defining a 'political party' in the African context has already been discussed. In contrast with 'congresses' the significant characteristics of 'parties' would seem to be (a) elaboration of objectives, in the form of an actual programme, and frequently also definition of ideology;\* (b) a formally democratic structure, usually based upon local branches and individual membership;† (c) willingness to compete periodically with other parties (where, and so long as, these exist) in periodic elections, with a view to controlling the government; (d) greater flexibility of strategy, consequent upon the possibility, or fact, of exercising political power.

A revolutionary 'front' is a form of organization which is only brought into being in a revolutionary situation (e.g. the FLN in contemporary Algeria). Like a 'congress', a 'front' attempts to unite within itself all existing political organizations and tendencies, and seeks to bring about a total transformation of the political and social order, by extra-constitutional rather than electoral means.‡ On the other hand a 'front' resembles a political party, more particularly a mass party, in respect of the tightness of its structure (based upon cells rather than branches), the strictness of its discipline, and the definition of its objectives.

\* See Ch. 7, below.

† See pp. 69–70 and 82–8, below.

‡ See pp. 125–33, below.

Of course, in practice these distinctions are by no means clear-cut. There are 'congresses' which are in process of becoming 'parties', 'parties' which have retained some of the characteristics of 'congresses' or acquired some of the characteristics of revolutionary 'fronts'. What matters is simply that real differences should be noted.

The process whereby a party evolves out of an already existing 'congress' – with or without the kind of rebirth which involves the adoption of a new name – is thus partly a matter of acquiring a new and more effective type of structure, with a basis in local party branches, or *cellules*, composed of individual members who contribute, or are intended to contribute, to party funds. This is a process which is likely in practice to be gradual, even where a definite date can be assigned to the transformation. It may occur as a result of various kinds of stimulus: the need to participate in elections; the challenge of rival, competing parties, movements or standpoints; experience of the disintegrating tendencies of the congress form of organization; or any combination of these. This, broadly, was the origin of the Neo-Destour in Tunisia: formally established at the Ksar Hellal Congress in 1934, but essentially a development out of the much older Destour movement – the movement, that is, which grew up around the demand for the restoration of a constitutional form of government (*dastūr* = constitution) – and, more particularly, out of the *ḥizb al-ḥurr al-dastūrī*, founded in 1920.<sup>27</sup> Similarly Istiqlal in Morocco was essentially a reconstruction – stimulated by the events of 1942–3, the Allied landings in North Africa, and the conversations between President Roosevelt and the Sultan – of the more loosely organized pre-war movements, the Comité d'Action Marocaine (1934–7) and the Parti National pour la Réalisation du Plan de Réformes (1937–9). R. Rézette has emphasized both the continuity and the structural difference: 'Until 1939 this party [i.e. CAM-PN-Istiqlal] modelled itself on the social structure of Morocco, rather than seeking to impose upon it institutions of a new type. From 1944 on it objectified itself; it became an independent reality, a genuine political party.'<sup>28</sup>

In Afrique Noire the RDA, initially described as the Rassemblement Africain, was certainly originally planned by the French

African deputies and their associates who summoned the Bamako Conference, in September 1946, as an inter-territorial 'movement' for African emancipation. In their manifesto the deputies proclaimed the formation of a 'united front', including 'all the peoples, all the races, all the political parties, all the workers' organizations, all the cultural and religious movements of Afrique Noire'.<sup>123</sup> The immediate stimulus which produced this call for an African *rassemblement* was the revival of 'reaction' in France, in particular the new initiative of the French *colons*' lobby, operating through the Etats Généraux de la Colonisation Française in Paris, and the political defeats which the African deputies had suffered on a number of issues in the second Constituent Assembly.<sup>38</sup> After Bamako, while it still described and regarded itself as a 'movement', the RDA fairly rapidly started to organize itself as a party: partly on account of the break with Senghor and the Socialists; partly because of the influence of organization-minded Communists and *communisants*, closely associated with it; and partly because administrative pressure on the one hand and electoral requirements on the other both made the construction of a disciplined party essential.

A somewhat similar process of evolution, from 'movement' into party, can be traced in the case of the NCNC in Nigeria – though in this case the 'movement' or 'congress' phase was much more prolonged, lasting approximately from its foundation in 1944 until 1948. The reconstitution of NCNC as a party, after a period of hibernation, was especially associated with the decision, at its 1951 Kano conference, to move over from an affiliated-organization to an individual-member basis.<sup>15</sup> Here again the new electoral opportunities and problems presented by the liberalized Macpherson constitution of 1951 were an obvious precipitant.

#### SPLITS IN CONGRESSES AND PARTIES

New parties are also generated as a result of fission within a parent organization. In some cases major parties have originated in this way – when, for example, a more 'dynamic' and 'progressive' nucleus has revolted against a more conservative and traditionalist leadership, and seceded. The revolt of Mehdi ben Barka's

wing of Istiqlal against the official leadership, associated particularly with 'Alāl al-Fāsi, in 1959, which led to the formation of the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, is a recent case in point.<sup>79</sup> Two earlier examples of parties so formed are the CPP in Ghana and BDS in Senegal – the former emerging out of a split within a 'congress', the United Gold Coast Convention, and the latter as a breakaway from the Senegalese section of the French Socialist Party (SFIO). There were certain parallels between these two cases. Both the new party leaders expressed the dissatisfaction of the younger generation of African politicians with the outlook and methods of the older generation. Both represented the demands of the underprivileged (former 'subjects' in Senegal, 'Standard VII boys' in Ghana) against the old élites, the intelligentsia, the Establishment. Both stressed the necessity for an effective mass organization, particularly in the rural areas, as against the older leadership's reliance on 'friends', clients, and kin. Both developed their own new types of party ideology, blending a modified Marxism with ideas of *Négritude* or Pan-Africanism.<sup>8, 88</sup>

The 'Umma in the former Anglo-Egyptian Sudan is another example of a major party which was established as a consequence of a split within a congress – but in totally different circumstances. The founders of the 'Umma broke away from the General Graduates' Congress in 1945, when the Congress passed into the control of Isma'il al-Azhari and the supporters of union with Egypt. They represented on the whole the more moderate faction, who were opposed to the Egyptian connexion, and prepared, within limits, to work for Sudanese self-government within the existing constitutional framework.<sup>84</sup>

The process of fragmentation, whereby dissident groups secede – or are expelled – from major parties, and forthwith set up their own minor parties, is a familiar one, in Africa as elsewhere. Thus the National Liberation Movement in Ghana, though it received the support of the Asantehene and a large proportion of Ashanti chiefs, was primarily the creation of a group of CPP *militants* who broke with the dominant party over a combination of specifically Ashanti grievances, with the lowering of the cocoa price as a precipitant.<sup>72</sup> The NCNC in Nigeria has shown a periodic tendency

towards fission: the National Independence Party (later UNIP) was set up in 1953 by a group of expelled NCNC Ministers; and the National Democratic Party of Nigeria and the Cameroons was organized by Dr M.K. Mbadiwe's Reform Committee in 1958, after its failure to change the party's constitution and policy from within. In Sierra Leone the United Progressive Party and the People's National Party arose out of splits within the dominant SLPP. In the Togoland Republic, 'JUVENTO was organized in 1951 by young men in the Lomé area who formerly belonged to the CUT but believed that the latter organization was not militant enough in working for unification and complete independence'.<sup>86</sup>

In cases of this kind a section of the leadership, and sometimes of the intermediate ranks, of the parent party is carried over into the new party. The mass support is much less easily transferred, if – as in the cases cited – the party leader and his mystique, the party machine, its name and reputation, remain with the parent party. The extent to which a major party is liable to this kind of fragmentation is, of course, connected with other questions discussed below: the effectiveness, or ineffectiveness, of party discipline; the degree to which the party has achieved a collective – as contrasted with a personal, or patriarchal – form of leadership; its success in reconciling divergent standpoints or *tendances* within the membership; and its ability, especially where it controls the government, to impose pressures or sanctions upon seceders.

The break-up of the RDA after the referendum of September 1958 deserves attention as a special case. For twelve years the RDA had been, on the whole, remarkably successful in checking tendencies towards fission, in spite of the vast area within which it operated, and the various internal tensions – ideological, regional and personal – which it had to reconcile. This was partly because it was organized as a confederation of parties rather than as a single centralized party. But the referendum, which confronted parties throughout French Africa with the choice of inclusion in, or exclusion from, a reconstituted French 'Community', brought these tensions into the open, splitting the RDA for a time into three: the Guinea section, PDG, which chose independence; the Union Soudanaise which joined the newly formed Parti de la Fédération Africaine, the dominant party in Mali; and the RDA

rump – the sections in the Ivory Coast, Haute-Volta, Niger, Dahomey, and Equatorial Africa – which kept the old name of the party, while losing much of the old dynamic.

#### REGROUPING OF PARTIES

The process of regrouping, or fusion, of existing parties is essentially the reverse of the process of fragmentation, described above. It is particularly liable to occur in the case of relatively weak opposition groups confronted with a dominant party which seems, for the time being, strongly entrenched. Thus in Ghana the Opposition has, since 1951, been organizationally fluid. The Ghana Congress Party was established in 1952 as a merger between the rump of the UGCC, the conservative National Democratic Party, and a group of CPP 'rebels'. The GCP, however, never succeeded in transforming itself into a mass party; after 1954 it became, for practical purposes, absorbed in the National Liberation Movement, which enjoyed a genuine mass basis in Ashanti. Then, in October 1957, partly as a consequence of new legislation introduced by the CPP Government making ethnic and regional parties illegal, the NLM Moslem Association Party, Northern People's Party, and Togoland Congress – which already had a working alliance for electoral purposes – combined with other smaller groupings to form the new United Party.

While it is a fairly common phenomenon for new parties to emerge out of a fusion between minor parties which find themselves in a situation of semi-permanent opposition, unions of this kind do not necessarily increase a party's power or stability. For example, the United Middle Belt Congress was created in 1955 as a result of a merger between two competing parties operating in the Middle Belt of northern Nigeria – the more conservative Middle Zone League and the more radical Middle Belt People's Party (whose principal demand was for a separate Middle Belt region). However, the same polar opposition soon reasserted itself within the UMBC, which 'broke into two factions, one headed by David Lot (founder of the MZL), which allied itself to the NPC, and the other headed by Moses Rwang (one of the founders of the MBPP), which remained allied with the NEPU and the NCNC'.<sup>15</sup>

Fusion is not merely a way in which minor parties attempt to compensate for weakness; it may also be a means whereby major parties seek to consolidate strength. Thus the National Unionist Party in the Sudan was the product of a merger between a major party, the Ashiqqa, and other minor parties and groups supporting the principle of a constitutional link with Egypt. In a somewhat similar way BDS in Senegal expanded, and reconstituted and renamed itself, after successive infusions of new elements, becoming the Bloc Populaire Sénégalais in 1956, after absorbing the left-wing Union Démocratique Sénégalaise, the regional Mouvement Autonome de la Casamance, and the Socialistes Unitaires (a breakaway from the SFIO); later, in 1958, transforming itself into the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise, after fusion with the remainder of the Socialists.

In a process of *regroupement* of this kind it is not simply a matter of a major party enlarging itself by swallowing smaller groups. The major party also changes qualitatively under the impact of the new groups. The *regroupement* in Senegal during the summer of 1956, which brought the reorganized BPS into being, took place partly on the initiative of the established BDS leadership – particularly Léopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia – but partly also as a result of the efforts of radical critics outside the party, ‘returned students, youth and trade union leaders, Muslim reformers, and UDS militants’, collectively known as *les jeunes turcs*. Moreover, ‘with each successive step towards the organization of a single Senegalese mass party’, the balance of party leadership moved further towards the *jeunes turcs*.<sup>38</sup> But here again the tendency towards fusion was counterbalanced by a tendency towards disintegration. The new situation created by the referendum of September 1958 stimulated the secession from the UPS of its radical wing – including the majority of the *jeunes turcs*, who wished to choose independence rather than the French Community, and later formed their own radical party, the PRA-Sénégal.

The process whereby a major party absorbs minor parties or political groups, as in Senegal during 1956–8, is a fairly normal one. Often it is the natural outcome of an existing electoral alliance. But the effort to achieve a unified party which will overcome all inter-party oppositions and rivalries clearly raises difficult problems.

Pressure for some form of 'united front' is liable to arise within and outside major parties, mainly in situations of crisis, which are seen as presenting special dangers or opportunities. In such situations the idea that 'the people's safety' comes before party interests has naturally a strong appeal. But, if the crisis is temporary, the pressure for political unity tends to be relaxed, and party interests to reassert themselves, once it has passed. Thus in Nigeria the United Front Committee, which was brought into being in 1947 over an issue of racial discrimination, and the National Emergency Committee, organized as an immediate reaction to the shooting of the Enugu miners in November 1949, disintegrated once the crises which had produced them had passed into history.<sup>15</sup>

The more ambitious movement for *regroupement* in French West Africa during 1957-8 - which sought an actual fusion of parties at the inter-territorial level, not merely a united front - though it achieved some temporary successes, also failed to realize its main objective. Here too the movement was stimulated by a situation of crisis: the fact that future constitutional relationships - between metropolitan France and Afrique Noire on the one hand, and between the various territories of Afrique Noire on the other - were in process of being determined. Hence the demand for *regroupement*, supported by important sections of opinion within each of the three major inter-territorial parties - RDA, the Convention Africaine, and the Mouvement Socialiste Africain - was in one sense a demand to strengthen the bargaining power of the peoples of French-speaking Africa in their relations with France during this critical phase. But, although the first inter-party conference, held at Paris in February 1958, resolved that 'only the unification of African parties would enable territories and people to overcome their internal contradictions', the second conference, at Dakar a month later, had to content itself with a limited measure of fusion - the creation of a Parti de Regroupement Africain, which failed to embrace the RDA.<sup>16</sup>

Superficially the failure of these conferences to achieve total fusion turned on a minor issue - the refusal of the RDA to modify its name, which had acquired important associations for the mass of its supporters. But in fact disputes over the party label merely

reflected the deeper problems which arise – in regard to leadership, structure, strategy, and ideas, as well as symbols – when unification is attempted on so comprehensive a scale. It is perhaps a revolutionary situation, such as occurred in Guinea immediately after independence, that is most favourable to the creation of a unified party comprehensive and powerful enough to absorb all former parties and political groupings.

#### EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

One final question: How far do the origins of African political parties lie outside the African societies within which they function? (This is distinct from the more general question, already discussed: How far have external influences helped to produce an environment favourable to the rise of parties?) In colonial territories there are various types of external agency to be taken into account – the Administration, immigrant communities, metropolitan political parties, Churches and religious organizations, and the like. While such agencies have undoubtedly on occasion fostered the growth of particular parties, the parties concerned have been, with few exceptions, of minor importance.

*Partis de l'administration* – in the sense of parties with a 'moderate' label, set up on the initiative of a colonial government to counteract the influence of nationalist parties – have been fairly common occurrences in French-controlled territories, both the Maghreb and Afrique Noire, during the period 1945–55. In the case of Morocco this point has been clearly put by R. Rézette (who, having served there as a French administrative officer, is in such matters a reliable source):

The Residency then conceived the idea of encouraging the birth of parties which could be rivals of Istiqlal – capable, like it, of working among the masses, but with a relatively conformist ideology, and willing to accept the principle of the Protectorate. Hence in about 1948 two 'moderate' parties were created: the Parti Démocrate Marocain des Hommes Libres, and the Parti Populaire Marocain. In spite of official support, these parties never had much influence in Moroccan circles – the personalities of the leaders chosen seeming not at all the kind to rally large sections of public opinion.<sup>37</sup>

Rézette goes on to describe how, in the first case, Sherif Moulay Idriss – an Andalusian singer, *marabout*, and miracle-worker – simply transformed the organization and clientele of his *tariqa*, the 'Aliya, into the organization and clientele of his party, the PDMHL – 'the great majority of whose members were primarily interested in obtaining some small material advantage, administrative sinecures, police toleration, or petty official favours'.

Parties of a comparable type were floated with the support of the Administration in those territories of Afrique Noire in which the RDA was dominant during the late 1940s, when it was the Administration's official policy to break the power of the RDA: for example, the Union Démocratique Tchadienne in Chad; the Bloc Démocratique Eburnéen, the Union des Indépendants de la Côte d'Ivoire, and the Entente des Indépendants de la Côte d'Ivoire, in the Ivory Coast.<sup>38</sup> Parties of this type have usually withered away or been absorbed by dominant mass parties, once decolonization has begun to take place, and administrative support has been withdrawn. In British colonial territories the Administration has at times given moral support to 'moderate' parties (e.g. the NPP in northern Ghana, NPC in the Northern Region of Nigeria), but has not actually created them.

During the recent post-war period the part played by members of local immigrant communities – European or Asian – in the creation of African political parties has been an altogether minor one. This is partly, of course, a measure of the increased political maturity and self-confidence of Africans, and their unwillingness to accept paternalist guidance from non-Africans, however well-intentioned. The situation was somewhat different during the inter-war period, when pre-party African pressure-groups were in some cases established and organized as a consequence of European initiative. For example, in Kenya Archdeacon Owen, an Anglican missionary, played a leading part in the founding of the Kavirondo Taxpayers' Welfare Association in 1923; and the Progressive Kikuyu Party seems to have come into existence largely under the aegis of the Church of Scotland Mission in 1928.<sup>78</sup> Such modern parties as have come into being with Mission encouragement – e.g. the Democratic Party in Uganda, which has been described as 'almost exclusively Roman Catholic in origin,

inspiration and membership',<sup>100</sup> and the Liberal Party in the southern Sudan – have usually tried to avoid any official ecclesiastical connexion. So far as secular influences are concerned, the multi-racial United Tanganyika Party is one example of a partly African party – UTP at one time claimed 10,000 members, two thirds of them Africans – in whose creation local Europeans played a major part.<sup>65</sup> But UTP, which was defeated by the Tanganyika African National Union in the 1958 elections, was clearly associated with an early phase in the development of Tanganyika parties, corresponding to a restricted franchise, heavily weighted in favour of non-Africans.

There is, however, one aspect of party origins with which the immigrant communities, particularly the Europeans, have been very much concerned: the formation of parties which have been formally or in fact subsidiaries of metropolitan parties – especially parties of the Left. In such cases there are two distinct external influences at work, often in collaboration – the metropolitan party, and its members, or sympathizers, in Africa. Thus the founding of the Senegalese SFIO in 1936, as a *fédération* within the French metropolitan party, involved the collaboration of Marius Moutet, Minister of Colonies in the French Popular Front Government, representing the party leadership in Paris, and Paul Bonifay, a French Socialist lawyer resident in Dakar.<sup>88</sup> The RDA was an African movement, with its roots in African society and sentiment, in a much more profound sense than the Senegalese SFIO; and, though until 1950 it was connected with the French Communist Party by the ties of *apparentement*, there was no organic relationship between the two parties. None the less the RDA received an important initial stimulus, both from local French Communists and from the metropolitan PCF, which alone among French parties accepted the invitation to attend the founding conference at Bamako, and was thus left with a clear field.<sup>88</sup>

In the States of the Maghreb, on the other hand, where the major nationalist parties developed almost entirely outside the range of French Communist influence, local Communist parties were established during the inter-war period by members of the local French communities which were initially simply subsidiaries

of the PCF. Since about 1943, however, the Moroccan and Tunisian parties have become formally independent, have increasingly attempted to 'nationalize' themselves, and have lost most of their local French support. Though restricted in influence – and, in Morocco, intermittently illegal – they can now be regarded as authentic African parties.<sup>11, 37</sup>

It would seem then that it is mainly in the case of conservative, or 'moderate', parties – *partis de l'administration* – and 'Marxist', more particularly Communist, parties (in the few territories where these exist), that external influences have played a significant part in the creation of African parties. They have operated, one might say, on the extreme Right and the extreme Left, but have made relatively little impact on the main body of nationalist parties. Moreover, it is principally in the very early stages of the growth of African parties that these influences – whether metropolitan or local, or a combination of the two – come into play. This generalization is well illustrated by the evolution of the parties of Afrique Noire, where the institutional framework – the 'metropolitan axis of reference' – made a measure of dependence of African upon French parties unavoidable in the initial stages. But the history of these parties since about 1950 has been a history of increasing disengagement from metropolitan connexions: the RDA from the PCF; the Indépendants d'Outre-Mer, and later the Convention Africaine, from the MRP; the Mouvement Socialiste Africain from the SFIO.<sup>38</sup> Whatever their origins, there has been an evident tendency for African parties to africanize themselves.

## Chapter 4

### TYPES OF PARTIES

So far I have discussed African political parties in a somewhat general way, without attempting to differentiate within the genus. But it is evident that, just as African parties can come into being in a variety of different ways, so they can develop various forms of organization. And, while it is true that every party 'is what it is and not another thing', this emphasis on uniqueness is compatible with drawing certain broad distinctions between types. Such distinctions are, of course, neither exhaustive – other differentia could be found – nor wholly adequate when one comes to consider individual cases. Parties are too complex and too fluid to fit any given set of pigeon-holes.

What seems essential is to take account of differences in three major respects: (a) the 'spread' of parties, i.e. the types of geographical area within which they operate, and the width or narrowness of their appeal; (b) the structure of parties, i.e. the contrasts between 'mass parties' and 'élite parties', between tightly and loosely organized parties, between parties which are 'Orders' and parties which are merely associations, including some reference to the influence of external models; and (c) the legality or illegality of parties, which involves various gradations between totally clandestine parties on the one hand, and parties which enjoy not merely legality but 'legitimacy', as established and recognized institutions within the political order, on the other.

#### THE SPREAD OF PARTIES

There is a striking difference in the scale of operations of the various African parties. For example, the former RDA, from 1946 to 1958, sought to function throughout the three million square miles of French sub-Saharan Africa with its population of approximately twenty-seven million, and claimed after the 1957 elections to be 'in a position of almost complete control of Afrique Noire'.

This was as different from the Union Populaire de Bandiagara in Mali, or the Parti Travailleiste Saloum-Saloum in Senegal, as an elephant is different from a bush-baby.<sup>38</sup> It might even seem far-fetched to label organizations of the latter type 'parties'; but since they may contest, and sometimes win, elections, they cannot be ignored. At first sight, then, it might seem reasonable to distinguish between (a) inter-territorial parties, such as the RDA, which transcend the frontiers of a single State; (b) territorial parties—such as Neo-Destour in Tunisia, the CPP in Ghana, or TANU in Tanganyika— which take as their field of operations a given territory, colonial or independent, and the population contained within its frontiers; (c) regional or ethnic, sometimes called 'tribal', parties— such as the Digil-Mirifleh Party in Somalia, the Northern People's Congress in Nigeria, or the former NLM in Ghana— whose range of influence is limited to a particular region, or a particular community, based on ties of history, culture, religion, kinship, or some combination of these; (d) dwarf parties, restricted to the inhabitants of a particular locality, such as Bandiagara, or Saloum-Saloum.

This kind of classification has clearly some validity. But it also raises difficulties. What, first, is meant by a 'territorial party'? One might be inclined to answer: Any party whose organization is based on an area with a single government and a common administrative system, from the Gambia to the ex-Belgian Congo. Parties have in fact tended to take for granted these curiously assorted units into which Africa was partitioned by the colonial powers at the end of the nineteenth century— but not entirely so. Some African frontiers are clearly unstable: for example, the frontiers between Morocco, Spanish West Africa (including Ifni) and Mauritania; the frontiers within the former Federations of French West and French Equatorial Africa; the Cameroun-Nigeria frontier; the former Somalia-British Somaliland-French Somaliland frontiers (with implications for Ethiopia and Kenya). Hence Dr I. M. Lewis, in his useful classification of Somali political parties, does not make use of the category of 'territorial parties', but distinguishes 'national parties' from 'clan' and 'regional' parties. 'National parties', defined as parties whose 'principal aim is to further a truly pan-Somali nationalism'— the Somali Youth League,

for instance – are 'inter-territorial parties' in my sense, since they may operate (legally or illegally) in any or all of the territories in which the Somali live.<sup>80, 86</sup>

To a more limited extent Istiqlal in Morocco might be regarded as an inter-territorial party, since it seeks to unite the Moors of Mauretania and the Spanish Sahara with the Moroccans in a single Greater Moroccan State, and has organized clandestine branches in these so far 'unredeemed' territories.<sup>11</sup> Even the CPP of Ghana, which might seem to be a clear case of a territorial party, also exists among Ghanaians *in partibus infidelibus*, in Monrovia, Liberia, for example. In Afrique Noire, the term 'territorial party' is generally used to describe a party based upon one of the eight territories of the former French West African Federation, or upon one of the four territories of former French Equatorial Africa, or Togo, or Cameroun: for example, UPS in Senegal, PDG in Guinea, or UDDIA in the Congo Republic. But in most cases such parties have had inter-territorial connexions – UPS with PFA, or UDDIA with RDA, for example. Hence, here again, the distinction between territorial and inter-territorial parties is not rigorous, and cannot be so long as the frontiers of future African States are indeterminate; some parties combine both characteristics.

Further difficulties arise if one seeks any kind of precision with regard to 'regional and ethnic parties'. There is the problem of the difference between what a party claims to be and what it really is, and between what it is at one period of its history and what it is at another. This is not, of course, a problem peculiar to Africa: the British Liberal Party once looked like a regional party, functioning in Wales and south-west England; and the ILP, after it split from the Labour Party, had the appearance of a predominantly Scottish party. The crucial question is, surely, whether a given party is in practice limited, as regards its appeal and its effective support, to the inhabitants of a particular region or the members of a particular linguistic or cultural group; or whether, while its main source of strength may lie in a particular region, or among a specific people, it none the less attempts to construct some kind of territorial organization.

In Nigeria it is understandable that the sheer size of the territory, its internal diversity, and the history and traditions of its

component peoples – as well as the pattern of colonial institutions – should have tended to encourage the formation of parties with a distinct regional or ethnic basis. But it is possible here to differentiate between parties which are essentially ethnic – like the Idoma State Union; parties which are explicitly regional – like the NPC, NEPU, and the United Middle Belt Congress; and parties – of which NCNC and the Action Group are the only significant examples – which, though they may appeal to regional and ethnic loyalties, seek to function on a territorial basis. This has been the case with the NCNC since its foundation: it has been organized as a party in the Eastern and Western Regions, while operating in the Northern Region in alliance with NEPU, the Idoma State Union, and the 'Moses Rwang Wing' of the UMBC.<sup>47</sup> The Action Group, on the other hand, while it started life as a Western Region, predominantly Yoruba party, has since 1951 extended its organization into the Eastern Region, and has made great efforts to establish itself in the North – not only in Ilorin and the Middle Belt, but also in the main centres of Hausaland and Bornu. On these grounds both the NCNC and the Action Group can properly be described as 'territorial', or 'national' parties.

The same sort of criteria can be applied elsewhere. In the Sudan the Liberal Party (originally known as the Southern Party) was a regional party, making its appeal to the economically and educationally retarded, and predominantly non-Muslim peoples of the three southern provinces. So was the Hizbia Digil-Mirifleh, a major opposition party in Somalia, representing 'the common cultural, economic, and territorial interests of the Digil and Raḥanweyn, inhabiting the most fertile region of Somalia'.<sup>48</sup> Differences in economic and social standards, whether resulting in a relatively favourable or unfavourable situation, clearly help to stimulate the formation of regional and ethnic parties. These may sometimes seek to avoid the appearance of a purely ethnic or regional appeal. The NLM, though essentially an Ashanti party, described itself as national, and contested elections in some constituencies in southern Ghana. But parties of this type are distinguishable from political organizations, whether parties or congresses, which though territorial in intention have their basis among particular 'advanced' peoples, e.g., the former Kenya African Union among the Kikuyu,

the Uganda National Congress among the Baganda, or the Union Démocratique de Défense des Intérêts Africains among the Bakongo and related peoples.

The essential characteristic of the regional-ethnic parties is their particularism. They derive both their strength and their weakness from their appeal to a sense of group solidarity, which may – as in Ashanti – be rooted in history, but may also – as in the southern Sudan – be a recent discovery. Other types of particularist party, which are strictly neither regional nor ethnic, can be assigned to the same general category: for example in Somalia where the ties of clanship have remained significant, there have been clan parties, ‘whose aim is to promote the interests of a particular agnatic group’, such as the Marrehaan Union or the Hawiye Party.<sup>96</sup>

Confessional parties, parties that is to say based upon a common religious allegiance, constitute another sub-type. Here again, it is not always easy to draw the line between a thoroughgoing, avowedly confessional party – like the Gambia Muslim Congress or the former Moslem Association Party in Ghana – and a confessionally oriented party, like the predominantly Catholic Democratic Party in Uganda. As a rule, where confessional or crypto-confessional parties emerge, it is in response to a definite sense of grievance, and to provide a channel for the realization of certain concrete demands, on the part of the community concerned. Thus such support as the Ghana MAP was able to attract lay primarily among the *lumpen-proletariat* inhabiting the zongos of Accra and Kumasi, including Muslim immigrants from the Northern Territories, Haute-Volta, and the Niger Bend, organized under semi-traditional leaders, who wanted State-subsidized Islamic schools and better housing and living conditions.<sup>107, 108</sup> Such parties, since they can seldom succeed in mobilizing more than a section of the community which they claim to represent, are almost doomed to be minor parties, extracting what concessions they can from the regime. No doubt some major territorial parties – PDG in Guinea, US in Mali, or SYL in Somalia, for example – have derived part of their dynamic from the way in which they have restated basic Islamic ideas, and appealed to a sense of Muslim solidarity. But Africans have, on the whole, been disinclined to give their

allegiance to parties of an exclusively confessional type, whether Muslim or Christian.

As regards dwarf parties, all that needs to be said is that their dwarfishness can be of different kinds. Some dwarf parties – like the former Anlo Youth Association in Ghana – restrict their appeal to a particular local group, in this case the Anlo Ewes. Thus dwarf parties may at the same time be tribal parties – like the former Ga Shifimo Kpee in Ghana, which was based ethnically on a section of the Ga people, and locally upon Accra.<sup>72</sup> There are also dwarf parties – like some of those in Uganda – which claim to be territorial, but have not in practice succeeded in extending their organization beyond the chief urban centres, in this case Kampala. Others again are essentially ‘one-man shows’ – like the Nigerian Dynamic Party, which provided a platform for the expression of Dr Chike Obi’s interesting ‘Kemalist’ ideology.<sup>56</sup> On the whole such parties tend to be short-lived: the principle of the survival of the fittest stimulates the major parties to seek continually to enlarge their field of operations, and promotes the absorption or disintegration of dwarf parties. And, in general, territorial and inter-territorial parties enjoy benefits of scale, financial resources, electoral effectiveness, and actual or prospective power, which give them an obvious advantage over regional, ethnic, clan, confessional, or local parties.

#### MASS PARTIES AND ÉLITE PARTIES

I use the term ‘élite parties’ in preference to M. Duverger’s ‘cadre parties’,<sup>1</sup> largely because ‘élite’ has become a reasonably familiar English word, whereas ‘cadre’, in so far as it means anything to English-speaking readers, suggests the ‘cadres’ or trained *militants* of a Communist party. But I cannot pretend that I am altogether satisfied with the term ‘élite parties’ since mass parties also have their ‘élites’. In any case, though the terms are unimportant, the distinction is fundamental for an understanding of the character and behaviour of African parties. It is a distinction which penetrates all aspects of party life – the concept of membership, structure, discipline, leadership, methods of finance, basic activities, techniques, ideology. Though in a general way its validity has already been assumed, it needs further explanation at this point.

The essential characteristic of mass parties is that they seek to enrol the mass of the population as members, or at least supporters, of the party. 'Élite parties', on the other hand, consist essentially of a nucleus of persons enjoying status and authority within the existing social order – an élite of chiefs, religious leaders, or wealthy bourgeois – and depend largely upon established ties of obligation and loyalty between the 'élite' and 'the people'. To state the contrast in the simplest form, élite parties are content to reflect the structure of society as it is, or as it used to be; while mass parties attempt to impose their own new type of structure upon society.

This opposition presents itself particularly clearly in regard to the notion of party membership. In principle, élite parties do not have members. 'The problem of the number of members belonging to the French Radical Socialist party is susceptible of no precise answer, simply because the problem itself is meaningless.'<sup>1</sup> Where such parties do in fact make an effort to build up a card-holding, subscription-paying membership, it is usually through the influence of 'the contagious pattern of mass parties'. In French West Africa the leaders of some élite parties, such as the Parti Progressiste Soudanais, 'at times attempted to sell membership cards after they saw the successful use of this money-raising technique by the leaders of the rival mass parties. But the cadre [élite] parties found few individual buyers for the cards, because the people who voted the party ticket did so out of a sense of loyalty, not to the party, but to the local notable who happened to represent the party.'<sup>38</sup> For the mass parties, on the other hand, the idea of individual membership and individual commitment is fundamental; and this commitment is normally expressed through the purchase of a party card, even though card-buying may be spasmodic, and the collection of subscriptions irregular.

With this contrast in regard to the notion of membership goes a clear distinction of structure. 'The mass party community became far more differentiated than the simple dual categories of leaders and voters – or patrons and clients – which characterized the cadre [élite] parties.'<sup>38</sup> True, in the latter case there is differentiation within the leadership: but the party hierarchy reaches no further than the local notable – chief or village head, businessman or teacher – who *is* the party in his locality, potentially between

elections, in actuality at election times. There are no organized channels of communication between the central nucleus of leading personalities and the mass of voters to whom it looks for support. But in the mass parties there are reasonably well defined degrees of participation and responsibility, and a recognizable chain of authority, leading down from the central executive and inner party directorate, through the regional leadership and local party officials, to the wider, more inclusive category of *militants*, 'willing to devote time to party work and propaganda'; and, beyond these, to the party members, 'who took the positive step of buying a party card', and ultimately to the still larger body of sympathizers, 'who attended mass meetings and voted the party ticket'.<sup>38</sup>

In this respect the mass parties – Neo-Destour in Tunisia, UNFP and the old Istiqlal in Morocco, the PDG in Guinea, the CPP in Ghana, the SYL in Somalia – are organisms of a more highly evolved type, with their more articulated structure and their better developed communications system, than the more primitive élite parties. Hence they are more flexible, able to deal with a wider range of situations – legality or illegality, power or opposition – and to vary their strategies between the revolutionary and gradualist poles in response to variations in the political climate. In the internal struggle for power which develops during the period of decolonization, élite parties tend therefore to lose ground to mass parties – as Vieux-Destour lost ground to Neo-Destour, the Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance to Istiqlal, the various regional, ethnic, and Administration-supported parties to RDA, and UGCC to CPP.

From this fundamental structural difference other distinctions follow. Because mass parties, by their nature, seek to mobilize the mass of the population, they normally generate, or draw into partnership, allied organizations – women's and youth organizations and trade unions in particular; sometimes also farmers' and traders' associations, charitable and welfare organizations, sports clubs, theatrical companies, and independent schools.\* Such groups serve a dual purpose: they enable the party to draw into its field of influence a larger body of people than those who are willing to accept the obligations – and sometimes risks – of party membership; and if, as in Tunisia and Morocco under the Pro-

\* See pp. 117–24, below.

tecorate, the mass party finds itself illegal, some at any rate of its *organismes annexes* may be left unmolested. Élite parties do not normally develop subsidiaries of this type.

Further, mass parties take the question of discipline seriously. To maintain this discipline they do not hesitate to suspend, expel, or demote those in positions of authority within the party hierarchy. The culprits may be not merely aberrant intellectuals, but entire 'deviationist' factions – as the CPP publicly expelled the eighty 'Independents' who stood in defiance of the party in the 1954 elections,<sup>55</sup> and the RDA Comité de Coordination, at its Conakry conference in 1955, expelled its Senegal, Niger, and Cameroun *sections*, which had continued to adhere to the party's pre-1950 militant, Communist-inclined line.<sup>56</sup> Élite parties are in no position to impose discipline of this kind; first, because they do not conceive of politics as a battleground, with the party as a semi-military force; second, because their looser structure and more rudimentary communications system provide no mechanism by which deviant individuals or groups can be removed. If the local party representative disagrees with instructions from headquarters, he simply moves out, taking his 'followers' with him. This is a potential danger, of course, for mass parties also; but the principle that the loyalty of the rank-and-file is given to the party, not to the local leadership, reduces the risks.

There is a similar contrast in regard to the main sources of party funds. Mass parties, especially when they are out of office, seek with varying degrees of success to finance themselves from the contributions of the mass of their members and supporters. As with European Socialist and Communist parties, this method of finance has an educational as well as an economic purpose: it strengthens the sense of personal commitment. The individual contributions may be of various kinds: regular monthly subscriptions (in the best organized mass parties); initial subscriptions, paid on admission to the party; 'donations' at mass meetings and rallies; profits on party festivals and dances; special levies (including the regular deductions from the salaries of assemblymen and Ministers which several mass parties impose). Contributions in kind, as Dr. Schachter has rightly emphasized in the case of French West Africa, represent another important source of mass party

income – 'in the form of loaned cars and trucks, work without pay, communally built shelters, platforms and decorations for demonstrations, cloth for party insignia, music from amateur and professional musicians, rudimentary bridges and roads to facilitate communications'.<sup>88</sup> These are some of the ways in which mass parties have been able to adapt African traditions of mutual help and collective enterprise for their own purposes.

Élite parties, on the other hand, are organizationally ill-adapted to tap such sources of funds on any scale. Hence they have usually been obliged to rely upon gifts – sometimes of a lavish kind – from wealthy individual patrons, or from corporate bodies,<sup>89</sup> or, in French Africa, from the Administration and European firms. This tendency has, of course, been present in the case of some of the mass parties also. For example, the NLM, which had some of the characteristics of a mass party, and raised part of its funds from the sale of party cards, subscriptions, and donations, was at the same time heavily subsidized by the Asanteman Council.<sup>66</sup> One consequence of this method of financing a party is that, almost inevitably, it gives the paymasters a measure of control over party policy.

Other contrasts can be traced. The leadership of the élite parties comes in the main from those who already enjoy authority – within the 'modified-traditional' system, as chiefs or members of ruling families (the Sardauna of Sokoto, for example), or within the 'modern' system, as professionals or men of property (in Ghana, Dr Danquah, or the late George Grant) or indeed in both. In such parties it is the dominant personalities whose authority gives weight and influence to the party. In the mass parties, on the other hand, it is the party that manufactures its own leaders: it is from the party, primarily, that they derive their status and authority; the élite to which they belong is an essentially new élite of professional politicians, with a background of agitation in student and youth organizations, trade unions, and the like. Where leaders of mass parties in fact belong to ruling families, or the older élites, they are usually at pains to point out, like Saïfoulaye Diallo in Guinea, that they have 'renounced their privileges in order to join the democratic camp'<sup>125</sup> – in other words, that they have exchanged the status of 'personalities' for that of party *militants*.

With this difference is associated a contrast both of ideologies and of functions. Though the ideologies of mass parties may vary widely, they must be in some sense *progressiste*: that is, they must appeal to 'the common man'; they must talk the language of 'the people'.<sup>71, 72</sup> Élite parties, on the other hand, are more liable to develop a 'moderate', or conservative, ideology; to emphasize order and stability, respect for tradition, the rights of 'Natural Rulers' and established interests, the government of 'the best'. From a functional standpoint, the mass parties are concerned to develop a multiplicity of activities – from running baby clinics to organizing a gendarmerie, a dance-band, or a burial club; while élite parties tend to be primarily – and sometimes exclusively – electoral associations, preoccupied with the periodic effort to secure, or retain, seats on local councils or parliamentary or ministerial office for their leaders.<sup>3</sup>

In so far as the mass parties succeed in developing a form of organization which seeks to cater for the totality of human needs, within which an individual's life can be entirely lived, which generates a warmth, an enthusiasm, and a sense of community of its own, they begin to acquire the characteristics of an 'Order' (in M. Duverger's terminology), as contrasted with a mere 'Association'.<sup>1</sup> R. Rézette brings out this point very clearly, writing of Istiqlal in Morocco, at the stage of development which it had reached by the early 1950s:

The party *militant*, when he leaves his factory, his works, or his school, turns for relaxation to the party sports club, or takes part in the Scouts organization, or goes to watch the performance of a party-sponsored play. His wife, or wives, will often belong to a women's branch of the party; sometimes they will attend courses to assist the emancipation of women arranged by the party. If the *militant* is able to read and write, he will give evening courses in reading and writing to illiterate *militants*. If he is illiterate, he will attend such courses himself. The books used in these courses are banned in Morocco and are imported illegally from Egypt and the East – hence they are in short supply. Such leisure as is left to the *militant* he is likely to spend copying these books by hand, in order to pass them on to those with whom he is in contact.<sup>37</sup>

Where the party came to play so many-sided and absorbing a part in the life of an individual, it tended to acquire the characteristics of

an 'Order' which was itself a quasi-religious community: not in the sense that the philosophy of Istiqlal was substituted for the philosophy of Islam (the two were in practice quite compatible), but that the brotherly ties of Istiqlal took the place of the brotherly ties of a Muslim *ṭarīqa*.

Dr David Apter, using somewhat different language, found essentially the same qualities present in the Ghana CPP in 1953:

The CPP is fraternal and open, intimate and tolerant. It is particularistic in its loyalties and universalistic in its recruitment. It rewards its friends and removes its enemies. It has diffuse purposes with as many different groups of people finding in it social, economic, or political success as is necessary to provide a mass following; yet it is specific in its political objectives. It is responsible to its local groups, tightly unified, a society of the elect to which many are elected.<sup>8</sup>

The same kind of statement could certainly be made about the RDA in certain territories during particular periods – for example, in the Ivory Coast and Soudan from 1948 to 1950, or in Guinea from 1955 on. This tendency of the mass party to consider itself 'a society of the elect' is reflected in its own specific external forms: its distinctive modes of dress, such as the black and white striped *jellāba*, the prison graduates' caps; its characteristic symbols, as the head of the party leader on badges and cloths; its cycle of folk-songs and ballads, hymns and prayers; its established dances, ceremonials, pilgrimages to the tombs of party saints and martyrs. The party-functioning-as-an-'Order' may itself be transient, associated with revolutionary or near-revolutionary phases of its history: 'progressively the tension of the Order lessens and enthusiasm diminishes'.<sup>1</sup> None the less it is another feature of the mass party, entirely lacking in the élite parties, that it should be capable, during phases of effervescence, of generating a totally satisfying way of life for its membership, of seeking to provide a total solution to their problems.

Clearly there are structural resemblances between African mass parties and parties of the Left in Europe. For this there are two good reasons. There is, first, a similarity of objectives. Just as the European Socialist or Communist Party aims – in principle, at least – 'at the political education of the working class, at picking out from it an élite capable of taking over the government and the

administration of the country',<sup>1</sup> so the African mass party aims at picking out from the indigenous, colonized community an élite capable of taking over government and administration. A successful mass party tends to become, in effect, a parallel, or shadow State, even before it has actually taken control of State power. Hence there are bound to be similarities between the types of organization required for these two tasks.

Second, the African mass parties have tended, particularly in the initial stages, to look to European Socialist or Communist parties as models for the construction of their own institutions. This process of institutional borrowing has naturally been eclectic. European models have been adapted, not copied. But, broadly speaking, in territories which have been within the French sphere of influence – Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Afrique Noire – mass parties have been mainly affected by the more rigid Communist, *cellule*-based, form of organization; while in territories within the British sphere the looser, Labour-Party-type, branch-based, model has predominated. Too much, however, should not be made of this distinction, since whether the basic unit of an African mass party describes itself as a *cellule* or a branch does not necessarily make much practical difference.\* One must also take into account the influence of another quite different external model, the Egyptian Wafd, upon the organization of the mass parties of the Sudan, particularly the Ashiqqa-NUP.

#### LEGALITY AND ILLEGALITY

It is worth while trying to indicate some of the stages through which parties can pass on the route from illegality to legality. There is, first, the party which is proscribed – both in law and in fact – and can therefore only exist as an underground, clandestine organization. This was the situation of Istiqlal in Morocco from December 1952 to 1955; of UPC in the French Cameroons after 1955; of the Sudan Movement for National Liberation (the Sudan equivalent of the Communist Party) from its foundation in 1944. And it is the situation of Sawaba in Niger at the present time. Second, there are parties which are formally illegal, but in practice

\* See pp. 82–6, below.

permitted to enjoy a quasi-legal existence. This, roughly, was the position of Istiqlal from 1944 until its total suppression in December 1952: it 'remained permanently on the margins of clandestinity; it was tolerated, but its illegal character from the standpoint of the *Dahir* regarding associations meant that it could be dissolved at discretion'.<sup>37</sup> The Moroccan Communist Party is in a somewhat similar position at the present time. Third, there is the contrary situation, in which a party is formally legal, but is subject to such a degree of police persecution that it is obliged to develop some of the forms of organization and modes of operation of an underground party. An outstanding example of a party so situated was the RDA in the Ivory Coast during the *répression* of 1949-50.<sup>38, 111</sup> But most of the mass parties have had an almost comparable experience at some stage of their histories. Fourth, there is the formerly illegal party which has achieved legality - e.g. Istiqlal and Neo-Destour after 1955. Fifth, there are parties which are legal, but whose position is not so secure that they can take their continuing legality for granted; I have in mind particularly opposition parties in States governed by a single dominant party - e.g. the United Party in Ghana.

Finally, there is the party which is not merely legal, but has become an integral part of the institutions of government, so that it could hardly be made illegal without some form of revolutionary upheaval, changing the basis of legitimate authority. This is to be more than legal; it is to be part of the established order of things, in something like the sense in which the British Conservative and Labour Parties are part of the established order of things. True, an established order may be upset, 'by chance or nature's changing course untrimm'd'; but, so long as it continues, such parties are sufficiently firmly rooted to have a reasonable expectation of surviving with it. This would seem to be the case with those dominant parties which have been in a position to provide a constitutional underpinning to their dominance, for example, Neo-Destour in Tunisia, the CPP in Ghana, PDG in Guinea.

In the flux of African politics qualities can change quite rapidly into their opposites. Thus in a year or so a party may traverse - like Istiqlal in 1955-6 - the whole route from total illegality to something approaching legitimacy; in a somewhat less spectacular

way the CPP travelled, between January 1950 and February 1951, from a state of semi-clandestinity to ministerial office. The reverse process can also occur, as in the Sudan after the *coup d'état* of November 1958, where parties which had for the past five years been part of the legitimate apparatus of government found themselves suddenly illegal. Moreover, it is not only in a temporal context that the situation is fluid. A given inter-territorial party may at the same time be legal in one territory and illegal in another. This was formerly the situation of the SYL, which enjoyed power in Somalia, existed legally in British Somaliland, but operated under cover in Ethiopia and the Northern Province of Kenya.<sup>96</sup> Even within a single State there may be degrees or shades of legality as between one region and another: to be a member of the Action Group in Ijebu-Ode is to belong to a powerful governing party; in Kano, on the other hand, it means adhering to a tolerated but suspect opposition.

Another complicating factor is the loose association that sometimes occurs between a legal mass party, employing constitutional methods, and a clandestine or semi-clandestine organization, more militant in outlook, committed to methods of direct action or violence.\* A symbiotic relationship of this type existed in Algeria from 1949 to 1954 between the MTL D – itself a legal reconstruction of the old PPA, which had continued to operate underground through the period of the Second World War – and the clandestine, para-military group known as the Organisation Secrète.<sup>26</sup> In a minor key, a somewhat comparable relationship existed during the years 1945–50 between the NCNC and the Zikist Movement, a militant youth association within the wider body, which was declared illegal in April 1950.<sup>15</sup> According to some accounts the Kenya African Union, before its suppression in 1952, had similar connexions with a clandestine organization known as the 'Forty Group'.<sup>36, 78</sup> In such cases there may be little in the way of formal, organizational links between the legal party and the revolutionary group beyond the existence of a partly overlapping leadership.

What are the effects of illegality – total or partial, past, present, or prospective – on party structure and behaviour? Difficulties of investigation and lack of data make it impossible to pursue this

\* See pp. 125–33, below.

question far. A few points, however, stand out. First, an illegal party is obliged to limit very strictly the number of members in its basic units; and, broadly speaking, the greater the degree of illegality, the more restricted the membership of the units. In the case of Istiqlal, for example, during its period of total illegality after the end of 1952, *cellules* generally consisted of from three to five members. This is a normal maximum in any genuinely underground party. Moreover, clandestinity meant a strengthening of vertical, to the exclusion of horizontal links within the party: that is to say, the *cellule* leader was in contact with the president, or secretary, of the *section* to which his *cellule* belonged, but lacked all contact with other *cellules* (usually between three and ten in all) forming part of the same *section*.<sup>37</sup> This again was a natural precautionary measure.

Second, illegality strengthens tendencies towards centralization and rigorous discipline. Orders coming down from the central or regional committees to the basic units have to be obeyed. As the 'Internal Regulations for the use of FLN *Militants*' put it:

Once the meeting [of an FLN *cellule*] is open ... each *militant* ceases to exist as a private person; he becomes an impersonal and anonymous being, speaking in the name of a movement within which he is merely a part, a wheel.... The meeting is essentially a working session, and cell members must regard themselves as being on the battlefield.<sup>127</sup>

While the elective principle may be maintained, especially at the lower levels, there are obvious limits to its use, above all in conditions in which no general congresses can be held. At the higher levels the leadership tends to renew itself by the co-option of outstanding *militants*. Hence, in his account of Istiqlal, Rézette contrasts its 'relatively democratic base' and its 'autocratic centre'.<sup>37</sup>

Third, under conditions of illegality a party is obliged to develop a closed system of communications under its own exclusive control. Telecommunications and the post have, in the last resort, to be replaced by messengers on foot or on mule-back. Such a system can, as FLN experience has shown, be highly efficient in its own way. But it inevitably slows down the process of communication between the central leadership and the basic units, thus limiting in practice the degree of centralization which the illegal party is able to achieve. Fourth, illegality intensifies the distinction be-

tween the hard core of *militants* on the one hand – bound together by common ties of discipline, loyalty, and danger – and the mass of supporters and sympathizers on the other. Hence the party tends to develop the characteristics of an 'Order' to a more marked extent than normally occurs under conditions of legality: it becomes in a more profound sense a 'band of brothers', an inner group of dedicated persons.

The transition from partial or total illegality to legality, or even to governing power, presents a party with difficult problems of adjustment: the process has been described as a 'mutation'. The party becomes swamped with new members: Istiqlal, whose membership had not reached more than 100,000 in the period before 1955, estimated its members as 1,600,000 in the summer of 1956. The *cellules* are greatly enlarged; discipline is relaxed, and there are demands for 'democratization' within the party; competing factions begin to assert themselves; and the party's main energies have to be transferred from terrorism and revolutionary activity to the maintenance of law and order, administration, and peaceful reconstruction. While Morocco and Tunisia are classic instances of this type of 'mutation', the process has occurred in a modified form elsewhere, e.g. in Ghana and in some of the territories of Afrique Noire.

Some parties may fail to solve the problems of reorganization which the transition from illegality to legality raises. Thus the split in Istiqlal in 1959 was partly caused by the failure of the party leadership to absorb the younger *militants* who had largely directed the revolution of 1953–5.<sup>79</sup> In all cases, periods of illegality, near-illegality, and repression leave their marks upon a party long after the event. They affect, for example, the basis of classification of party members.

Thus in the Ivory Coast RDA there were the 'martyrs', who were imprisoned or otherwise suffered for the party cause [in the administrative repression of 1949–50]; the 'strong' RDA militants, those generally considered to have passed difficult tests of loyalty, to have refused temptations – offers of promotion, money, cars, and so forth – which were officially offered to encourage them to change parties; the 'soft' RDA members, those who during the repression retired from active politics, but did not resign; the RDA 'traitors', who left the party during the

repression; the 'ex-RDA-RDA', who left the party, but returned to it afterwards; and lastly the 'neo-RDA', who joined the RDA after, and were not involved in, the repression, e.g. the university students returned from Paris.<sup>38</sup>

Thus it is important to understand, not only the present situation of a party in regard to legality and illegality, but also its past history.

## *Chapter 5*

### PARTY ORGANIZATION

THE question with which this chapter is concerned – How are African political parties organized? – is clearly central to the whole subject. At the same time it is a topic in regard to which it is particularly dangerous to generalize. What is possible is to look at the limited evidence available comparatively, paying special attention to parties which can be classified (on the basis of the types outlined in the last chapter) as legal, territorial or inter-territorial, mass parties, and trying to pick out those aspects of party structure which are relatively constant. Thus all such parties have basic units of some description; some form of intermediate, regional organization; some type of central directing committee, some inner party leadership; and some full-time party officials. In addition, they normally have some representatives in the various organs of government – parliament, council of ministers, and so forth; they organize periodic congresses for the purpose of renewing the party leadership, formulating or approving policy, asserting solidarity; they show a special concern to associate women and youth with the party, and they develop special relationships with allied organizations of other types. They may also contain groups of activists or radicals, who seek to influence party policy from within – ‘parties within the party’.

Our object should be to consider how African parties tend to function at these various levels, and what kinds of relationship can exist between the levels. This should at least provide a method of approach to more fundamental questions, which must be answered differently in the case of each individual party: How is power distributed within the party? What elements of oligarchy and democracy exist, and what is their relative strength? By what sorts of process are major decisions arrived at? It is hardly necessary to say that an inquiry of this kind must be concerned with the real relationships between the various levels and groupings within the party hierarchy – so far as these can be understood – rather than

with the formal relationships, as described in party constitutions. Written constitutions may throw an interesting light upon actual power relationships. But they tend, in Africa as elsewhere, to be an expression of democratic ideals rather than a description of political facts.

#### MEMBERS AND BRANCHES

It is of the nature of a mass party, I have suggested, to have members, and for these members to be organized in some kind of basic unit. But what is meant by being a 'party member', and what is the character of these basic units?

To take the second question first, there are naturally variations in the terms used to describe the basic units. In the Maghreb the Arabic term *jam'a* – meaning a 'meeting' or 'gathering' – and the French *cellule*, with its very different associations, have been used almost interchangeably. In French Africa south of the Sahara RDA was organized – in principle everywhere, and in practice in its main strongholds, the Ivory Coast, the French Sudan, and Guinea – on the basis of *comités de quartier* in the towns and *comités de village* in rural areas. These first-order *comités* were grouped together in second-order *sous-sections* at the level of the town or the *cercle*.<sup>38</sup>

In BDS-BPS-UPS in Senegal, on the other hand, the *sous-section* was itself the effective basic unit, though with the reorganization of the party in 1957 there was an attempt to introduce a system of *groupes*, at the level of the individual *quartier* or place of work.<sup>39</sup> In territories within the zone of British political influence the party branch has fairly consistently functioned as the primary cell, though with the development of parliamentary systems, the constituency has sometimes tended, as in Ghana, to replace the branch as the effective basis of party organizations.<sup>72</sup> However, the 1959 constitution of the CPP asserts the primacy of the branch as party doctrine:

The Branch is the basic organization of the Party. The Party shall establish branches in all towns and villages. Each branch shall be governed by a Branch Executive Committee which shall be elected annually at a General Meeting of the Branch.<sup>120</sup>

The constitution adds that in the municipalities ward organiza-

tions (corresponding to *comités de quartier*) are considered as branches.

On the whole, then, African mass parties are *branch* parties – whether the basic unit is so referred to, or described as a *sous-section*, *comité de village*, *cellule*, or *jam'a*. As Rézette has pointed out in relation to Istiqlal, the *cellule* was seldom, except during periods of total illegality, organized like the Communist cell, on the basis of the place of work: it was rather, like the branch, localized – based on the village or *quartier*.<sup>37</sup> This is broadly true also of Neo-Destour. The branch type of organization is, in fact, admirably adapted to the main purposes of African mass parties – ‘to try and organize the masses, to give them a political education and to recruit from them the [nationalist] élites’.<sup>1</sup> In addition, it is well suited to the needs of the electoral struggle – a major pre-occupation in many African territories – as an instrument for mobilizing the party’s voters, and counteracting the influence of its rivals, the colonial Administration or the ‘chiefs’. Moreover, the party branch offers the advantages of sociability, replacing in part the lineage, the age-set, or the secret society, and providing, through its political discussions, a new kind of common ground for those whom the stratifications of modern society tend to separate – teachers, clerks, traders, lorry-drivers, farmers. Over and above the minutes, reports, and agenda, the meeting of a well organized party branch can be a very pleasant social occasion.

This general pattern of the branch-based party is subject to wide variations. There are, first, big differences in the actual number of branches which a territorial party may contain. In some cases, during periods of a party’s greatest vigour and activity, the number has been very large. Neo-Destour estimated its *cellules* at 1,500 in 1957, which from my own observations I would consider a close approximation. The number of *comités de village* and *comités de quartier* included within the PDCI (the Ivory Coast section of the RDA), before the repressions of 1949–50, was believed to be about 2,000.<sup>38</sup> An official, and therefore critical, source claimed that the UPC in the French Cameroons had multiplied its basic units until, at the time of its suppression in May 1955, it comprised 3,000 *comités de village* and 460 *comités de base*.<sup>39</sup> While such estimates are never entirely reliable, they at least give

some indication of the sort of scale on which the network of branches can be developed, in favourable circumstances.

The level of branch activity seems equally variable. Unfortunately there have been few field studies of the structure and functions of individual party branches. It is therefore worth taking special note of the views of the few social anthropologists who have paid attention to these institutions. Dr Lloyd, for example, emphasizes the extreme weakness of the branch organization of the two major parties operating in the Western Region of Nigeria during 1952-4:

At their Warri Conference in December 1953, it was reported that Action Group had 185 branches in 1951, but that in 1952 only 45 could be considered active, and the stimulus of local government elections had raised this to only 81 by the end of 1953. . . . Branches of the NCNC are equally feebly developed in most towns. By 1954 the Ijebu Ode branch was well organized and conducting fairly regular open meetings. . . . But . . . frequent public meetings, except at election time, were not common in either party. The Action Group meetings tended to be private cliques assembled in the house of the local member. . . . Quite large towns numbered their party members in tens and rarely in hundreds. Local party leaders complained that members had no conception of a duty to attend meetings.<sup>99</sup>

Dr Lewis, on the other hand, has given a quite different picture of the branch life of the Somali Youth League, as he found it in 1957:

Wherever there is a party branch weekly meetings are held in a building used as a meeting-place and club by the local party members. The proceedings at these meetings are generally formal. When the local party leaders enter the premises all present stand up as a sign of respect. Young members are appointed as ushers responsible for the discipline of the meeting. . . . They wear a uniform consisting of white slacks and a white shirt crossed diagonally from shoulder to hip by a red and blue bandolier with the slogan 'SYL'. . . . The local weekly meetings . . . are largely taken up with discussions and addresses on the aims of the party and with debates on matters of topical interest. A prominent feature . . . is the recitation and singing of patriotic verse (usually in the form of *gabay*) and songs epitomizing the aims of the party.<sup>98</sup>

This sharp contrast in styles of branch life is connected with the fact that the SYL in Somalia is a well-developed mass party, where-

as the Action Group in Nigeria is a kind of hybrid – an élite party in origin, which has been obliged, for electoral purposes, to develop a system of branches. The same kind of contrast is evident in regard to the branch leadership – its selection, responsibilities, and relations with the higher levels of the party hierarchy. Almost all mass parties provide in their constitutions for the election of branch committees by the branch membership, usually annually; and these committees normally include at least a president or chairman, a secretary, and a treasurer. Sometimes the structure of the branch leadership is more elaborate: the *cellules* of Neo-Destour elect eight or ten *responsables*, each with a definite area of responsibility – social welfare, youth activities, propaganda, etc.

In well-organized mass parties the *responsables* are regarded, and regard themselves, as having a positive educational responsibility. In Istiqlal 'the primary function of the *cellule* leader was to conduct courses in Arabic for the membership, to teach them to read and write, and to make them comment on the party newspapers – hence he had himself to be literate'.<sup>37</sup> A similar system operated in Neo-Destour. Moreover, in such parties the branch leadership has the further function of acting as a liaison between the central organs of the party and the rank-and-file. In Neo-Destour in 1957 the *responsables* of each *cellule* were expected to attend one-day conferences, held in principle quarterly, at the regional (*fédération*) headquarters, where they listened to reports from the *fédération* leadership, and expressed their own criticisms and points of view. They had also to explain, and attempt to justify, party policy to their local *cellule* membership; to distribute party literature; to receive, and arrange meetings for, visiting representatives of the party leadership; and to take the initiative in dealing with urgent local needs and problems – building a school or combating a plague of locusts.

At the other extreme Lloyd gives a gloomy picture of the situation of the – sometimes self-appointed – branch leadership of the Action Group and NCNC in 1952–4:

Links between local party branches and the central party organization are weak. Most local branch secretaries, when questioned, seem to have no regular channel of communication with their leaders; some have only the most vague ideas about party policy, which reading the party news-

paper would soon correct. Even at election times the Action Group has seemed unable to provide its branches with literature either for general distribution or even for educating the local party members.<sup>99</sup>

The effectiveness of branch organization and leadership tends to vary between these two poles. Moreover, the same party may pass – like the RDA in the Ivory Coast – from a phase of vigorous branch life, democratically elected branch committees, and close links between branch and territorial leadership, to a phase in which the basic cells begin to atrophy – a process particularly liable to occur in the case of parties firmly established in power.

It is within this kind of context that the question – What is meant by ‘being a party member’? – can best be discussed. Reduced to its simplest terms, to be a member of a given party means to have taken the positive step of joining one of its basic units. But this is a formal answer. In practice party membership can have different meanings, involving varying degrees of participation and commitment, roughly correlated with the degree of organization and internal discipline achieved by party branches. At one end of the scale membership can mean regular and punctual attendance at branch meetings, regular payment of party dues, participation in branch discussions and elections of officers, unquestioning obedience to collective decisions and the directives of the branch leadership. This conception of membership, with its obvious resemblances to the Communist conception, seldom operates in African parties except during periods of illegality – in Istiqlal from 1952 to 1955, or in FLN from November 1954. In such circumstances the branch becomes, in a genuine sense, a *cellule*; and the party member becomes indistinguishable from a *militant* – indeed, he tends to be so described.

But in most African legal mass parties the obligations of membership are less strict, the criteria a good deal looser. In the case of the SYL, for example; ‘membership requires payment of an entrance fee and a small monthly subscription. A membership card is issued and a badge bearing the inscription “S.Y.L.”’<sup>100</sup> These are in fact the normal criteria of membership: possession of a party card, the payment of a subscription, together with the acceptance of a fairly general obligation to participate in party activities – branch meetings, rallies, demonstrations, election campaigns,

etc. But these standards are not necessarily always adhered to. In her account of French West African parties Ruth Schachter has pointed out that:

The mass parties – particularly RDA and BDS – knew years in which the bonds of loyalty were so strong that they sold hundreds of thousands of cards, costing about 100 francs (4s.) each. These periods of intense discipline, when the party's supporters expended resources and effort, alternated with others, when people felt less inclined to purchase cards.<sup>38</sup>

On the eve of party congresses, in particular, there is evidence of intensive card-buying, in order to strengthen the voting power of particular branches or *sections*.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, in some parties, as in PDG in Guinea, families – including children – have enrolled *en bloc*.

An expanding party, like the CPP during the early 1950s, may derive such a relatively large income from the sale of cards to new members that it has no financial incentive to insist on the regular renewal of subscriptions by existing members. This gives rise to a still looser interpretation of party 'member', meaning one who has once bought a party card, and is still, in his own eyes and the eyes of the party, committed to its support; or even one who, though he has never bought a party card, describes himself as a party member, and can be relied on to vote for the party's candidate at an election. Thus the notion of membership is essentially flexible, shading off into the disciplined party *militant* in one direction, and the unorganized supporter or sympathizer in the other. Alternatively one can classify different levels of 'party membership' involving differing degrees of commitment: the reliable voter, the card-holder, the regular subscriber to party funds, etc. This is a point worth bearing in mind in relation to some of the very varied estimates of the membership of mass parties.

This discussion of membership has tended to assume that the initial act of joining a party takes the form of buying a party card, and that anyone who wishes can be enrolled in this way in the party of his choice. Both assumptions are normally true, but neither is entirely true. Other procedures for the admission of members have been employed, particularly in the case of semi-illegal parties where cards may mean that members are too easily identifiable. In the period of the Protectorate in Morocco new members were

admitted to Istiqlal by the ceremony of an oath, couched in the following terms:

I swear by God in the presence of the Holy Koran to be faithful to my religion, to my country, to my king, and to the party, Istiqlal; to apply decisions taken and to keep them secret.<sup>67</sup>

This oath, whose solemnity was enhanced by the fact that it was administered by the regional committee of the Party, not the committee of the *cellule*, was not a rigid formula: conscientious atheists were permitted to skip the pledge to be faithful to their religion. Similarly the aspect of the procedure of enrolling a new member which Duverger refers to as the 'decision to admit taken by a responsible organ of the party'<sup>1</sup> is sometimes more than a formality – especially, again, in the case of semi-illegal parties, where 'screening' is necessary to try to safeguard against the infiltration of police agents. Even in the case of the CPP, a legitimate ruling party, Dr Nkrumah has stated that a period of two years' probation is necessary for former members of other parties who wish to be admitted to membership.<sup>72</sup>

No African mass party can be understood without a careful examination of the organization and functions of its basic units. Indeed, a party's effectiveness would seem to depend largely on the extent to which the sense of solidarity ('*asabiyya* is the Arabic term), generated by these 'primary or face-to-face groupings' within the party, is able to take the place of the solidarity associated with older forms of face-to-face grouping – the lineage group, the *asafo* company, the Poro society, the *tariqa*.

#### INTERMEDIATE LEVELS

Between the basic units of a party and its central leadership lie intermediate authorities of various types: the *comités régionaux* of Istiqlal; the *fédérations* of Neo-Destour; the *sous-sections* and *sections* of RDA; the constituency and regional organs of the CPP. These are the levels at which a large proportion of the *militants*, the tried party workers, function. They provide the essential 'cadres', during the period of nationalist struggle and opposition, which can take over responsibility if the organization is decapitated by the arrest of its most prominent leaders. It is they who, in a post-

revolutionary situation – as in Morocco during 1955–6 – become in effect the local administration, concerned with the maintenance of internal security in their areas. It is from them, in the case of a governing party, that the office-bearers are principally drawn – municipal and district councillors, back-bench members of territorial or legislative assemblies, appointees to offices of profit in governmental and semi-governmental agencies, constituency or regional party organizers and officials.

This is how Hédi Nouira, a member of the central leadership of Neo-Destour, writing in 1954, described the functions of the party's *fédérations*:

The *fédération* is the intermediary between the base and the central directorate. It coordinates the activities of the branches which come within its jurisdiction, and supervises the carrying out of the tasks entrusted to it. At the same time it studies, at the regional level, the needs of the population... Its members, elected by the branch leadership, are released from parish-pump concerns to take charge of more important matters; relatively free from administrative functions, their responsibilities are primarily political... Whether they are drawn from the liberal professions, from agriculture, or commerce, their ties with the locality are strong; that is to say, they are not given to speculation, but interested in presenting to their supporters, in a practical and intelligible form, the most complex basic problems, the most subtle questions of tactics. Over the past ten years more and more intellectuals have been included in the leadership of the *fédérations*. And even those who have had no more than a primary education have acquired a solid political culture which many graduates from the capital might envy. Most of them are bilingual [i.e. in Arabic and French], and thus in direct touch with the Western world.<sup>103</sup>

This passage is interesting, not only as an account of the functions of Neo-Destour's *fédérations*, as seen from above at a time when the party was still in opposition; but also because it suggests rather than states almost all the problems which arise in connexion with the intermediate organs of mass parties. On the one hand they are constructed, normally, as an essential element in the party's popular basis, a vital link in the chain that binds the party to 'the people' – responsible to the local branches, with strong roots in the regions to which they belong. At the same time they are of necessity part of the apparatus of party power, responsible

for ensuring that the policies of the central directorate are accepted, and its instructions – however unpopular – carried out by the branches. Thus the intermediate organs are liable to find themselves ground between the upper, oligarchic, and the nether, democratic, millstones. No doubt, to use the term ‘democratic’ in this context is an oversimplification. For what is characteristic of the intermediate organs is that this is the level – as Professor Kenneth Robinson points out in relation to BPS in Senegal – at which the mass parties reveal themselves most clearly as ‘genuine political organizations, resembling in many respects those familiar in western countries, and struggling to conciliate the diverse interests of real life within a single movement’.<sup>22</sup>

The regional leadership of a mass party, while it usually includes representatives of the younger *militants* – brought up in the party, and giving it their undivided loyalty – may also have to find room for the leaders of what in Senegal are called *clans*, dominant local personalities and their followings. Indeed, in seeking to draw into the leadership of its *fédérations*, or *sections*, or constituency executives those whose ‘ties with the locality are strong’, the mass party may find itself obliged to seek local alliances with the heads of powerful *clans* – whose basis may be regional, ethnic, religious, economic, ideological, or any combination of these. In the élite parties, this raises no special problems, since such parties are essentially confederations of *clans*. But in the mass parties – which normally regard themselves as disciplined, centralized, monolithic, expressions of the popular will – the *clan* should, in theory, have no place. Hence the manoeuvres of the *clans* within BDS-BPS, ‘particularly in connexion with the nomination of candidates’, were ‘constantly denounced at congresses as endangering party unity’.<sup>23</sup>

However much the central leadership of the mass parties may disapprove of *clan* politics, in practice it often depends upon the local backing of *clan*-leaders. Thus the predominance of BDS-BPS-UPS in Kaolack during the decade 1948–58 was partly secured by the allegiance of the ‘patriarch of Kaolack’, Ibrahima Seydou N’Daw, the *Diaraf* of the region, and head of the Syndicat des Commerçants des Indigènes du Sine-Saloum, an organization grouping the African middlemen in the economically vital groundnut trade. Elsewhere the party’s popular following was increased by the

support of the three most important religious dynasties in Senegal – the Sy family of Tivouane, spiritual leaders of the 'Hafedist' Tijanis; the Tijani connexion associated with Seydou Nourou Tall, a direct descendant of al-Hājj 'Umar al-Tāl, especially influential among the Toucouleurs; and the M'Bake family, based on Diourbel, hereditary leaders of the powerful Murid confraternity.<sup>38</sup> (Two of these *clan* leaders, Ibrahima N'Daw and Sheikh Tidjane Sy, broke away from UPS to form the Parti de la Solidarité Sénégalaise in 1958, partly on personal grounds, but partly also expressing a conservative, Muslim-traditionalist, pro-French ideology.) In a somewhat similar way the NCNC succeeded in dominating Ibadan – the capital of the Western Region of Nigeria – thanks largely to the support, during his lifetime, of that great *clan* leader, Adegoke Adelabu, described as 'in effect the Ibadan District Council in himself', and at one time Chairman of the Council and of all its Committees.

There is no doubt that Mr Adelabu was the 'architect of victory' for the NCNC at the [1954] Council elections. His organizing ability, and his capacity to sway masses of people by emotional appeals and by those individual touches which mark all leaders of men, were decisive factors in this victory.<sup>39</sup>

Minor *clan*-leaders have their own importance too. Dennis Austin has stressed this point in relation to the CPP in northern Ghana: for example, the party's control of the constituency of Bongo after the 1956 elections depended upon its success in winning over W. A. Amoro, an early follower of the CPP through the Frafra Youngsters Association, originally elected to the Assembly as an Independent with the backing of the local chief; his followers were 'school contemporaries or kinsmen who are attracted by the modernism of the CPP and who have a high personal regard for him'.<sup>74</sup>

One might therefore argue that tension is liable to arise between the intermediate organs of a mass party and its central leadership, not so much because the former are necessarily 'democratic', but because they are broadly representative of local and regional standpoints and interests. Such tension may arise out of the attitudes of the party *militants* – who are in fact frequently 'given to speculation', whether the central leadership likes it or not, and

therefore liable to be critical of policies handed down from the centre – or of the local *clans* and their patrons. Where both elements are involved, tension is liable to develop into downright opposition, as in Ashanti in 1954, where a sizeable proportion of the middle leadership and regional supporters of the CPP seceded to form the National Liberation Movement. (At one time eighteen out of the NLM Executive Committee of twenty-one were former CPP members.<sup>72</sup>)

Hence, in order to strengthen party discipline and enforce the authority of the central committee, mass parties may be induced to accept a reduction of the autonomy of their intermediate organs and the disappearance of their elective basis. This is what appears to have occurred at the sixth congress of Neo-Destour in March 1959, at Sousse:

The *fédérations* elected by the *cellules*, which from a democratic point of view assisted communications between the *bureau politique* and the base, have been suppressed on the pretext that they had developed into 'fiefs'. They have been replaced by *missi dominici*, appointed by the *bureau*, who will doubtless see to the implementation of decisions taken at a higher level rather than concern themselves with demands coming up from the basic units.<sup>120</sup>

A similar kind of centralizing process has taken place within the CPP, where the former Regional Committees have been replaced by Regional Propaganda Secretaries – full-time, paid officers, appointed by the Central Committee, and considered 'part of the Accra Headquarters Secretariat' – though the elected annual Regional Conference, consisting of two representatives from each constituency, has been maintained.<sup>120</sup> Central control over the constituency organizations has likewise been strengthened by the appointment of salaried constituency secretaries.

Of course, there is a relationship between the geographical spread of a party and the degree of autonomy enjoyed by its intermediate organs. It is more possible to construct a highly centralized, disciplined party in Tunisia or Ghana than in Nigeria, or even Morocco. And in the case of an inter-territorial party, like the old RDA, the various territorial parties of which it was composed, though described as *sections* of the wider organization, in practice retained a large power of initiative, particularly evident in

the major *sections* of the Ivory Coast, Soudan, and Guinea. Thus, at the 1957 Bamako Congress for example, it was possible for the Ivory Coast and Guinea delegations to support totally opposed policies, and yet for formulae to be found which would keep both, for a period, within the framework of a single party.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, the experience of the RDA during 1957-8 shows how difficult it is for a decentralized party – a party which is in reality a confederation of parties – to resist tendencies to disintegration in a period of political transformation. This simply means that African mass parties are confronted with what is, after all, the basic political dilemma: the choice between excessive centralization and discipline – with the attendant danger of a slow decay of the party's popular basis – and excessive decentralization and local autonomy, with the danger of disruption through splits and factions.

#### THE PARTY LEADERSHIP

The question of the leadership of African parties – how it is organized, whom it contains, what sort of relationships exist between the various individual leaders, how major decisions are reached – is as interesting as it is difficult. The formal structure of the leadership of the mass parties is reasonably clear. Normally it contains three elements: the party leader, president, or chairman; an inner policy-making central committee, or *bureau politique*; and an outer executive committee or council, whose functions are mainly consultative. Except where, as in the case of the CPP, the party leader is 'life chairman', he and the outer committee are usually elected by the party congress; the inner committee may also be elected in this way, or elected by the outer committee, or nominated by the party leader. In Neo-Destour, for example, both the National President, Habib Bourguiba, and the *bureau politique* of fifteen members are elected, independently, by the party congress. The Central Committee of the CPP, on the other hand, is made up of the party leader, and 'eight other members selected by him and approved by the National Executive Committee'.<sup>120</sup> Istiqlal's leadership included in the same way a virtually permanent party leader, Si 'Alāl al-Fāsi; an inner *comité exécutif* – which at one time consisted of no more than four members – and an outer *conseil supérieur*, from which the inner committee was drawn.<sup>37</sup>

Under conditions of legality the *conseil supérieur* was elected by the party congress.

The structure of the leadership of RDA, as a party of a federal type, was necessarily somewhat different. Its better-organized territorial *sections* conformed to the general pattern, with an outer *comité directeur* and an inner *bureau politique*, as well as a recognized territorial party leader. But at the inter-territorial level power was vested initially in an extremely interesting kind of directorate, the *comité de coordination* – consisting of half-a-dozen party officers, the President (Félix Houphouët-Boigny), four Vice-Presidents, and a General Secretary; a delegate from each of the territories in which the RDA possessed a *section*; and the party's parliamentary representatives, the *élus*.<sup>38, 122 \*</sup>

The difference between the two kinds of committee – inner and outer – reflects two different aspects of the party's practical needs. The outer committee is intended to reflect, as far as possible, the life of the party, and to associate regional or constituency representatives with the making of major party decisions. Hence it is frequently a large body, more of a parliament than a cabinet. For example, the executive committee of BPS in Senegal in 1957 was made up of 'the party *élus* (not only members of the metropolitan or territorial assemblies but also mayors who were party members), nine Youth Movement officials, together with constituency members numbering at least one more than the total number of *élus*, the quota for each constituency being determined in proportion to population'.<sup>32</sup> By 1958 the total membership of the executive had grown to 154. Similarly the National Executive Committee of the CPP has a membership of approximately eighty – including all the national and regional officers, six elected representatives from each region, and two representatives each from the Parliamentary Committee, the T.U.C., the Farmers' Council, and the Co-operative Movement.<sup>120</sup> Bodies of this size and composition are too large for discussion, and can only be assembled fairly infrequently, especially in Africa, where journeys may take days rather than hours: the CPP constitution provides for not less than twice-yearly meetings of its National Executive Committee.

The inner committee, on the other hand, is essentially a working

\* See pp. 104–5, below.

committee, small enough to permit the full discussion of major questions of policy, readily accessible to the party leader, and meeting, as a rule, at frequent intervals. The CPP constitution lays it down that 'the members of the Central Committee shall normally reside in Accra, the capital, and shall meet ... at least once a week or, if emergency arises, from day to day to review major trends, formulate tactics and strategy'.<sup>120</sup> According to Kwame Nkrumah's *Autobiography*, meetings of the Central Committee were usually held at his home on Tuesday evenings.<sup>55</sup>

The *Autobiography* also gives some indication of the kinds of issues discussed, both by the Central Committee of the CPP and by its National Executive Committee. The former is mentioned as having met – (a) in February 1951, immediately after Kwame Nkrumah's interview with the Governor and shortly after his release from James Fort prison, to discuss the names of the ministers to be included in his first government; (b) some time in 1953, to discuss a report by the Chairman of the Cocoa Marketing Board regarding irregularities in the affairs of the Cocoa Purchasing Company; (c) in 1954, before the June general election, to consider recommendations from constituency parties for candidates for the Assembly, and to approve the final list; (d) in June 1956, to decide whether Nkrumah should attend a CPP pre-election rally in Kumasi.

The N.E.C., on the other hand, appears to have met in 1951, after the formation of Nkrumah's first government, when it expressed the view that, by accepting office, the CPP was 'at least preventing the "stooges and reactionaries" from taking advantage of the position'. It met again before the emergency delegates' conference in November 1953, when it recommended that 'an Act of Independence be simultaneously passed by the United Kingdom Parliament and the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly declaring the Gold Coast to be, under the new name of Ghana, a sovereign and independent State with Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II as Head of State'. And it met in May 1956, when it agreed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies' request for a general election, but asked that 'the Governor should contact the political leaders of every party, including the Asantehene, and warn the people against violence', and take other steps to ensure the maintenance of law

and order during the election period.<sup>55</sup> This is, of course, a relatively small sample: but, so far as it goes, it confirms the generalization – that the Central Committee meets to decide day-to-day questions of policy, whereas the N.E.C. is summoned to give, not necessarily uncritical, support to the inner party leadership over large issues of principle, or to assist in making decisions involving a wide range of local knowledge – the selection of the party's candidates for parliamentary elections in particular.

The more interesting question, however, is the actual locus of power within the party leadership, rather than its formal structure. How does the leadership of any given party arrive at its decisions? What part in the process of decision-making is played by the party leader himself, by individuals standing in a particularly close relationship to the leader – as Botsio and Gbedemah have stood in relation to Nkrumah, Mamadou Dia to Senghor, Ismail Touré to Sékou Touré – by the central committee or *bureau politique* as a corporate group, by the leaders of powerful pressure-groups associated with the party? Clearly this is the kind of question to which there is no general answer. But there is evidence of two contrasting tendencies in African parties – one towards a more personal, and the other towards a more collective, form of leadership.

In the more weakly structured élite parties it is natural that supreme authority should frequently be concentrated in the hands of the dominant personality, as it was concentrated in the hands of Lamine Guèye in the Senegalese SFIO or of Fily Dabo Sissoko in the PPS of Soudan. Indeed, the leader's predominance may often be such that, with his death or retirement, the party disintegrates, as the Union Franco-Guinéenne in Guinea disintegrated after the death of deputy Yacine Diallo.<sup>56</sup> In the mass parties the situation is more complex. Here the contrast is between parties in which in practice an agreed constitutional procedure exists for arriving at decisions, where 'power is distributed among a number of duly appointed leaders' and there are 'institutional checks on the use made by the leaders of the powers delegated to them',<sup>57</sup> and parties where – whatever the formal constitutional arrangements – such procedures and checks are in practice lacking, where the effective source of power is the party leader and his personal appointees.

Between these two ideal types – of personal and collective leadership – there is room for many variations; and all mass parties, no doubt, contain elements of both types. But while, for example, both Dr Azikiwe and Dr Nkrumah possess certain ‘charismatic’ qualities, it seems clear that leadership is much more highly personalized in the NCNC – where successive attempts to introduce more collective methods of decision-making have been defeated, and led at times to splits within the party – than in the CPP, where the directorate has from the outset had more of a collegiate character, and Nkrumah has tended to regard his function more as that of supreme arbiter, the ultimate reconciler of conflicting *tendances* and standpoints within the party.

Dr Schachter has pointed out similar contrasts between various *sections* of the RDA in former French West Africa.<sup>38</sup> In the Ivory Coast Félix Houphouët-Boigny came increasingly to exercise a patriarchal form of leadership. In Soudan, on the other hand, Mamadou Konaté, until his death in 1956 the party’s pre-eminent leader, was subject to the checks of a regularly meeting *comité directeur*, which allocated tasks and responsibilities, and could on occasion overrule him. PDG in Guinea lay somewhere between these two extremes – accepting the principle of collective decisions, but limited as regards its practical application by the rapid pace of party growth, the party’s semi-clandestine character prior to 1956, and the intense popular reverence attaching to the personality of Sékou Touré. These differences in the form of party leadership were associated with different procedures for the selection of the party’s candidates for parliamentary office: nomination by the party leader, with occasional provision for ratification by the party executive, in the Ivory Coast; discussion of the party leader’s recommendations in the *comité directeur*, leading to an agreed committee decision, in Soudan and Guinea.

In Senegal, with its tradition of a politically active intelligentsia, ‘the educated leaders of BDS-BPS-UPS were not inhibited from expressing disagreement with the pre-eminent leader, Senghor, even though he enjoyed a degree of popular prestige which approximated to charisma’.<sup>38</sup> Professor Robinson’s account of the 1957 elections to the Senegal Territorial Assembly gives a good idea of the way in which this prestige was used to harmonize, as far as

possible, opposing standpoints, interests, factions, and claims within the BPS, during the critical period when the party was nominating its candidates – which, given the party's political predominance, in the majority of cases meant selecting its assemblymen.<sup>32</sup>

I have mentioned elsewhere certain common characteristics of African mass party leaders:<sup>24</sup> the fact that in many cases they are the founders of their parties, and frequently also the main architects of the party machine; that, for the mass of their supporters, they have come to symbolize the nationalist idea, and with it – as Dr Apter has stressed, in relation to the CPP's slogan, 'Free-dom' – new possibilities of satisfaction, and the demand for improved material standards;<sup>8</sup> that they have tended to replace the chief or the *marabout* as the intermediary between God and man, and hence may be regarded – by Animists, Muslims, and Christians alike – as having a special sanctity, or *baraka*, and sometimes as possessing quasi-magical powers.

These qualities have given the first generation of African party leaders a position of predominance which it is difficult to challenge. Even those who have preferred the status of Caesar to that of Augustus, and have not actually adopted Nkrumah's title of 'Life Chairman', often seem to be in practice irremovable from the party leadership, so long as they choose to remain in office. One example of a mass party leader whose authority was ultimately rejected by the majority of his central committee was Messali Hajj, the founder and president of the Algerian PPA-MTLD, on the occasion of the split between the *centralistes* and the *messalistes* in 1954 – the crisis which immediately preceded the launching of the Algerian revolution.<sup>11, 26</sup> But, while circumstances normally tend to encourage a concentration of power in the hands of party leaders, both during the period of nationalist struggle and after the achievement of independence, there are none the less significant differences between the ways in which the various leaders interpret their functions. Many become chief ministers, which may be only a preliminary – as with Bourguiba, Sékou Touré, or Nkrumah – to becoming also Heads of State. Others, like Si 'Alāl al-Fāsi, have remained outside the institutions of government, exercising their authority mainly through the institutions of the party.

Sometimes the leader's influence is buttressed by the develop-

ment of a specific ideology, with which he is personally identified – as Bourguiba is identified with 'Bourguibism', and Nkrumah with Pan-Africanism, and more recently 'Nkrumaism'. Some – like the Abbé Fulbert Youlou in the Republic of the Congo, or the late Barthélémy Boganda in the Central African Republic – have been widely regarded as spiritual leaders, prophets, messiahs, in their own right; while others – like Isma'il al-Azhari (up to 1956) or 'Abdullah Khalil in the Republic of the Sudan – have limited themselves to secular functions, but have partly depended for their influence among the mass upon the background support of the heads of the established religious orders.

It could, I think, be argued that it is among the older generation of mass party leaders – those who had already achieved political authority by the end of the Second World War – that the tendency to personal leadership has been most pronounced: Lamine Guèye in Senegal; Houphouët-Boigny in the Ivory Coast; Messali Hajj in Algeria; Bourguiba in Tunisia; Azikiwe in Nigeria; and Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya. The newer leaders who have emerged during the period 1945–60 have on the whole reacted against the 'cult of personality', and have criticized the great patriarchs of the past – and the present – on the ground that a collective form of leadership is more mature, rational, and effective; they have sometimes also asserted that it is more in harmony with 'the African tradition' of constitutional checks on chiefly power. (I am aware that there is a strong tendency to exaltation of the leader in Kwame Nkrumah's case. But within the CPP it is, I think, recognized that the responsibility for decisions rests with the Central Committee, not merely with the Life Chairman.)

Some parties have used the collective principle as part of the basis of their popular appeal; the BDS in Senegal, for example, described the system of leadership in the SFIO as *Laminisme*, and claimed that the Senegalese Socialists worshipped 'the fetish of a man – the divine-right chief of African democracy'.<sup>38</sup> And while FLN, as a revolutionary front, is in a special position, its insistence upon government by committee and the insufficiency of the individual would find support in many of the mass parties:

FLN in its very essence is violently opposed to the cult of personality. It has officially condemned 'Messalism' in its historic proclamation of the

1st November 1954.... This is a medieval method of government and leadership which Islam yesterday and today, in the twentieth century, has unremittingly condemned.... The first Khalifs after the Prophet Muḥammad rigorously applied, in their relations with their citizens, the verse of the Koran 'Matters are arranged in common'. Granted the principle of human fallibility, the only remedy for man's inadequacy, required by Providence, is consultation with others, the interchange of ideas, the free discussion of every problem. The advantages of this type of leadership in our organization, at every level, are immense.<sup>127</sup>

How far this ideal of government by discussion has actually been realized, in FLN or any other African political organization, deserves investigation. But that this is an operative idea in many of the mass parties is undeniable. And, as Dr Schachter has pointed out in relation to the French West African parties, in so far as the idea has been applied, it has operated as a barrier to the influence of external pressure-groups upon the party, assisted the resolution of internal controversies, made it easier to deal with problems of succession within the leadership, and provided some check upon corruption and patronage.<sup>38</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATIVES AND THE PARTY

What kind of relations exist between African parties and their representatives in parliament, or other forms of elected assembly, including, in the case of governing parties, their ministers? How far do the parliamentary representatives tend to dominate their parties? How far, and how effectively, do parties attempt to control their representatives? Questions of this kind have again to be related to the very different political contexts in which they may arise.

At one extreme are the legislatures of the Central African Federation, in which, as in the *Conseil Colonial* of the former Belgian Congo, Europeans – elected, nominated, or official – have been preponderant. In such circumstances the attitude of African nationalist parties, or congresses, to 'European-dominated' assemblies has been one of diffidence, or even open hostility. In Northern Rhodesia the Zambia African National Congress, led by Kenneth Kaunda, split from the main body of the Congress in 1958 principally on the issue of non-participation in the elections held

under the new constitution.<sup>131</sup> Where candidates put forward by nationalist organizations win seats in such assemblies, they are carefully watched lest they 'go over to the enemy' or become European 'stooges'. Nationalist leaders who are also members of the legislature can only retain the confidence of their supporters if they conduct themselves as 'tribunes of the people', and use their positions to agitate for fundamental constitutional change. At the other extreme are the legislatures of Ghana, Guinea, or Somalia, which are – in present circumstances – essentially mechanisms employed by a dominant mass party for achieving certain ends which it regards as desirable: putting new legislation on to the statute book, giving publicity to its plans and policies, sounding opinion, permitting a limited ventilation of grievance, and so forth. Here there is clearly a tendency towards identity, not merely of interests but of personnel, between the party leadership and its parliamentary representatives and ministers.

Somewhere in between these extremes lies the type of situation that existed in French Africa during the period 1945–58. On the one hand, the *parlementaires* representing the mass parties, in particular the RDA, were obliged to function as a tiny minority within a European-controlled, Paris-centred, parliamentary system, and were liable to become involved in the manoeuvrings of French metropolitan parties, and the dynastic conflicts of the *ministres*, remote from the problems of the African masses; they were therefore exposed to criticism from elements in the party leadership who remained outside the French parliament. At times they were even regarded by the left wing of the party as *corrompus*, *traîtres*. On the other hand, since the RDA (and BDS) *parlementaires* were genuine mass party leaders, owing their parliamentary status to popular support and votes, and able within limits to use their strategic position within the French system to achieve constitutional and social reforms in Africa, their parliamentary role tended on balance to reinforce their authority within their parties.<sup>38</sup>

Granted these profound differences in the political setting, there are none the less certain common factors affecting relations between African parties and their parliamentary representatives. One of the most obvious is the economic gulf which separates the member of an African Legislative Assembly from the mass of his

constituents and supporters, and even from the main body of his party's *militants*. The salary scales of African legislators vary, but their general range is from £700 to £1,500 a year. In addition, there are the usual subsidiary advantages of parliamentary office, travelling and subsistence allowances, and the like. And there are 'prospects' of various kinds to which office opens the door: gifts from followers; the possibility, if the party is in power, of a ministry, a ministerial secretaryship, or a seat on a Government Board. In societies in which the average annual income per head is of the order of £15 or £30 membership of the legislature normally means promotion to an economically privileged class, to a much more marked extent than in the case of Socialist deputies in Western countries.

The benefits are not, of course, all on one side. The African deputy is expected to reciprocate on a more generous scale than is expected, or even permitted, in the contemporary West. In his constituency he is regarded as an investment. Especially at election time he must provide 'kola nuts, supplemented with beer, and even whisky', rewards for 'dancers, drummers, pipers', 'consolation for relatives of the dead, honour for relatives of the new-born, help for the destitute'.<sup>77</sup> If the disparity of economic standards is greater than in the West, the social distance is certainly narrower.

Second, the parliamentary representative occupies a recognized and important place in the new social hierarchy. The view that most African electors do not understand the meaning of parliament or the purpose of elections is certainly mistaken. 'The member of parliament is known to be an important person, who has replaced the old District Commissioner, with access to the distant seat of authority.'<sup>74</sup> Even though he depends for his parliamentary seat upon party endorsement and support, in so far as he can get things done for the benefit of his constituency he rapidly becomes 'important' in his own right.

Third, there is the factor of local loyalties – the extent to which a parliamentary representative's support in his constituency is liable to depend upon the strength of his local, ethnic, or family connexions. It has been said of Western Nigeria – but the statement has fairly general validity outside the great cosmopolitan urban

centres – that ‘it is very difficult for a man to stand outside the area where he was born’.<sup>79</sup> This is not, of course, true of front-rank politicians: the fact that he was born in Nzima has not prevented Dr Nkrumah from winning large majorities in Accra. And it has in the past been less true of the French than of the British territories. It has been possible for Gabriel D’Arboussier, now a Minister in the Senegal Government – whose father was a French colonial governor, and whose mother’s home was Jenne, in Soudan – to reside in Dakar, and win seats as an RDA candidate in the Moyen-Congo, the Ivory Coast, and Niger. But this is unusual. Professor Robinson in his account of the 1957 Senegal elections describes the ‘parachuting’ by the BPS of leading members of the party, resident in Dakar or Saint Louis, into rural constituencies, over the heads of candidates with local claims, as one cause of friction between the party leadership and its local organs.<sup>32</sup>

Fourth, in territories where the pace of constitutional change has been rapid, dominant parties have generally been faced with the problem of finding enough parliamentary representatives, and – what is often a more serious problem – enough ministers. A party may be thoroughly egalitarian from an ideological standpoint; it may, like PDG, assert that ‘Mamadou [i.e. Bill Smith] is as good as Vincent Auriol’,<sup>38</sup> or believe that every houseboy must learn to govern Africa. But it is still faced with the problem that certain combinations of qualities – linguistic, technical, and intellectual, as well as moral and political – are needed by those who have to carry out parliamentary or ministerial functions. This has a dual effect. On the one hand it is likely to mean that a very high proportion of the party’s leadership – intermediate as well as central – is ‘absorbed’, especially where there are diplomatic posts, chairmanships of boards and committees, special missions, and the like, requiring reliable party men, as well as the cabinet and the legislature. In these circumstances there is not likely to be much of the party’s internal leadership remaining unabsorbed by the organs of government. On the other hand a governing party, particularly if it has only recently obtained power, may seek to strengthen its position by including among its ministers some – intellectuals, professional men, or technicians – whose status in the party is doubtful, or non-party men who only become party members

after they have become party ministers – as Dr Nkrumah included A. Casely-Hayford and E. O. Asafu-Adjaye in his 1954 government.

The combined effect of these various factors – the economic gulf between the parliamentary representative and the common man, the status and prestige which the representative enjoys, the importance of his local connexions, the tendency of the party leadership to become absorbed in the parliamentary and ministerial leadership – is, naturally, to assist the domination of the representatives, and even more the ministers, over the party. In the case of élite parties, like the NPC in northern Nigeria, no problems arise: this domination is taken for granted. But in mass parties the situation is not so simple. Like Jehovah, the mass party is a jealous God. It permits the worship of no gods but itself. To bow down before ministers and members of parliament – except in their capacity as party leaders and *militants* – is idolatry. Hence in the mass parties – as in the Socialist parties of the West – there is always tension, present as a possibility if not as a fact, not necessarily between the parliamentary leadership and the non-parliamentary *militants* (although it may on occasion take this form), but rather between the actual tendency for power to become concentrated in the hands of the parliamentary representatives and the idea of the party as the sole source of power, with representatives – or ministers – acting as no more than party delegates.

Much of the time this tension is contained. Occasionally it expresses itself in open conflict. One example of such a conflict was the 1950 crisis in the RDA.<sup>38, 124</sup> True, like all party crises, this one turned on a variety of issues – of which the most significant appeared to be the question of breaking the RDA's relationship with the French Communist Party. But it involved at the same time a struggle for control over the RDA between the *parlementaires*, led by F. Houphouët-Boigny, the party's President, and the left wing of the party, led by G. D'Arboussier, who, though himself a minor *parlementaire* representing the Ivory Coast in the Assembly of the French Union, owed his status and influence in the party to the fact that, as Secretary-General, he had made himself the highly efficient manager of its machine.

During its phase of close association with the PCF, from 1946 to

1950, the RDA had accepted the principle that its parliamentary representatives were 'firmly subordinated to the Coordinating Committee, the supreme directing organ' of the party.<sup>122</sup> Indeed, at its second Abidjan Congress, in February 1949, the party reorganized the Coordinating Committee in such a way as to exclude the *parlementaires* as such, and to include only the eight inter-territorial officers and two representatives from each territorial *section* – some of whom were in fact *parlementaires*.<sup>123</sup> But in 1950 it was the RDA *parlementaires*, meeting as a distinct group, who took the critical decisions – to cut the party's communications with the PCF; to abandon its former 'systematic opposition' to the regime, in France and in Africa, and substitute a policy of 'constructive collaboration'; and to request D'Arboussier to resign his post as Secretary-General, as a necessary 'tactical retreat'. From 1950 until 1955 the Coordinating Committee never in fact met, and the group of RDA *parlementaires* for practical purposes took over its functions, transforming itself quite unconstitutionally into the 'supreme directing organ' of the party.

Hence, in the lengthy controversy which followed, Gabriel D'Arboussier and his supporters were as much concerned to attack the usurpation of power by the parliamentary oligarchy as to criticize the 'betrayal of the anti-colonial struggle'. Whether the Coordinating Committee, had it met in 1950, would have backed the *tendance D'Arboussier* against the *tendance Houphouet* is uncertain. But it is significant that it was five years before the parliamentary leadership was sufficiently confident that its authority was established and its policies approved, in most of the territories of Afrique Noire, to call a meeting of the Coordinating Committee, at which the still dissident *sections* of Senegal, Niger, and Cameroun, were formally expelled from the party.<sup>12, 77</sup> It is significant also that in 1956 D'Arboussier made his peace with Houphouet-Boigny, acknowledged past errors, and was readmitted to the party leadership. The practical outcome of the 1950 crisis in the RDA was a clear victory for the *parlementaires*.

One might contrast the outcome in Nigeria of the 1952–3 crisis in the NCNC, in which the claims of the parliamentary representatives, and more particularly of the ministers, to power openly collided with the party's claim to control its representatives. This

episode ended in a clear victory for the party.<sup>15</sup> True, the two situations differed in a number of respects. From an organizational standpoint the NCNC was a good deal more weakly structured than the RDA. Dr Azikiwe enjoyed an even greater degree of personal ascendancy in the inner party caucus – the Executive Committee – than F. Houphouët-Boigny. And the NCNC was represented in the federal Council of Ministers by three young intellectuals – A.C. Nwapa, Dr Okoi Arikpo, and E. Njoku – whose links with the party were more tenuous, and their status less secure, than those of the RDA *parlementaires*. A further complicating factor was the constitutional arrangements, which had the effect of separating the federal Ministers from the NCNC national leadership, most of whom sat in the House of Assembly of the Eastern Region, while Dr Azikiwe himself represented Lagos in the Western House.

The three federal Ministers attempted to overcome these difficulties by holding periodic consultations with the party President, Dr Azikiwe. But conflict developed, partly – according to Arikpo's account – because of the feeling of the party leaders that the Ministers should supply them with secret government information; partly because the Ministers believed that the constitution should be worked, while the party leadership was more inclined to the view that it should be rendered unworkable; but above all because the Ministers made clear their dislike of what they regarded as 'arbitrary dictation and control by the party leaders', a control exercised not by any parliamentary committee of the party, but directly by its National Executive.<sup>44</sup> Finally the three Ministers excused themselves, on the ground of pressure of government business, from attending a special Convention of the party, held at Jos in December 1952, at which they were expelled for insubordination. Later, in 1953, a similar fate overtook some of the NCNC ministers in the Eastern Regional House of Assembly who were unwilling to cooperate in a ministerial 'reshuffle' on which the party's National Executive had agreed.

Just as the RDA crisis of 1950 was followed by an effort of the *parlementaires* to consolidate their authority over the party, so the NCNC crisis of 1952–3 was followed by moves on the side of the party leadership to strengthen its control over its parliamentary

representatives and ministers. At the Jos Convention the party President laid down the principle that – ‘from now onwards the Party will see to it that all Ministers toe the Party line or be disciplined’.<sup>15</sup> The Convention decided to introduce an ‘oath of fidelity’, insisted that henceforward NCNC legislators should carry out party instructions ‘to the letter’, and agreed that no one should contest an election on the NCNC’s platform who had not been a member of the party for at least two years. Other techniques were later introduced or recommended, aiming at increasing the effectiveness of party control, and emphasizing the ‘delegate’ conception of parliamentary and ministerial office. In 1954 the National Executive decided that all future NCNC Ministers must sign an undated resignation, to be kept by the party’s President; while the parliamentary party requested the federal Government to introduce legislation compelling any assemblyman, elected on a given party ticket, who subsequently changed his allegiance, to resign his seat – a request which the federal House of Representatives in fact rejected.<sup>16</sup>

These examples of tensions within the party erupting into open conflict suggest certain tentative conclusions. First, though there has clearly been a tendency for parties to be dominated by their parliamentary representatives, this is not a tendency which operates uniformly. Within all the mass parties there are alternative sources of power. Various factors may operate to limit the importance and influence of assemblymen: in Ghana, their fairly rapid turnover; in Guinea, the PDG’s insistence that they should combine other forms of public service, as administrators or the like, with their duties in the Assembly.

Second, parliamentary representatives operate in a different environment, face different problems, talk a different language, from party leaders. This remains true even where the party leader is also Prime Minister, and his cabinet colleagues are leading members of the party caucus. The same issues may be discussed by the same participants with ‘calm deliberation’ in the cabinet and ‘in bitter and angry terms’ in the party’s central committee.<sup>8</sup> Thus tension exists even where the party’s chief parliamentary representatives and its inner leadership are identical. But it is where there is a clear divorce between the two, as in the NCNC in

1952-3, or where the policies pursued by the majority of the parliamentary representatives are opposed by a sufficiently powerful element within the party leadership, as in the RDA in 1950, that tension is liable to lead to actual conflict.

Finally, where power within the party passes into the hands of its parliamentary representatives and ministers – as tends especially to occur in the case of well established governing parties – and tasks formerly carried out through the agency of the party are increasingly dealt with through the organs of government, this is likely to have a weakening effect upon a party's vitality. The lines of communication between the party's central committee, its regional authorities, and its basic units deteriorate through lack of use.

#### THE PARTY CONFERENCE

Party conferences, in Africa as elsewhere, have as their lowest common denominator the fact that they are great ceremonial occasions, when the solidarity of the party community is reasserted through the rituals of reports by the party leadership, prolonged debates, resolutions, elections, ovations, greetings from fraternal delegates and local dignitaries. The mere assembling of representatives from a variety of widely separated towns and villages – and sometimes nomadic encampments – throughout the area in which the party operates, their intercourse with one another and with the party leadership in a setting dominated by the party's colours, emblems, slogans, songs, and in a centre where they are surrounded by the interest and enthusiasm of the local population – all this makes the party conference an essential institution for maintaining party unity, and strengthening party loyalty as against other competing loyalties.

In the élite parties it is undoubtedly this ceremonial aspect that predominates. But in the mass parties the conference combines this with other functions. It provides also a channel of communication between the party leadership and the *militants*, an elective basis for the leadership's authority, and a means of securing popular endorsement – and sometimes modification – of its attitude to major questions of policy.

The party conference is not, of course, the only, and not necessarily the most important, means of communication between leadership and *militants*, or even rank-and-file party members. In most mass parties there are frequent deputations, from party branches or allied organizations, to the party headquarters. On the whole mass party leaders have preserved the tradition of the accessibility of the Chief. Dr Nkrumah, describing his working day during the early period of CPP power, says:

And then there was the Party to consider. The party Headquarters was filled to capacity each day with members coming to see me with urgent problems, personal matters, or just to shake my hand, and it was all-important that I should be there to meet them.<sup>55</sup>

There are also the periodic tours of the party leader and his close associates in the central committee; these are, like the traditional *ziara* of the *marabout*, opportunities for confirming the faithful, but also for discussions regarding party organization and policy. There may be special party assemblies – apart from the full-dress conferences for which party constitutions provide – which enable the leadership to sound opinion among the local *militants*, like the CPP emergency delegates' conference in November 1953, called to discuss organizational problems and the next stage of constitutional reform.<sup>56</sup> The PDG in Guinea, during its period of rapid growth and transformation from a militant opposition into a governing party, from 1953 to 1957, held in fact no formal territorial conferences – at which, constitutionally, the number of delegates should have been proportional to the number of card-carrying members in each *sous-section* – but only territorial meetings, at which two delegates from each *sous-section* had the right to vote.<sup>58</sup> None the less, the party conference, conceived in mass party theory as the ultimate source of power, which 'lays down the broad basic policy and programme of the party', whose 'decisions ... shall be binding on all members of the party and affiliated organizations',<sup>120</sup> remains an interesting institution. It is worth considering what contribution it actually makes to the shaping of party policies and the selection of party leaders.

Over and above the general limitations which apply to elected assemblies of all types, everywhere, and at all times, there are some

special limits to the control over party decisions which African party conferences can exercise. One is their irregularity. Party constitutions normally provide for conferences to be held at regular intervals, usually annually. But various factors operate to prevent this from occurring in practice, even in some of the best organized parties: among them transport problems, finance, administrative difficulties, the restrictions imposed by semi-illegality, rapid changes in the political situation, conflicts between rival factions in the leadership of the party, or the sheer unwillingness of the leadership to be confronted with the party *militants* at this or that particular juncture. The CPP in principle holds its Annual Delegates' Conference during August Bank Holiday week-end. But no conferences were in fact held in 1954, 1956, or 1957 on account of either general elections or the Life Chairman's absence in the U.S.A. The NCNC, though its constitution provided for an 'Annual Convention' which should meet during the second or third week of October, in fact held no conference between its Kaduna Convention in April 1948 and its Kano Convention in August 1951, during which period the standpoint of the leadership underwent a fundamental change.<sup>15</sup> Neo-Destour, which in principle holds biennial congresses, in fact held its sixth congress in March 1959, twenty-five years after its founding congress, and more than three years after its fifth.<sup>120</sup>

The outstanding example of a party which succeeded in maintaining its cohesion and popular support over a period of eight years, during which no inter-territorial conference was held, was the RDA. According to the RDA's constitution, such conferences should be held 'in principle' annually. In fact the institution lapsed between the second congress at Abidjan in January 1949, and the third at Bamako in September 1957; and the latter was three times postponed, to suit the requirements of the party leadership – in particular the party President, Houphouët-Boigny, at that time a French cabinet minister. As André Blanchet put it:

One might suspect that there was some concern among the party leadership at the prospect of facing a public debate with the various territorial *sections*, perhaps less convinced than themselves of the soundness of the line followed since 1951 and the break with the Communists. Whether M. Houphouët had deliberately chosen to wait until this conversion was

'digested', or whether he wanted to give the electors time to appreciate by practical experience the advantages of the *Loi-Cadre*, his course of action was bound to give rise to some uneasiness.<sup>19</sup>

The survival and growth of the RDA during the long period while inter-territorial conferences were put into cold storage were made possible by the use of other methods of communication: territorial conferences, held fairly regularly in the case of some *sections*, such as the Union Soudanaise; occasional meetings of the inter-territorial *Comité de Coordination*; and frequent informal contact between leading members of the various *sections*. None the less, there is probably truth in Sékou Touré's criticism, that in this way the RDA developed as an organization which was capable, up to a point, of accommodating its conflicting internal *tendances*, but incapable of taking decisions on major issues of policy.<sup>58</sup>

Control over the timing of conferences is thus one instrument which the leadership can use to limit their influence. Partial control of the participants is another. Formally, the basis of representation at party conferences is highly democratic, consisting of so many delegates elected by each *cellule* (as in Neo-Destour), or each constituency party (as in the CPP), or each territorial *section* (as in the RDA), plus a prescribed number of delegates from affiliated organizations, women's and youth sections, students' associations, etcetera. In practice, however, entire delegations may be excluded by a decision of the leadership in the interval between conferences – as occurred in the case of the supposedly Communist-inclined *sections* of the RDA, in Cameroun, Niger, and Senegal in 1955.<sup>39</sup> Or particular factions within the party may be neutralized by the expulsion of their leader, as the *Youssefistes* within Neo-Destour, who were opposed to Bourguiba's policy of accepting French concessions and seeking independence by instalments, were neutralized by the expulsion from the party of Salah ben-Youssef, who stood for the continuance of the national struggle, on the eve of the Sfax Congress in November 1955.<sup>20</sup>

Another method whereby the leadership naturally tends to limit the powers of the conference is through its control over procedure. Although the subordinate organs of the party can submit resolutions, most conferences spend much of their time receiving

and debating reports: perhaps a general report on party achievements and policy in the contemporary situation by the party leader, followed by special reports by members of the central committee on such topics as party organization, youth, economic development and problems, social conditions, education, and culture. In substance these reports define the party's policy and objectives. They may be modified by the conference on points of detail, but seldom as regards fundamentals.

The resolutions of the RDA's 1949 Abidjan Congress reflected the left-wing anti-colonial standpoint, and were couched in the Marxist language accepted at that time by the party leadership.<sup>123</sup> The resolutions of its 1957 Bamako Congress reflected the moderate nationalist standpoint, and were couched in the language of the French-African community, to which much of the party's leadership – little changed in composition since 1949 – had by that time moved.<sup>124</sup> This simply underlines a familiar point: that in all organizations a special kind of power is enjoyed by the office-holders, the *literati*, the Ministers of the Pen, those who actually write the party's reports and draft its resolutions, especially in societies in which party policies have to be committed to writing in an alien language, which many of the rank-and-file do not understand, and few outside the leadership can use with complete facility.

In spite of these limitations, the national conference plays a definite part in the making of mass party decisions, even if the kind of power which it can exercise is frequently kept in reserve. The mere fact that party leaders show hesitation and diffidence about summoning conferences is evidence that a conference is more than a ceremonial occasion. Dr Apter, however, has argued that the National Annual Conference of the CPP

is not exactly a rubber stamp, but it is not the arena of group struggle for the factions within the CPP, and enthusiasm and displays of esteem for the life chairman play a more significant part in the conferences than do the bloc manoeuvring characteristics of a Labour Party conference.<sup>8</sup>

This may be true of the CPP: it would certainly not apply to mass parties in general. In the case of the RDA's 1957 Bamako Congress – which was recognized as an important event in African history,

and has therefore been more adequately described than most – manoeuvring between blocs was clearly one of its dominant features.<sup>12</sup> On several major issues the radical Guinea bloc was in deep disagreement with the relatively conservative Ivory Coast bloc, with the Soudan bloc occupying something of a mediating position.

True, this kind of situation is more likely to arise in an inter-territorial party, in which each territorial *section* possesses its own leadership, than in parties – like the CPP or Neo-Destour – of a more highly centralized type. But this aspect of a mass party conference, as a setting in which conflicting *tendances* within the party confront one another in public debate, is never entirely absent. It is, in addition, an occasion when the *militants*, the party's intermediate and local leadership, although they cannot, except in a formal sense, 'determine' party policy or 'choose' its leaders, can none the less influence both, usually in a radical direction. Thus at Bamako it was the great majority of the delegates, not merely the Guinea bloc, who insisted upon a stiffening of the leadership's Algerian resolution, to include an urgent appeal to the French Government to negotiate with 'the authentic representatives of the Algerian people', and who showed very clearly their support for Sékou Touré's idea of democratic federalism, as opposed to Houphouët-Boigny's insistence upon States' rights; they even occasionally dropped their normal restraint to boo the Ivory Coast defenders of particularism.<sup>105</sup> The need to work out in committee an acceptable compromise resolution on this latter point, which would reconcile the views of the majority with the attitude of the party President and his supporters, eventually led to the prolongation of the Congress from four days to six.

Though the tendency of party conferences – in Africa as elsewhere – is to re-elect essentially the same party leadership, provided it retains its internal coherence, it can also give some indication of the limits within which the leadership is expected to use its power. Thus Sékou Touré, presiding over the closing session of the Bamako Congress, declared, somewhat in the manner of the leader of a Greek chorus, that

Félix Houphouët-Boigny remains our President. But he will represent to the [French] Government not his own ideas, but those of the RDA.<sup>12</sup>

## THE 'PARTY WITHIN THE PARTY'

It seems a fairly common phenomenon for African mass parties to contain within themselves small closely-knit groupings that seek, in one way or another, to influence party policy, or to reform the party from within. These inner groupings normally regard themselves as standing in the same kind of relationship to the mass party as the party stands in relation to the totality of society—as a 'vanguard', an *aile marchante*. Thus the NCNC in Nigeria has had its Zikist Movement and, after the latter's suppression in 1950, its Freedom Movement.<sup>15</sup> The CPP in the early 1950s contained a radical group known as 'the League of Ghana Patriots'.<sup>8</sup> More recently its place has been taken by NASSO and the 'Vanguard Activists'.<sup>72, 120</sup> The Groupes d'Études Communistes functioned as a kind of ideological advance-guard within the pre-1950 RDA.<sup>38</sup> From 1956, and possibly earlier, the groups of young intellectuals in Senegal known as *les jeunes turcs* played a prominent part in the BDS, and worked actively for the reorganization of structure and the reorientation of policy involved in the party's transformation into the BPS.<sup>38</sup> The Algerian MTLD had its underground para-military wing, the Organisation Secrète.<sup>28</sup> In Morocco, during the first three years of independence, from 1956–9, Istiqlal contained a radical wing, led by Si Mehdi ben Barka, which criticized the more traditionalist elements in the leadership, grouped around the party leader, Si 'Alāl al-Fāsi, and tried to achieve a reconstruction of the party from within.<sup>30, 59</sup>

These 'parties within the party' have certain well-marked common characteristics. They are based upon an ideology; their leaders and members, for the most part, take their ideology seriously. It is an ideology, naturally, of the Left, militantly anti-colonial, Marxist-influenced, or in some cases formally Marxist. From Communism is borrowed the idea of working as fractions within the mass party, leavening the lump, pushing it towards more 'progressive' or 'socialist' policies – or within organizations allied with the party, especially the trade unions. At the same time the 'party within the party' insists upon its loyalty to the wider organization, whose conscience and true interpreter of basic principles it is. The weakness of the mass party, from the standpoint of

this inner grouping, lies as a rule in its central leadership, which often fails to act on these principles; while preaching anti-imperial doctrine, for example, in practice it comes to terms with imperialism. It was on such a basis that the Zikist Movement criticized Dr Azikiwe: the Organisation Secrète criticized Messali Hajj: and the left wing of Istiqlal criticized 'Alāl al-Fāsi and, more strongly, Aḥmad Balafrej.

The ossification as well as the opportunism of the party leadership frequently comes under attack. Hence the 'party within the party' presses for a greater measure of party democracy, and more initiative for the basic units, the *militants*, the regional organizations, i.e. for those groupings within the party among which it enjoys influence. With this goes the idea of revolution as a continuing process. 'Independence is not enough': the political revolution must be followed by a social revolution, a transformation of antiquated economic and social institutions in the interests of the masses, who make national revolutions, but gain little of their fruits. Thus there is usually a strong Puritan strain in the 'party within the party', which increases its popular appeal, especially once the mass party becomes a governing party. It emphasizes the virtues of austerity, simple living, discipline, sacrifice, in opposition to the *arrivisme*, careerism, conspicuous consumption, of the new ruling élite.

It must, however, be admitted that, even if the 'party within the party' can be regarded as a common phenomenon, there are major differences in the form which it can take in the various mass parties at various stages of their history. Such groups may be committed to the idea of violence, as a necessary instrument of revolutionary policy, like the Organisation Secrète; or they may flirt with the idea (as seems to have been the case with the Zikist Movement); or (like the Senegal *jeunes turcs*) they may restrict themselves to agitation and pressure politics. And they may stand in various kinds of relationship to the party leader and the official leadership in general.

In the case of the Organisation Secrète and Mehdi ben Barka's movement within Istiqlal, the relationship was one of increasing strain, leading eventually to open conflict. The Zikist Movement was more ambiguous: 'Azikiwe tried to avoid open identification

with the leadership of the Zikist Movement at the height of its militant activity.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, it was with a measure of support from the leaders of the BDS, Lécopold-Sédar Senghor and Mamadou Dia, that the *jeunes turcs* energetically set about creating 'the first organized detachment of the West African masses of Senegal, the Senegalese section of the unified movement of workers and peasants.'<sup>16</sup> In Ghana, NASSO and the 'Vanguard Activists' have operated under the direct patronage of Dr Nkrumah. From a structural standpoint too the 'party within the party' may take various forms. It may, like the Organisation Secrète, develop a definite cell-structure, or, like the Zikist Movement, establish a network of branches. It may, on the other hand, be no more than a 'minority movement', an ideological *tendance*, a group – like the Senegalese *jeunes turcs* – of like-minded individuals, loosely associated on the basis of a common creed.

Understandably, the relationship between the 'party within the party' and the mass party within which it operates is likely to be unstable. No party finds it easy to digest a pressure-group of devoted, militant theoreticians who seek to reconstruct it according to their principles, even when they insist that their principles are simply the party's principles correctly interpreted. The problems involved in this relationship can be resolved in one of four main ways. The 'party within the party' may be suppressed – more or less successfully – as was the Zikist Movement. Or it may be contained – accepted by the party leadership, and used as part of the official party machinery – as in the case of NASSO and the 'Vanguard Activists'. Or it may be expelled or secede from the party, and become the germ of a new, more militant organization, as the Algerian Organisation Secrète was the germ from which FLN later developed.

Having learned their lesson from the setbacks of the political parties, sickened by futile discussions, alive to the dangers of the cult of personality, some of the younger men who had held posts of responsibility in MTLD, faithful to the revolutionary spirit which had created the O.S., met in Algiers, to the number of twenty-two. They decided to move over to direct political, economic, and social action, and fixed November 1st 1954 as the date on which operations should start.<sup>17</sup>

Thus also Mehdi ben Barka's wing of Istiqlal eventually broke away to form the nucleus of the UNFC.

Finally, the 'party within the party' may achieve, for a time at least, a position of dominance within the party, which it can then begin to transform in the light of its own political conceptions. This roughly was the situation of the *jeunes turcs* in relation to BDS-BPS-UPS during the period 1956-8. In all these cases, the final outcome remains unclear. The 'party within the party' may, like the Zikist Movement, reconstitute itself in some new form, after its apparent suppression or absorption; it may equally be forced to withdraw from a position of dominance within the party which at one time it achieved, as the *jeunes turcs* moved out of UPS. What is clear is that the power relations within an African mass party cannot be understood without taking account of this kind of advance-guard, or radical wing, which it is in the nature of mass parties to generate.

#### ALLIED ORGANIZATIONS

Any discussion of party organization must take account of the various peripheral associations which grow up on the margins of parties, particularly the mass parties, and within their general field of influence. How far are such associations spontaneously generated, and how far are they consciously constructed by the party and its leadership? The answer to this question naturally varies according to local circumstances, the types of association involved, and the political philosophy of the party concerned.

Where, as in the Maghreb, parties were faced with conditions of intermittent illegality or near-illegality, or where – as in the pre-1950 RDA, or the UPC in the French Cameroons – the Communist model had a definite influence, there was undoubtedly a tendency for the party to promote 'front' organizations, which, in theory at least, were less liable to be suppressed, or harried by the Administration and police, than the party itself. Thus Neo-Destour inspired the creation of such allied organizations as UTAC, the Union Tunisienne de l'Artisanat et du Commerce, and UNAT, the Union Nationale des Agriculteurs Tunisiens; while UPC fostered the growth of the Union Démocratique des Femmes and the Union de la Jeunesse.

Much more often, however, such associations have come into being by a process of spontaneous generation, and only at a later stage have they been brought within the ambit of a dominant party. I have already described the way in which, after the Second World War, in States in which Africans had come to enjoy certain rights of association, there occurred an efflorescence of popular organizations, in response to varying demand and catering for different interests: an ex-servicemen's interest, a trade union interest, an ethnic interest, a women's interest, and so forth. The explicitly political organizations which emerged during the same period were sometimes the offspring of these more specialized bodies, sometimes symbiotic with them.

Surveying the situation as it confronted them, the leaders of the new political organizations saw in these specialized bodies a source of further strength in the struggle against colonial power. By forging links with them they could greatly extend the range of interests to which their 'congress' or party appealed. Since it was their aim to speak on behalf of the entire people, or 'nation', it was natural that they should seek, through these links, to mobilize not merely the undifferentiated nation – of citizens or potential voters – but the nation in all its diversity, as women, youth, farmers, ex-servicemen, trade unionists, boy scouts, or footballers. While there has been a tendency for 'congresses' – like the NCNC in its first period – to attempt to build these specialized associations into their formal structure, African parties have in general preferred a looser kind of relationship; and the CPP's constitution has even referred disparagingly to affiliated organizations as 'apt to cause divided loyalties'.<sup>55</sup>

So long as parties have been in opposition, adequate links have been provided by the existence of an interlocking leadership, an overlapping membership, and an ideology and strategy which have had many elements in common. The mass parties have usually taken care that the major specialized interests – trade unions, farmers, women – should be represented in their higher leadership. Trade union power in particular has commonly served – as in other parts of the world – as a route to power within the mass party: as illustrated by the parts played by Ferhat Hached and Ahmed ben Salah in Neo-Destour; Mahjoub ben Seddik in Istiqlal and later

in UNFP; Sékou Touré in the RDA; Bakary Djibo in MSA-Sawaba; Anthony Woode, and at a later stage John Tettegah, in the CPP; and Tom Mboya in KANU and its predecessors. In 1958, trade union leaders held portfolios in the governments of seven out of the eight territories of French West Africa, all, that is, except Mauretania.<sup>114</sup>

At this point certain distinctions need to be drawn. The type of relationship established between trade unions and mass parties is in some ways a special case. Trade unions, even where – as in Tunisia – their development has been actively encouraged by the party leadership, have grown up in response to the pressures of a specific social group – the class of wage and small salary earners. It has been above all among this group that the general ideas of nationalism have been associated with well-defined economic demands – demands which are not necessarily acceptable to representatives of the professional and commercial élites, or those with a broadly 'bourgeois' outlook, within the party leadership. Hence trade unions are the clearest example of an organization which, even where it has accepted the principle of alliance with the mass party, has generally tried to preserve a measure of real autonomy. In this trade unions have been assisted by their international connexions, their affiliations to the ICFTU or sometimes to the WFTU. The fact of conducting their own international relations has given them a certain prestige and freedom of manoeuvre.

Hence too there have been frequent instances of tension between trade unions and parties: most pronounced, perhaps, in the Sudan, where the Sudan Workers' Trade Union Federation, under left-wing leadership, preserved its entire independence of both the major parties;<sup>19</sup> least evident in Guinea, where the unions provided the leadership, impulse, and initial organization around which the mass party was built.<sup>38</sup> On the whole it has been in the former French-controlled territories that the new model unions – UMT in Morocco, UGTT in Tunisia, and UGTAN in former French West Africa – though organized around the idea of 'backing political action in order to hasten the coming of national independence', have kept free from formal ties with the dominant parties, and thus have had the strongest impact.<sup>112</sup> In Tunisia in 1956 the influence of the UGTT 'alarmed the bourgeoisie, and appeared likely to be

an obstacle in the path of the financial aid which Tunisia was seeking in France and the West', giving rise to a situation in which, for a time, Neo-Destour floated its own breakaway trade union federation, the UTT. When the split occurred in Istiqlal in 1959, it was the UMT that provided an important body of organized support for the radical wing under Mehdi ben Barka's leadership. Allied organizations representing other types of economic interest – farmers, traders, or marketwomen – have seldom been so coherent, articulate, or politically effective, and have tended to function rather as satellites of the dominant party.

Women's and youth organizations stand in an altogether different, and much more intimate relationship to the party. In fact, it is somewhat straining the term 'allied organizations' to class them under this head. In the case of women in particular, where they have their own distinct sections, these are usually tied into the party structure, with horizontal links at the branch or constituency level. The CPP constitution, for example, lays it down that:

Each Party Branch shall have a Women's Section to cater for the special interests of women, but the Women's Section shall be part and parcel of the Branch. There shall be only one Executive Committee for each Branch, including the Women's Section. The same applies to the Ward and the Constituencies.<sup>120</sup>

Most mass parties, even in Muslim territories, emphasize the equality of women with men within the party, though in the SYL Dr Lewis points out that it is only 'in the partly Bantu culture of southern Somalia', as contrasted with the nomadic north, that women attend party meetings.<sup>98</sup>

The point of creating a distinct and parallel form of organization for women is not merely that it accords with the traditional social pattern, but also that it provides a channel through which women can carry out specific party functions – 'hold rallies, dances, picnics, and other social functions throughout the year', as the CPP constitution puts it.<sup>120</sup> In Tunisia, where Neo-Destour no longer has a women's section, but women participate in the life of the *cellules* on equal terms with men, the Union Nationale des Femmes Tunisiennes operates as an independent pressure-group,

concerning itself with the special needs and problems of Tunisian women, and representing their demands to the party leadership.

It would, however, be a profound mistake to conceive of the women's sections of mass parties as pre-occupied with organizing picnics and *tam-tams*, admirably though they carry out these duties. In many areas women constitute an important economic interest, illustrated by the case of the Ghana marketwoman who, when asked why she was going to vote, replied 'mebeko vote apatre' – 'I am going to vote fish' – as a Lancashire woman might 'vote cotton'. They have also played an extremely active part in political campaigns, especially during periods when their parties have been involved in direct or 'positive' action, involving strikes, boycotts, or disturbances, against the colonial regime, as in Ghana and the Ivory Coast in 1950. Modibo Keita, addressing the Bamako Conference of the RDA in 1957, pointed out that:

In all the [French African] territories women have taken part in militant action with more enthusiasm than men. While the latter are less liable to discouragement, the women on the other hand are less responsive to offers of place and office, and thus less open to corruption.<sup>77</sup>

But women's sections have also been important as agents for recruiting new members into the party and in the organization of electoral campaigns. They have stimulated nationalist parties – in the Maghreb especially – to include in their programmes demands of special interest to women, such as opposition to the veil, voting rights, reform of the divorce laws, the expansion and improvement of girls' education, or freer access for women to civil service posts.

It is perhaps surprising, given the significance of the contribution which women have made at the lower and intermediate levels of party life, that they have hitherto been relatively weakly represented in the national leadership. This may be in part a projection of tradition, in which women have tended to exercise political influence, as Queen Mothers or consorts, rather than to enjoy executive power. Mme Ouezzin Coulibaly, a *militante* of long standing in the Ivory Coast RDA, and a former Minister of Social Affairs, Labour, and Housing, in the Haute-Volta Government, is one of the rare women who have achieved a position of power at the centre of a major party.<sup>18</sup>

Structurally, youth organizations tend to be connected with their parent parties in much the same way as women's sections, through horizontal links at various levels, though with the difference that they are not necessarily regarded as organic parts of the parties to which they are attached. They have operated as a rule on the margins of parties, engaging at times of crisis in their own independent skirmishes with colonial authority, organizing school strikes and demonstrations, and subjected at other times to a measure of party discipline. Sometimes they have developed new and interesting lines of activity of their own. For example, the theatrical companies associated with Istiqlal's youth movement in Morocco performed 'unrehearsed plays dealing with contemporary topics; these plays attacked illiteracy, extravagance in marriage expenditure, the evils of drunkenness, and the like, in such a way as to make cautious propaganda for Istiqlal'.<sup>37</sup>

But the interests of 'youth', however interpreted, have generally been too diversified to be expressed through a single organization. In Africa especially the term 'youth' covers a wide age-range, from schoolboys to greybeards. In some territories, Tunisia and Morocco for example, nationalist boy-scout and girl-guide associations, operating outside the control of the colonial Administration and under the general influence of the dominant party, have been a means of mobilizing the under-twenties. Independent schools in the Maghreb, in Ghana, and to a limited extent elsewhere, and independent teachers' training colleges in Kenya, have been established under the inspiration of, and in fairly close liaison with, dominant parties.<sup>37, 78</sup> Students' organizations – especially those based initially upon France, UGEMA (the Union Générale des Étudiants du Maghreb Arabe) and FEANF (the Fédération des Étudiants d'Afrique Noire en France), and the various Students' Unions associated with the Committee of African Organizations in Britain – while avoiding in general commitment to particular parties, and frequently taking up positions to the left of the dominant parties in their own territories, represent an important type of pressure-group through which the young intelligentsia is able to support, criticize, or influence the parties.<sup>114</sup> Indeed youth organizations, like trade unions, have shown a fairly consistent tendency to independent action and radicalism. In

Senegal and Soudan (Mali), for example, the youth movements were pressing for *indépendance totale* well before the dominant parties were ready to formulate this demand.

It must, moreover, be remembered that, during the early phases of the history of most mass parties, a large proportion of their active membership is drawn from the very young, say the under-twenty-fives. At this stage it may well be through the party itself and its branches, rather than through a distinct youth organization, that the ideas and demands of the young are expressed. PDG in Guinea in the mid-1950s was described as possessing 'many of the characteristics of a youth organization', and consequently as free from the tensions between generations which had already shown themselves in older-established *sections* of the RDA.<sup>88</sup>

Just as there is a multiplicity of types of allied organization, so there can be different types of connexion between these organizations and the parent party. During the period of anti-colonial struggle, I have suggested, these connexions are in most cases fairly loose. To put it crudely, the party leadership need not worry overmuch about attempting to control its allies, since it knows that they and it are travelling in broadly the same direction. But after independence, or whenever a mass party finds itself in the position of a governing party, what were formerly allied organizations may become potential centres of opposition, expressing demands that conflict with Government policy – organs of criticism rather than of support. In such a situation there is a much more pronounced tendency for the party to seek to control these organizations, to ensure that their leadership is subordinated to the party leadership, and that their strategy fits into the general framework of party strategy. Neo-Destour and the CPP are both illustrations of this trend.

Neo-Destour, since 1956, in addition to taking steps to prevent the UGTT from becoming a basis of opposition to the regime, has restricted the autonomy of the party youth organization and the party Press.<sup>102</sup> In Ghana the TUC has reorganized itself, on the initiative of the CPP stalwarts within the leadership, partly on the model of the Histadruth in Israel, thus becoming more of a subsidiary of the party. And party control has been extended in a number of other directions:

Now that the party has become a government, the CPP likes to work through 'front organizations'. These are either party movements set up to rival existing associations (e.g. the Ghana Moslem Council v. the Moslem Association Party), or organizations 'captured' by the party (e.g. the Ghana Ex-Servicemen's Union), or specially designed by the party (e.g. the Ghana Builders' Brigade). These ancillary organizations have a life of their own, but, generally speaking, they are satellites thrown off and kept in orbit by the party.<sup>7a</sup>

At the same time party-controlled 'voluntary organizations' have become, in both Tunisia and Ghana, useful agencies for implementing certain aspects of Government policy. The unpopular decision to reduce the cocoa price from 72s. to 60s. a load, for example, was taken by the Ghana Farmers' Council. Such developments may be regarded as illustrations of a trend towards 'totalitarianism' if the term is understood in its literal sense as denoting a system in which the governing party seeks to organize, directly or indirectly, the 'totality' of social life.<sup>1</sup>

The main conclusion to be drawn from this lengthy discussion is the somewhat obvious one – that African mass parties are political systems of a highly complex kind. The simple 'authoritarian' labels of their critics are no more adequate to describe them than the simple 'democratic' labels of their supporters. One way, however, of attempting to answer the question – where, in any given party, does power lie? – is by breaking it down into a series of further questions: What part is played in the making of decisions and the formulation of policies by the party's basic units, its intermediate or regional organs, its central leadership (which itself includes various components), its parliamentary representatives and permanent officials, its delegate conferences, its inner groups of activists, its allied and peripheral organizations?

These questions will, of course, be answered differently, not only for different parties, but for the same party at different phases in its history. A party which at one stage of its development shows a strongly 'democratic' tendency – in the sense that considerable liberty of action is enjoyed by branches, regional organs, inner party groups, and peripheral organizations – may at another stage acquire a much more 'authoritarian', highly centralized character.

## Chapter 6

### PARTY ACTIVITIES

ANOTHER way of looking at African political parties is to consider what they *do*. Clearly there is some kind of relationship between structure and functions. In general it is the parties which are organizationally the most highly developed that generate the widest range of activities, while parties of a more primitive, amorphous type may in practice restrict themselves to competing periodically in elections. The mass party must, during the period of nationalist struggle, attempt to offer its members and supporters a set of values and a way of living consciously opposed to the values and mode of life sanctioned by the colonial regime. Hence it is liable to develop a multiplicity of activities, designed not only to diffuse its principles and objectives as widely as possible among the masses, but also to enable them to 'taste and see' the superiority of the new political order which the party seeks to establish over the existing colonial order. In addition to its propaganda, such a party may exercise a variety of judicial, administrative, police, educational, and social welfare functions.

This tendency shows itself especially where a mass party is on its way to becoming a kind of 'parallel State', coexisting with, and challenging, the colonial State; or where, as in Morocco and Tunisia in 1955-6 or Guinea in 1958-9, there has been a relatively rapid transfer of power from a colonial to a national government. In the interval between the partial breakdown of the old bureaucracy and its replacement by a new administrative apparatus, the dominant party may be the only agency capable of maintaining order and organizing essential services.

Is it possible then to suggest any basis on which the types of activities which African parties undertake might be roughly classified?

#### CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION AND VIOLENCE

At the outset it is worth asking: How far are African parties in general committed to employing what are usually called 'consti-

tutional' methods, i.e. participating in elections, agitation and propaganda, pressure-group activities, and the like, to gain their ends? How far are they willing, on occasion, to use non-constitutional and, in particular, violent methods? So stated, this is clearly an unsatisfactory question – though it is a question which colonial governments are liable to ask. It is unsatisfactory partly because we do not have clear and distinct ideas of what is meant by 'constitutional' action or by 'violence'. A particular operation, a general strike for example, may be regarded as unconstitutional by a colonial government and as constitutional by a nationalist party. Violence can vary enormously, both in intensity and character, from minor acts of intimidation to terrorism and armed insurrection organized on a national scale. Moreover, constitutional action and violence are not true opposites; certain types of activity, such as refusal to pay taxes, may be at the same time unconstitutional and non-violent.

It is, perhaps, more useful to imagine a spectrum or range of political methods, from exclusive reliance upon electoral and associated techniques at one end of the scale, to exclusive use of the method of revolutionary armed uprising at the other; and in reality, of course, we find a great variety of gradations between these theoretical limits. As regards Africa south of the Sahara, the point has already been made that representative institutions, elections, and the franchise have acted as a major stimulant to the development of parties, or the transformation of pre-existing congresses into parties.\* Hence there has been an evident bias among sub-Saharan African parties in favour of seeking power by constitutional means, in the sense of making use of such electoral machinery and representative institutions as happened to be available. These have been the techniques with which the parties have been most at home, since it was largely in order to apply these techniques that they were initially constructed.

Even where, as in Tunisia or Morocco, constitutional means for seeking power have been partially or wholly absent, and the developing parties have therefore shown much more marked revolutionary characteristics, they have tended to prefer legality and peaceful negotiation, when these were open to them. On the other

\* See pp. 34–8, above.

hand, in the two major instances of armed revolt in post-War Africa – Kenya and Algeria – the situation seems to have passed out of the control of the nationalist parties – which were in any case declared illegal – before revolt on any scale was undertaken. In the former French Cameroons the UPC, a party with a definite revolutionary bent, only turned to methods of armed revolt, describing itself as '*UPC sous maquis*', some time after it had been banned by the Administration in July 1955.<sup>65</sup>

One might therefore argue that African parties have revealed, on the whole, a 'constitutional bias'. This does not, of course, mean that they never resort to violence or approve its use. Indeed, the question whether or not to endorse a strategy of total non-violence was one of the most controversial issues arising at the 1958 All-African Peoples' Conference at Accra – dividing, in particular, the West African and some of the British East African delegates from the delegates of the Maghreb, supported by Somalis and Cameroonians. The eventual compromise resolution declared the Conference's

full support to all fighters for freedom in Africa, to all those who resort to peaceful means of non-violence and civil disobedience as well as to all those who are compelled to retaliate against violence to attain national independence and freedom for the people.<sup>128</sup>

The reasons for this divergence between what then appeared as the Maghribi and the West African (or possibly Commonwealth African) points of view are worth considering. It has sometimes been suggested that the Islamic conception of *jihād* may predispose national movements in Muslim countries to accept and justify the use of violence as a means to independence. I am sceptical about this hypothesis. Conceptions derived from the *Shari'a* play as a rule little part in the ideologies of modern Muslim nationalists: the Umma Party in the Sudan was not noticeably influenced by the traditions of the *Mahdiyya*; the NPC in Northern Nigeria, while it reveres the memory of 'Uthmān dan Fodio, seldom talks the language of his *jihād*. The influence of Gandhism and the example of the use of non-violent techniques by the pre-war Indian Congress have been more significant factors. Gandhist ideas have certainly penetrated further and deeper into Commonwealth Africa than into other African territories. But most impor-

tant are the differences of actual experience: the relative success of ballot-box techniques in West Africa (Guinea and Mali, as well as Ghana and Nigeria) and the partial failure of violent techniques in Kenya are contrasted with the success of armed revolt in Morocco, and to a more limited extent in Tunisia, and the total failure of *élections à l'algérienne*.

While there is no reason to suppose that African nationalist leaders are insincere in saying that they prefer a strategy of non-violence to a strategy involving the possibility or probability of violence, the choice does not usually present itself in such simple terms. There is a whole range of political techniques, broadly covered by Nkrumah's term 'positive action', which are normally regarded by colonial governments as unconstitutional, and whose use leads them to bring out the police and the military, to declare states of emergency, to place nationalist leaders under arrest, and so forth. The techniques of 'positive action' were defined by Nkrumah in 1949 as:

- (a) legitimate political agitation,
- (b) newspaper and educational campaigns, and
- (c) as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts, and non-cooperation, based on the principle of absolute non-violence.<sup>119</sup>

Techniques of the type referred to in Nkrumah's third category, while 'non-violent' in the sense that they do not involve the organizations which employ them in taking the initiative in violence are liable to produce, as their practical outcome, violent collisions between the popular forces and the forces of the colonial regime. There is indeed a fairly familiar pattern of events – illustrated by the Accra disturbances in February 1948, or the Leopoldville revolt in December 1958 – when a banned procession or meeting, called by a nationalist organization, leads to intervention by the police and military, spontaneous protest and physical resistance by participants, culminating in the shooting of members of the crowd by the forces of the regime.

Such collisions, though seldom planned by the leaders of the nationalist organizations concerned, cannot conceivably be repudiated by them, for various reasons. First, their effect is often to secure political concessions from the regime which would not

otherwise have been obtained – or at least to speed up considerably the process of political change. Second, they tend to intensify national consciousness among the masses. Third, they help to provide the heroic memories and the cult of martyrs which every popular movement in history has had to acquire. (Even so solidly constitutional a body as the British Labour Party attaches importance to Peterloo, the Tolpuddle Martyrs, and Bloody Sunday.) In his discussion of the role of political martyrs Sorel even argued that:

The Christian ideology was based on these rather rare but very heroic events; there was no necessity for the martyrdoms to be numerous in order to prove, by the test of experience, the absolute truth of the new religion and the absolute error of the old, to establish thus that there were two incompatible ways, and to make it clear that the reign of evil would come to an end.<sup>6</sup>

The same principle holds good for the ideology of modern African national movements.

Thus the disjunction – ‘either peaceful constitutional action or violence’ – is misleading, since the activities of African political organizations may in fact fall into neither category. Frequently they belong to intermediate regions of the spectrum where ‘extra-constitutional action, intended to be non-violent, and not in fact involving violence’, shades off into ‘extra-constitutional action, intended to be non-violent, but leading in practice to violent collisions’, and that again into ‘extra-constitutional action, with violence neither planned nor excluded, but in fact occurring’. There may also be situations in which violence is planned, not by the top leadership of an organization, but by individuals within the leadership who desire a more militant policy. This is the kind of explanation which the Devlin Report, on the basis of somewhat inconclusive evidence, gave of the Nyasaland disturbances of March 1959; a great deal seems to turn on what exactly M. H. B. Chipembere meant by the term ‘action’.<sup>69</sup> Such a situation is naturally more liable to arise in a loosely organized ‘congress’ than in a disciplined party which has been able to develop a reasonably effective form of collective leadership. Indeed congresses may get into difficulties about the use of violence in much the same way as the Chartist Movement in nineteenth-century England, since they

may include 'physical-force' men and 'moral-force' men, with the oppositions between them largely unreconciled.

Finally, a party's leadership may itself sanction, and the party at its lower levels carry out a policy of violence in the full sense of organized sabotage, terrorism, and armed uprising, directed against the colonial regime, as in the case of Neo-Destour in Tunisia and Istiqlal in Morocco in 1954-5. But here again one needs to be careful: it is doubtful whether in either of these cases the initiative to move over to violent action was taken by the party leadership. According to Félix Garas' account of the Tunisian rising:

The *fellagha* movement, in its details and structure, was not planned in advance by Neo-Destour. It was rather the product of individual initiative – these initiatives being all stimulated by the repression, but unrelated to one another. It was only later that Neo-Destour attempted to give direction to a movement that it had inspired, but not organized.<sup>20</sup>

Most African political parties, I would suggest, have a 'constitutional bias' in the following senses: (a) They are predisposed, both by their actual structure and by the middle-class background and outlook of their leaders, to seek power by electoral means, where these are available; where, however, there is reason to suppose that power cannot be achieved by these means in the foreseeable future, they are liable to fall back upon extra-constitutional techniques, which may in practice give rise to violence, even when intended to be non-violent. (b) African parties, being in general 'modernist' and centralizing in their outlook, disapprove of 'primitive', uncontrolled forms of violence, including tribal clashes, vendettas, or spontaneous revolts. On the other hand, a party leadership which is committed to the use of 'constitutional' methods may find that the use or threat of violence by militant supporters helps them to extract concessions from the colonial regime; this is a point made by Georges Sorel, when discussing the strategies of Jaurès and Parnell:

It would not be in their interest for the people to be quite calm; a certain amount of agitation suits them, but this agitation must be contained within well-defined limits and controlled by politicians.<sup>6</sup>

(c) Once the colonial power has taken the crucial step of permitting the dominant party to become, in effect, a national govern-

ment – as in Tunisia and Morocco after 1955, French West Africa after 1956–7, Ghana and Nigeria after 1951, the Sudan after 1953 – the main motive for the use of extra-constitutional or violent methods, to bring pressure to bear upon the colonial administration or metropolitan public opinion, disappears, so far, at least, as the dominant party is concerned. The party is then in a position to turn – in Kwame Nkrumah's language – from 'positive action' to 'tactical action', i.e. to use the constitutional machinery at its disposal to carry through the final stages in the transfer of power.<sup>68</sup> Moreover at this stage it begins to carry out the conventional functions of parties discussed in the text-books; it provides a government, links the executive with the legislature, and both with the electorate.

So far the discussion has dealt only with the use of violence in a colonial situation – directed towards transforming, or seriously modifying, the colonial system. But one must also ask: What part does violence play in the behaviour of parties in independent, or near-independent, African States, when there is no longer a colonial regime to serve as the main target of opposition? Certain types of context seem to recur.

First, there is the use of violence by members or supporters of the dominant party against those who are regarded as 'enemies of the people', former collaborators, 'lackeys', or members of minority groups, as in post-war liberated Europe. On the whole this type of violence has been relatively little used in liberated Africa. It has naturally tended to occur most in territories, such as Morocco, in which the nationalist struggle has been particularly bitter and prolonged. The activities of the organization known as the *Troupes de l'Éléphant* (the elephant being the RDA symbol) which 'carried out a policy of revenge against the local anti-RDA leaders' in the Mau area of the Ivory Coast in 1956, belong to this category.<sup>38</sup>

Second, there are cases in which violence is used by the irreconcilables – often former *fellagha* or *maquisards* – who may be associated with an opposition party, an underground party, or a minority movement within the dominant party; they claim that the revolution has stopped too soon, has failed to achieve its main objectives, or has passed out of the control of patriots into the

hands of politicians. This was the kind of justification of violence put forward – from very different political standpoints – by the supporters of Ben-Youssef in Tunisia in 1955–6, by the Moroccan Army of Liberation in the Rif in 1958, and by the unreconciled UPC in independent Cameroun. (There is an obvious analogy with Ireland after 1922.)

Third, there is a whole range of situations in which old antagonisms – the products usually of both the pre-colonial and colonial periods – reassert themselves through the modern channels of party conflict. Of these there have been numerous examples: the NLM–CPP conflict in Ashanti in 1954–6; the tensions between the Liberal Party and the NUP before and after the 1955 mutiny in the southern Sudan; the Kano disturbances in May 1953; and the battle between UDDIA and MSA in Brazzaville in January 1959. Though cases of this kind reveal some kind of common pattern, there have been large variations in the extent to which ethnic, religious, economic, or ideological factors were involved in these conflicts, in their duration and intensity, and in the degree to which the political parties, or para-military organizations associated with the parties, actually promoted or approved the use of violence.

Electoral violence, which may occur in association with the forms of conflict referred to in the last paragraph, is a quite general phenomenon. H. G. Nicholas has pointed out how, as late as 1868, British elections were characterized by ‘popular tumult, intimidation, seductive canvassing, liveliness, and display’. Indeed, what needs explanation is the decline of electoral violence rather than its occurrence. In the British case it was apparently the 1872 Ballot Act that ‘robbed the British election of half its character as a popular public festival and made of its culminating ceremony merely a series of private rendezvous with the citizens’ consciences’.<sup>4</sup> Despite the ballot box, African elections have not yet been formalized to this extent. The ‘popular public festival’ aspect is still important: hence electoral violence – in the form both of ‘tumult’ and ‘intimidation’ – is liable to occur.

To conclude – one effect of the transfer of power from colonial to national governments is to release internal tensions, which have been held in check during the colonial period. At the same time it tends to reinforce the ‘constitutional bias’ of dominant parties,

which see in the electoral system – provided it is based on universal suffrage – a means of retaining their own power in the foreseeable future, and, in still colonial countries, a powerful instrument of relatively peaceful African revolution:

The Government [of Ghana] believes that if the principle of 'one man one vote' and 'one vote one value' were to be universally accepted on the African Continent, the bloodshed, disturbance, and repression, which are unfortunately occurring in so many parts of the continent, would be to a large measure ended.<sup>68</sup>

In this situation the use of violence in domestic politics has attractions primarily for opposition parties and unreconciled minorities, for whom electoral techniques offer little prospect of securing power or changing the character of the State.

#### PROPAGANDA AND POLITICAL EDUCATION

The main purpose of party propaganda is to build up, among the largest possible sector of the population, an attitude of loyalty, commitment, and enthusiasm towards the party and its leader or leaders. In the case of a traditionalist regional or ethnic party this may involve relatively little shift, from the loyalties required of a man in his traditional capacity as a subject of a particular State and chief to the loyalties required of him in his new capacity as a supporter of a particular party and its leader. Not much of a leap is necessary in the case of the orthodox Hausa elector who extends his traditional allegiance to the Sultan of Sokoto as *Sarkin Musulmi*, Commander of the Faithful, to include a supplementary allegiance to the Sardauna of Sokoto as leader of the NPC. But to take the politically heretical step of supporting NEPU and Mallam Aminu Kano involves a fundamental change in one's world-view.

A mass party, while it may on occasion make use of traditional ties, is normally faced with the problem of building up an entirely new set of loyalties to a new form of organization under a new type of leader. A new sense of solidarity, based upon the party, has to be substituted for the solidarity based upon older, more restrictive groupings, associated with kinship, locality, language, religion. At the same time the mass party has to dispel the inertia and irresponsibility which colonial systems, by their nature, tend to produce among the governed; to put in its place a belief in the

'historic role' of Africans in general and of a given African community in particular; and to refer back to past periods of greatness and the achievements of folk heroes in order to stimulate a confidence in the possibilities of the present. Hence the importance which mass parties attach to propaganda and re-education, and the remarkable variety of techniques which they employ.

The character of these techniques is naturally determined, in part, by the social setting. Since the proportion of literates among the adult population is relatively low in most African territories (though rapidly increasing in many), parties tend to pay more attention to the organization of mass meetings and rallies, the use of particular ceremonials and rituals, the popularization of particular symbols – the RDA elephant, the CPP red cock – than to the circulation of literature. The importance of 'action' as an instrument of propaganda, as opposed to words, was stressed by Kwame Nkrumah in the CPP's first pamphlet, *What I mean by Positive Action*:

We have talked too much and pined too long over our disabilities – political, social, and economic.... We must remember that, because of the educational backwardness of the Colonial countries, the majority of the people of this country cannot read. There is only one thing they can understand and that is Action.<sup>118</sup>

In his account of the 1957 general election in Senegal Professor Robinson makes the point that 'the most striking feature of the campaign as a whole, from the point of view of methods, was its concentration on oral propaganda and meetings', and contrasts 'the limited role of the press and of printed party propaganda, including posters'.<sup>32</sup>

In this connexion the fact that African societies are by tradition so extremely 'meeting-conscious' is relevant. As Senghor once poetically put it, thinking especially of the western Sudan, but with a wider African reference:

During the eight months of the dry season we are all the time absorbed in our relations with others; with spirits, ancestors, members of the family, of the tribe, of the kingdom, even with strangers.... There are the feasts of harvests and the feasts of sowing, of births, initiations, weddings, funerals; the feasts of the corporations and the feasts of the fraternities.<sup>118</sup>

Thus the feasts of the political parties have been able to build upon the traditions associated with these more ancient types of feast. The party leader, like the chief, must ride in his palanquin in procession through the streets. Moreover, the continuing effectiveness of the old channels of communication – through the market, the family, the women's associations, the young men, the chiefs and elders – makes it possible to organize meetings attended by the entire population of a village or quarter of a town, children as well as adults, with a rapidity unknown in the West.

The following description of a pre-electoral party meeting in Senegal, while it includes some special local features, has a fairly general application to party meetings in other territories of sub-Saharan Africa:

Political meetings, large or small, and of all parties, follow a broadly similar pattern. Those in the bush are held in a patch of cleared ground under an outsize *baobab* or under an awning in the village 'square' (so as to give some shade to the speakers and prominent personalities); those in towns in some public square, a sports stadium, or an open-air cinema; ... high up on top of the tree someone has tied the party flag, or there may be a rough flagstaff set in the ground; drummers beat out intermittent messages and to while away the time before the speakers arrive some of the women, who are sitting together in a solid phalanx, wearing headscarves or dresses in the party colours, may advance in ones or twos into the open space in the centre and execute a dance; there will perhaps be a long succession of speeches by local worthies, expounding their loyalty to the party ...; when the speakers arrive and have been introduced, if not before, the *bureau* of the meeting will be announced amid applause ...; then may follow a song by the *griot* in praise of the party and its leaders; and, finally, the main speeches.<sup>32</sup>

This passage illustrates another general characteristic of African party propaganda, the adaptation of traditional ceremonial – the praise-songs of the *griot*, the drummers, the women's dance – and its transformation into party ceremonial. Other examples are the ritual pouring of libations at the opening of a party meeting and, on special occasions, the sacrifice of a sheep. Dr Lewis makes a similar point in regard to the use of the *gabay* at meetings of the Somali Youth League: 'It is particularly interesting that the *gabay*, which in the traditional context is often an effective vehicle for clan

and lineage-group enmity, should here be used to promote the extension of nationalist sentiments and unity.<sup>96</sup>

Often specifically religious forms and symbols – Christian, Muslim, or Animist – are adapted for party purposes: for example, the regular use of hymns at CPP meetings and rallies – either in their original form (e.g. 'Lead Kindly Light', which at an early stage became a party anthem),<sup>95</sup> or in a new politicized version ('Fight the good fight with all thy might. Kwame Nkrumah is on thy right. ... Only believe and thou shalt see that Nkrumah is all in all to thee'<sup>98</sup>). NCNC and its subsidiary, the National Church of Nigeria and the Cameroons, at one time made use of a large collection of nationalist hymns and prayers, especially composed for the purpose, including a Litany of the Nationalists:

From foreign rule and domination,  
*God of freedom deliver us ...*  
 From oppressions, suppressions and exploitations,  
*God of freedom deliver us ...*

NEPU's use of the Koranic text, '*Inna al-sa'ā 'atīyatu*' ('Verily the hour is coming'), inscribed with a portrait of the party leader on its badge, illustrates the way in which a similar adaptive process can be carried out in a Muslim context. So does the *qubba* erected in Tunis in honour of Ferhat Hached, the trade union leader and martyr of the anti-colonial struggle, which – like the saint's tomb in traditional Maghreb society – has become an object of veneration and a place of pilgrimage.

In all such cases the essential point is that the mass parties, while predominantly modernist and secular as regards their ideologies (adhering to Kwame Nkrumah's principle – 'Seek ye first the political kingdom'), none the less find it necessary to appeal to the people in a language which they will readily understand. Such a language is likely to include Christian symbols in areas in which the Missions are well established, Islamic symbols in predominantly Muslim areas.

This does not mean, of course, that African parties are tradition-bound in their choice of techniques. Naturally, a great deal of borrowing from European, American, and Asian sources has also occurred, as regards methods of organizing rallies and the use of

propaganda vans, of party flags, badges, salutes, uniforms, slogans (the CPP's 'Free-dom', NEPU's 'Sawaba'), calendars, and 'Prison Graduate' caps, a mode borrowed by the CPP from the Indian Congress. It might even be interesting to investigate where, when, and from what sources particular techniques of propaganda were first introduced into Africa, and how they have since been diffused; since it seems clear that, once a new technique – propaganda vans, or lapel badges – has been adopted in one territory, it tends fairly rapidly to penetrate into others. In any case one is confronted here, as in other fields, with a process of synthesis: traditional methods of influencing opinion and asserting solidarity are modernized, while imported methods are adapted to local needs.

In the case of most, perhaps all, mass parties the cult of the leader is an indispensable instrument by which the party seeks to attach to itself a body of popular loyalty. This popularization of the person of the leader, and projection of his image, for propaganda purposes, is a quite different point from the question, already discussed, of the extent to which the central leadership of the party is in fact organized on a personal or a collective basis.\* There is an interesting passage in the Devlin Report, summarizing correspondence between M. H. B. Chipembere and Dr Hastings Banda (later President-General of the Nyasaland National Congress) during 1956–7, in which Chipembere dispassionately discusses the need for a leader who can be presented to the people as a messianic figure:

What was needed was a kind of saviour: although it is wrong to be led by a single man placed in a powerful position, still 'human nature' is such that it needs a kind of hero to be hero-worshipped if a political struggle is to succeed.... Mr. Chipembere said quite frankly that Dr Banda's reputation would have to be built up.... He must not be frightened if he was heralded as the political messiah. Publicity of this sort could be used with advantage; it would cause great excitement and should precipitate almost a revolution in political thought.<sup>69</sup>

The cult of the leader, again, is developed by means of a fusion of traditional and modern themes. Dr Schachter has pointed out how in the political folk-songs of Guinea, during the period of

\* See pp. 96–100, above.

anti-colonial struggle, the party (PDG), *sily* the elephant, the symbol of the party, and Sékou Touré, the party leader, were linked together to express the dominant idea of a better world for Africans:

God wants the elephant.  
 Muhammad the Prophet wants the elephant.  
 You went to Paris.  
 You returned from Paris.  
 Your face shows  
 That even the people of Paris  
 Want the elephant.<sup>38</sup>

The following is an extract from a song composed by women members of PDG in honour of Sékou Touré:

Here is the light  
 Of the chieftancy of Sékou Touré.  
 It rises,  
 Inextinguishable,  
 Immeasurable,  
 Glorious.  
 Those who are of good faith  
 Speak in our way.  
 Those who are of bad faith  
 Qualify what they say.<sup>38</sup>

A similar literature of folk-songs and dance-tunes has grown up around Kwame Nkrumah. He also is 'something like a former chief writ large.... There is a deliberate exaggeration of his position. He is "Africa's Man of Destiny", the "Star of Ghana", "Osagyefo", "Founder of the Nation". His head appears on the coins; his statue (dressed in a northern farmer's smock) stands outside the parliament house; his birthday is a public holiday.'<sup>32</sup> His picture, stamped on cloth, is circulated throughout the nation.

Meetings, ceremonials, symbols, images, songs, and slogans – these are some of the techniques by means of which the mass party seeks to mobilize public opinion and give it direction. To these should be added campaigns, which transform vague popular grievances into well-defined political issues, using them as instruments to challenge the authority of the colonial regime and wear down its resistance. Examples are the NCNC's campaign against

the Richards Constitution and the 'four obnoxious ordinances' in Nigeria in 1946-7;<sup>15</sup> the CPP's campaign against the compulsory cutting out of cocoa plants affected by swollen shoot in the Gold Coast in 1949-50;<sup>72</sup> the PDG's campaign against chiefs in Guinea during 1953-5;<sup>38</sup> and the Nyasaland Congress's campaign against Federation in 1952-4.<sup>69</sup> Quite apart from any concrete results which they may achieve, such campaigns can be of great value to a party in enabling it to test itself, make itself known, and establish its authority in regions remote from the main centres of population, as in the case of the NCNC delegation's eight-month tour of Nigeria in 1946:

By car, lorry, horseback, accompanied by brass bands, flute bands, cow-horn bands, dancers, and soldiers, in schoolrooms, halls, compounds, cinemas, and churches, they touched the lives of hundreds of isolated communities in a way never known before.<sup>15</sup>

If it is mainly through action and oral propaganda that the party makes its appeal to the masses, what sort of political education does it provide for the literate minority, particularly for the clerks, teachers, petty traders, and the like, who normally form the party's leadership at branch, constituency, and regional levels? Reference has already been made to the importance of the party press. This is most commonly the main channel through which the *militants* are kept informed about the party's decisions and activities and can keep in touch with party affairs in other areas, read reports of conferences, parliamentary debates, or the leader's speeches, discover from editorials the party 'line' on current issues, and, to a more limited extent, learn about developments in world affairs. In the case of parties in power, broadcasting serves a somewhat similar purpose: Habib Bourguiba's regular Thursday broadcasts to the nation, for example, provide a powerful instrument of Neo-Destour education.<sup>49</sup>

It must be remembered too that, in addition to the major, well-established party newspapers – like the NCNC's *West African Pilot*, the CPP's *Evening News* and *Ghana Times*, Neo-Destour's *Al-Amal*, or *Essor*, the journal of the Union Soudanaise – there is a considerable range of minor journals, sometimes only single sheets, cyclostyled rather than printed, which are none the less influential, because they are read and passed from hand to hand

by active party members: for example, the *Comet*, NEPU's journal in northern Nigeria. There are also journals produced by peripheral organizations – trade unions, students' societies, reformist Muslim associations, and the like. To these may be added party election manifestoes, often fairly detailed documents; pamphlets, which seem to be produced in the greatest abundance in the early period of party formation, when the political climate is favourable to controversy and debate; and – for a minority within the minority – occasional major works by party leaders and intellectuals, such as Kwame Nkrumah's *Autobiography*,<sup>55</sup> Mamadou Dia's *L'Économie africaine*,<sup>56</sup> Abdoulaye Ly's *Les Masses africaines et l'actuelle condition humaine*,<sup>41</sup> and 'Alāl al-Fāsi's *Al-nuqd al-dhātī* (*Autocritique*).<sup>42</sup> On the whole, for understandable reasons, there is a larger output of nationalist newspapers and pamphlets in zones of English cultural influence, and of more serious studies, dealing with aspects of 'ideology', in zones of French culture.

Material about the amount of formal political education which is carried on by the mass parties is scanty. My impression is that it is mainly in Marxist or Marxist-influenced parties, such as the pre-1950 RDA or the UPC in Cameroun, that emphasis has been laid on the training of 'cadres', through study-courses of various types. This has not merely been a case of borrowing from the French Communist Party: it is connected also with the fact that a Marxist party has readily available (subject to difficulties of importation) a body of orthodox literature which it can use for purposes of instruction, whereas a radical nationalist party has not yet acquired comparable classics. What should a keen party member in Neo-Destour or the CPP read? Habib Bourguiba's collected addresses (*Ḥadīth al-jam'a*), presumably, in the one case; George Padmore's *Pan-Africanism or Communism?* and Kwame Nkrumah's *Autobiography*, in the other. But these works have not the same standing as the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin; nor do they present an ideology in so definite a form. The only political writings in contemporary Africa which seem already on the way to becoming genuine classics – for the Left throughout Afrique Noire as well as for Guinea – are the publications of Sékou Touré and the PDG.<sup>58, 59, 60, 64</sup>

The tendency has been for the mass parties to depend for their political education mainly upon informal channels, such as discussions in party branches, periodic conferences at various levels, and actual participation in party work. But this is sometimes supplemented by education of a more institutionalized kind: as at the residential college conducted by Neo-Destour at Bir al-Bey, near Tunis, where selected members of the party's youth organization from all over the country come, for periods of a week to a fortnight, for practical and political instruction. The National Association of Socialist Students' Organizations (NASSO) functions as the education wing of the CPP, under Nkrumah's direct patronage, conducting a regular discussion group for members of the party leadership, and directing the party's training school.<sup>72</sup> Indeed, the CPP appears to be attaching increasing importance to the education of party 'cadres', to judge from the Life Chairman's speech at its Tenth Anniversary rally:

All of us need to go back to the Party school from time to time to re-learn some of the things we may have forgotten in the hustle and bustle of our daily routine. Week-end seminars will help to stimulate our thinking and to stimulate our ideas. None of us is too old in the political struggle not to gain something new from periodic educational courses. Our branch secretaries especially should be educated in political consciousness and understanding of the political objectives of our Party, for how else can they interpret them to our rank-and-file members and to the great mass of Party sympathizers? But neither will it do harm for Ministers, our Parliamentary Secretaries, and our Members of Parliament to attend courses at our Party School. In fact the Central Committee intends making such a course of study in Party ideology obligatory upon them.<sup>119</sup>

As might be expected, the extent to which an African party has a concern, however expressed, for the political education and re-education of its *militants* is correlated with the extent to which it takes its ideology seriously.

#### WELFARE, ADMINISTRATION, AND PATRONAGE

I have already stressed the importance of the social-service aspect of African party functions. In this respect African parties in general, and the mass parties in particular, belong to the category

which Professor Neumann has labelled 'parties of social integration', parties, that is to say, which seek to provide for the social needs of their members and supporters 'from the cradle to the grave'.<sup>3</sup> There are various reasons why African parties have tended to assume 'welfare' functions, of which imitation of European parties of the Left is probably the least important. What is most evident is that pre-colonial African societies, like pre-capitalist societies in other parts of the world, had as a rule a well-developed system of mutual aid, which ensured that the resources of a community, limited though they might be, were available to its members, above all in periods of crisis, personal or collective: birth, marriage, and death, plague, pestilence, and famine. This traditional system of mutual aid, though it has by no means been destroyed during the colonial epoch, has been made much less effective as a result of processes with which we are all familiar: urbanization, the growth of a proletariat, mass migration, the imposition of a framework of alien institutions, the spread of competitive values, and so forth. At the same time modern African man has to deal with crises of new types.<sup>10</sup> The resulting need for new institutions which will provide the individual with protection, support, and a sense of fraternity, has been met by organizations of various kinds – Tribal Unions, Improvement Associations, Burial Societies, Dancing *Compin's*, and so on.<sup>98</sup> It has also been met, in some territories most effectively met, by the political parties.

There are other reasons why mass parties are likely to take a special interest in social needs. One is that their members deliberately run risks of a special kind, during the period of nationalist struggle; their activities are likely to lead to clashes with the police, arrest, trial, imprisonment. Hence parties like RDA, Neo-Destour, or Istiqlal, which have had to face long periods of administrative *répression*, have been obliged to pay a great deal of attention to the provision of legal aid for those arrested, and the raising of funds to provide for the maintenance of the dependants of those imprisoned or killed. During long strikes, such as those which occurred in French West Africa during 1953, the parties, as well as the trade unions, have been responsible for organizing the supply of food from the villages to the families of the strikers in the towns.<sup>99</sup> In

addition they have constantly been involved in case-work, dealing with the innumerable minor problems arising from administrative disapproval: for example, transfers and dismissals of party members who are also civil servants.

Moreover, the mass parties are better equipped than other African organizations to provide for social needs because, at least during their more flourishing periods, they are relatively rich. This is particularly true of territories like Ghana, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal, where parties have been able to tap the resources of a sizeable bourgeois class. Dr Schachter describes the pre-1950 RDA in the Ivory Coast as 'easily the richest, financially the most self-reliant, and ... the most generous of all West African political parties', and quotes M. Léon's remark - 'If Houphouët asks the Baule today for 5, 10, or 20 million [francs C.F.A., i.e. £10,000, £20,000 or £40,000], he will have them in twenty-four or forty-eight hours.'<sup>88</sup> Such special appeals for funds, made by the party leader to his own Baule community, were in addition to the party's regular income, based upon an annual subscription of fr. C.F.A. 50 (2s.) and an estimated membership, in 1950, of 850,000 card-carrying members. There are also various forms of practical assistance - foodstuffs, or the use of lorries, for example - which such parties can call on their bourgeois supporters to provide.

Another advantage which mass parties possess is that, even where they do not enjoy power, so long as they are legal, their leaders normally have access to the seats of power. Even during the period from 1947 to 1950, when the RDA was in total opposition to the French Administration, 'a deputy who had access to the French Government might succeed in having governors or administrators replaced or reprimanded'.<sup>89</sup> The party leader who is also a member of the legislature in a colonial State must include in his responsibilities the effort to remedy acts of administrative injustice or stupidity affecting his constituents and supporters, and such cases naturally tend to be channelled through the party.

The responsibilities of African parties in regard to individual grievances and problems are much larger than those of European parties. The British, for example, do not normally regard their Government, as Africans during the colonial period came to regard the Administration, as essentially hostile, an 'instrument of

coercion', so that even its constructive and social services tended to be suspect. Sékou Touré makes this point, contrasting the functions of the State in former French Guinea with its functions in the new independent Guinea:

One of the characteristics of the regime of domination was that it gave supremacy to political force over moral force.... The colonial regime means simply that.... Hence it is easy to recognize that the Judiciary, the entire system of repressive institutions, the department of Water Supplies and Forestry [*Eaux et Forêts*], the local guards of the old regime, the police, the gendarmerie, the Army – all these had only one purpose, to maintain the supremacy of force, to restrain the trends towards emancipation.<sup>80</sup>

In these circumstances Africans have looked for assistance to the mass party, which was felt to be friendly, and in a sense their own creation, rather than to the colonial State, which was alien and imposed.

What sort of services do the mass parties provide? Partly, as I have indicated, they are concerned with case-work – combining the functions of Citizens' Advice Bureaux and the National Council of Civil Liberties in Britain, but supplementing these with a conscious agitational purpose. Dr Schachter gives some examples of typical day-to-day instructions issued to local RDA leaders:

Tell Abdoulaye his daughter cannot be forced to marry the old chief.  
Tell the peasants not to sell the crops at that ruinous price.  
Defend Pango's palm trees against destruction by the forestry service.  
Speak up for Binta's right to cultivate the land the chief claims.<sup>81</sup>

Second, while it is normal for parties to assist party members and their families in situations of special need – sickness, unemployment, victimization, imprisonment, overseas education, death – some parties or their peripheral organizations have concerned themselves with 'welfare' in a more systematic way. I have quoted elsewhere the instance of La Goumbé, in Treichville, Abidjan, a mixed, Muslim, predominantly Dioula, youth association, linked with the local RDA, which combined the activities of 'emancipating young women from family influences, assisting the process of matrimonial selection, providing on a contri-

butory basis marriage and maternity benefits (including perfume and layettes for the new-born), preserving the Dioula tribal spirit, and running an orchestra'.<sup>24</sup> La Goumbé was organized on a tribal basis. But parties can also meet an important need by knitting together tribal groups in a new social setting. Dennis Austin makes this point in regard to Tema, Ghana's new port, where the CPP was concerned with 'finding jobs, finding homes, settling disputes, because among the immigrant population the party was felt to be a more friendly, approachable, familiar body than the Labour Office, the Housing Officer, or the Magistrate's Court'.

Third, mass parties frequently organize their own police forces, primarily to preserve order at meetings and rallies and on public occasions. In areas where the population clearly prefers party justice to justice administered by officials, magistrates, or chiefs, they may also undertake judicial functions. Thus in the Ivory Coast:

in the village of Bopri ... an RDA tribunal, judging according to customary law, examined 200 cases during 1947-9. Tribunals of this type operated during this same period in the *cercles* of Mau (Guéré), Daloa, and Dimbokro.<sup>27</sup>

Finally, a mass party may come to exercise administrative functions; in particular areas it may effectively govern. This, no doubt, is most liable to occur in a near-revolutionary situation - but not only in such cases. It is possible for a *de facto* party administration and an official colonial administration to achieve, for a time, a form of peaceful coexistence, making mutual adjustments to one another. I have seen this type of relationship existing between the Spanish administration and Istiqlal's administration in the little enclave of Ifni during 1956. G. Bédos describes a comparable situation in the Ivory Coast during the period from 1947 to 1951, where:

'Officials', who held their mandate only from the RDA, tended to replace chiefs and local authorities appointed by the Administration. Before the decline of its influence in 1951, the RDA made efforts to bring these Government-appointed authorities over to its side; where this seemed impossible it set up local committees in their place. In some areas in the bush (in the District of Mau, for instance) the local party leaders offered

their help to the Administration, which sometimes accepted it. This, however, was not always the case; hence situations arose in which authorities designated by the Administration, lodging continual complaints about the usurpation of their functions, coexisted with RDA-appointed 'officials' who had found no difficulty in securing the support of the local population.<sup>77</sup>

Mass parties do not necessarily lose their welfare functions once independence has been achieved. Indeed, one of the main interests of the party leadership after independence is to redirect the party's resources and energies away from the negative task of destroying the old system and towards the positive task of constructing the new. Thus in Tunisia in 1957, a year after independence, Neo-Destour and its youth organization were involved in a variety of socially useful activities: building local schools, carrying on a campaign against trachoma, fighting locusts, reclaiming waste land, planting eucalyptus trees beside the roads, establishing 'Bourguiba Homes' for abandoned or destitute children, and providing for the needs of Algerian refugees and wounded.

In the administrative field, however, problems are apt to arise. What should be the relationship, in an independent African State, between the local leaders of the dominant party on the one hand and the elected local councils and administrative officials on the other? This is an old problem, but it has presented itself in a variety of new forms. 'The dualism existing between the political authorities and administrative authority' was discussed in the Guinea context, with particular clarity, by Sékou Touré at the second national conference of PDG *cadres* in November 1958. Broadly speaking, his conclusion was that a certain dualism, and consequently a certain tension, was necessary and healthy; but that the absolute supremacy of the party must be reconciled with the relative freedom of action and initiative of the *conseils de circonscription* and the new African professional administrators.<sup>58</sup> The fact that both the leaders of local councils and the administrators are likely at the same time to hold posts of responsibility within the party naturally tends in practice to limit the tension here.

Another problem confronting the mass parties after they have achieved power is that, without ceasing to be 'parties of principles', they inevitably become also 'parties of patronage'.<sup>3</sup> In some

respects this tends to increase the party's strength and effectiveness. It is of the nature of a mass party to 'reward its friends and remove its enemies'.<sup>8</sup> The enjoyment of power vastly extends the range and increases the value of the rewards which the party has to offer to its friends, allies, and *militants*. Dennis Austin has pointed out how, in the case of the CPP,

Patronage is used as an additional cement of party unity: e.g., CPP candidates who lost the 1956 election were given diplomatic appointments abroad, directorships on the public corporations, jobs in the Builders' Brigade or in regional commissioners' offices, or scholarships to study law.<sup>72</sup>

Similarly the Cocoa Purchasing Company, which Krobo Edusei once picturesquely described as 'the atom bomb of the CPP', undoubtedly helped the CPP to win, or retain, the support of those farmers who were assisted with loans.

The difficulty is that, though patronage can be regarded as a special form of 'welfare', which a party in power uses to reward loyalty and past services (somewhat in the same way as the former colonial governments used to reward 'loyal' chiefs and intellectuals), the rewards which it has at its disposal, even in a relatively wealthy territory like Ghana, are limited. They can be numbered, perhaps, in thousands, whereas party members can be numbered in hundreds of thousands, and supporters – in times of maximum strength – in millions. Hence patronage, as the leaders of governing parties are well aware, is a two-edged weapon. While in some respects it may strengthen party unity, in others it may tend to weaken it, by creating a new division between the beneficiaries of patronage within the party – those enjoying middle-class salaries, expense accounts, cars, official houses, 'offices of profit' – and the mass of members and supporters who do not enjoy the material fruits of power.

What is difficult to decide is how far this use of government patronage has weakened the party's earlier enthusiasm and idealism – and how far it may prevent the party from keeping in touch with mass rank-and-file opinion.<sup>75</sup>

It is clear that the use of patronage by a governing party tends to promote the transformation of the party leadership, or a section

within the leadership, into a new ruling class; and that this in its turn tends to stimulate the growth of a puritan, reforming opposition, either within the party or outside it. Whether the mass parties now in power, and likely to obtain power, in the various African States will be able to find ways of counteracting this tendency, and reasserting their egalitarian principles, remains to be seen.

## *Chapter 7*

### PARTY OBJECTIVES

QUESTIONS about the objectives of African parties and questions about their ideologies, though distinct, are not really separable. For, if we are trying to decide what aims a given party wishes to achieve, it is natural to inquire also whether these aims are related to any coherent body of theory, or whether they are simply disconnected items – weakening the power of chiefs, Africanizing the administration, expanding public education, and so forth. Similarly, if we begin by asking questions about ideologies, it is of little use to point out that a given party is committed to the idea of 'African Socialism', or the principles of Pan-Africanism, or 'Buganda traditionalism', unless we know what these very general notions mean in terms of positive objectives to be worked for and policies to be pursued. But to try to give an adequate account of the ideologies of African parties, and the various sources – Islamic and Christian, liberal and Marxist – on which they have drawn, would be to open up too vast a subject.

Hence I propose to limit myself here to a discussion of some of the types of objective which it is possible for African parties to pursue, with some suggestions about the extent to which these objectives can be fitted into some kind of systematic framework. The purpose of this discussion is to provide a basis for answering some of the questions which any comparative study of African parties is bound to raise: What sort of issues give rise to opposition between parties and within parties? What meaning can be given to such terms as 'Left' and 'Right', 'Radical' and 'Conservative', in the contemporary African context? How strong is the tendency for single-party systems to emerge in independent African States?

Two preliminary points need to be made clear. First, a distinction must obviously be drawn between formal and real objectives. The formal aims of almost all parties, as written into their constitutions, are stated in the kind of language which has come to be approved in mid-twentieth-century Africa: 'the ending of

imperialism'; 'the emancipation of the colonial masses'; 'the liberation of the common man'; 'modernization'; 'industrialization'; 'the Welfare State'. Even parties which are profoundly conservative in outlook are apt to use such language in their declarations of principles, or their titles. This is a characteristic, of course, of Western as well as of African parties. The French 'Radical-Socialist Party' can be compared with the former 'Social Party for the Education of the African Masses' (PSEMA) in Haute-Volta, both being parties of a predominantly conservative type with radical labels. An examination of party platforms can certainly throw some light on the real objectives of African parties. But it is more important to pay attention to the policies which parties actually pursue, and the specific changes which they seek to effect.

Second, as has been already noted, African parties are in practice concerned with a wide variety of predominantly local issues – obtaining a school for village A, a road passing through constituency B, a loan for cocoa-farmer C, the destoolment of Chief D.\* Seen from one standpoint, a party is essentially an amalgam of local interests, a federation of local pressure-groups. Hence every party must attempt to include in the sum of its objectives measures which will be acceptable to the particular interests and pressure-groups on whose political support it depends – the marketwomen of Kumasi, the groundnut farmers of Kaolack, the local councillors of Ijebu Remo. While issues of this kind may clearly bulk large in party campaigns and inter-party controversy, particularly at election time, for present purposes this aspect of the situation must be taken for granted. Party objectives clearly cannot be entirely explained in terms of local interests, any more than human behaviour can be adequately explained in bio-chemical terms. The main question to be answered here is: What wider national and international types of objective do African parties seek to achieve?

#### 'INDEPENDENCE'

The point has already been made that the colonial situation obliges African parties to regard the realization of independence or self-

\* See p. 37, above.

government, in some form, as their primary aim. True, there are apparent exceptions to this generalization. The French African parties, during the post-war decade, normally preferred to speak of 'the struggle against colonialism', 'political emancipation', 'equality of rights within a French Union based upon the free consent of its constituent peoples';<sup>122</sup> and only gradually, from about 1955 on, did they begin to talk the language, first of 'internal autonomy', then of 'the right to independence', and eventually of 'total independence'.<sup>38</sup> In British East and Central Africa political organizations have tended, in their earlier stages, to put forward limited demands, for a larger African representation in the legislature, direct elections, a broader franchise, equality of civil rights, and so forth. Indeed, the Congresses in the Central African Federation consistently rejected the idea of 'independence', in the sense of a total transfer of power and responsibility from the British Parliament to a federal government controlled by the local European minority.

But these differences of objective can be understood as reflecting differences in the local political situation and its possibilities, or differences in the effectiveness and power of the organizations concerned, rather than differences in substantial aims. In whatever terms it may be described, there seems to be a constant basic objective – the eventual achievement of a political system in which power would lie with a predominantly African government, answerable to a predominantly African electorate. Even in the days when the leaders of the French African parties talked the language of 'equality of rights within a reconstructed French Union', they clearly conceived of these rights as including the right of African citizens to be governed by their own elected assemblies rather than by French colonial administrators.

None the less, the objective of 'independence' or 'self-government', even if it is a primary datum, can be interpreted in different ways, and there may be deep conflicts between and within parties over the actual interpretation to be adopted. There is, first, the opposition between the idea of independence enjoyed by a fully sovereign African State, and the idea of internal self-government within a larger, metropolitan-centred, federal system. This was the main issue which in 1958 split the RDA wide open, with Sékou

Touré's Guinea *section* of the party choosing the former alternative, Houphouët-Boigny's Ivory Coast *section* choosing the latter, and Modibo Keita's Soudan *section* adopting, provisionally, an intermediate position.

There is also the question of the political unit which is to enjoy independence. Where this is clearly identified with an existing colonial territory – the Gold Coast (Ghana), or Tanganyika – the situation is relatively simple; though even in the case of Ghana, conflict arose from the demand of the Togoland Congress for the detachment of British Togoland from the former Gold Coast, and its reunification with French Togo.<sup>86</sup> The issue becomes more complicated once future frontiers are seriously in doubt. This was another factor giving rise to conflict within the RDA in 1957–8 – between the 'Federalists', who wished to preserve the unity of the French West African Federation, and the 'Balkanizers', who wished to break it up into its eight constituent territorial units.<sup>12, 105</sup>

Similar tensions arose in 1953 between the NPC and other Nigerian parties, especially the NCNC, as a result of the NPC's semi-separatist attitude.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, for some parties the idea of independence has been linked with definite revisionist demands: for example, Istiqlal's claims to include Shinqit in Morocco; UPC's efforts to reconstitute 'Kamerun', with its pre-1914 frontiers; the SYL's pressure for a 'Greater Somalia'; or ABAKO's conception of a restored Congo State, grouping the predominantly Bakongo regions of the former Belgian Congo and Portuguese Angola with the (French) Republic of the Congo.<sup>9, 87</sup>

The question – What measure of independence is desirable and practicable? – gives rise to a further set of problems. The histories of Liberia, Ethiopia, and Egypt, during the first half of the twentieth century, serve as a reminder that formal sovereignty is compatible with a degree of effective subordination to an external power – or powers – that most of the major African parties would regard as intolerable. To the more radical nationalist parties, during their period of opposition, 'independence' tends to imply total freedom from external control or pressure, in the administrative, economic, cultural, diplomatic, and military – as well as purely political – spheres.

Such parties, once they have achieved power, have to face some at least of the problems involved in attempting to translate such an idea into reality. How completely, and rapidly, can the civil service be africanized? How far should economic ties with the former colonial power be preserved or modified? Should the new State remain within the sterling or franc area? What steps, if any, should be taken to control the activities of extra-territorial companies? What economic or political concessions may have to be made to attract foreign investment? How far can the new State afford to build up its own diplomatic network, and how far must it continue to rely on services provided by the former colonial power? Should the new State remain within the Western system of alliances, or should it pursue a policy of 'positive neutralism'? What should be its attitude to such foreign troops and foreign bases as may be located in its territory? All such problems have, moreover, to be seen in relation to the ever-present question of tempo. The conflicts arising between parties and within parties over issues of this kind naturally often turn not so much on the question: What course of action is ideally and ultimately desirable? as on the question: What precise policy should be pursued here and now?

These detailed issues are connected with another larger question: For whom is independence demanded? At this point the relationship between objectives and ideologies becomes evident. Neo-Destour in Tunisia and Istiqlal in Morocco have supported the FLN's demand for Algerian independence, not merely because they regard the continuance of French colonial rule in Algeria as a threat to the security of their respective countries, but also because both parties are committed to a broadly Pan-Maghreb standpoint – i.e. to the principle of liberation and closer union of all the peoples of the Maghreb.<sup>11, 27</sup> Similarly, those parties which – like the CPP in Ghana, PDG in Guinea, and most of the major parties and congresses of East and Central Africa – have identified themselves with a Pan-African ideology, are bound to interest themselves in, and give at least moral support to, national movements beyond the frontiers of their own territories.

At an earlier stage of history Pan-Africanism might have been regarded as a utopia rather than an ideology. But the idea has

now become, in some instances, part of the official doctrine of governing parties, and indeed of African States. The CPP, for example, declares in its constitution that it will:

seek to establish fraternal relations with, and offer guidance and support to, all nationalist, democratic, and socialist movements in Africa and elsewhere which are fighting for national independence and self-determination<sup>180</sup>

and that it 'endorses and gives active support to the conception of a Union of African States or Republics'. Article 34 of the constitution of the Republic of Guinea lays it down that:

The Republic may conclude agreements, of association or community, with any African State, involving the partial or total abrogation of sovereignty, with a view to the realization of African Unity.<sup>181</sup>

Moreover, a framework of institutions has now been brought into being through which this Pan-African conception is expressed, with variations of interpretation and emphasis: the Conference of Independent African States;<sup>182</sup> the Community of African States (initiated by Ghana, Guinea, and Liberia, at the Saniquellie Conference in August 1959); the All-African People's Conference, with its permanent secretariat at Accra;<sup>183</sup> PAFMECA (the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa);<sup>184</sup> and, in respect of some of its activities, the secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference at Cairo. Through all these institutions runs the common purpose of accelerating the process of transfer of power – conceived as 'historically inevitable' – from European colonial governments to independent African governments throughout the African continent. From this point of view territories in which there is special tension, colonial repression, or actual armed conflict – e.g., Algeria, the former Belgian Congo, Angola, South Africa – are regarded as in a special sense the concern of 'the African community'; so is the use of African land or people to serve the strategic and military ends of colonial powers, notably the French testing of atomic weapons in the Sahara.

Positively, the Pan-African idea involves, as an immediate and limited aim, the realization of 'regional groupings' of independent African States, 'on the basis of geographical contiguity, economic

interdependence, linguistic and cultural affinity', as a means of protection against the 'resurgence of colonialism even after their attainment of independence', and as steps towards 'the ultimate objective of a Pan-African Commonwealth'.<sup>128</sup> In this context the moves already made in the direction of a North African Federation, a West African and an East African 'grouping' are approved. Acceptance or rejection of this Pan-African ideology has thus tended to promote a new alignment of African parties – on an international rather than a territorial basis. In West Africa it has meant that Houphouët-Boigny's RDA, Senghor's UPS, the Sardauna of Sokoto's NPC, and Obafemi Awolowo's Action Group, parties which support a more cautious, particularist, Western-oriented approach to questions of external relations, have found themselves in roughly the same camp, in opposition to the Guinea PDG, the Union Soudanaise in Mali, and the CPP in Ghana – the parties which seem at present most clearly committed to a radical interpretation of the Pan-African idea.

#### 'DEMOCRACY'

'Democracy', like 'independence', is a primary datum for almost all African parties. (Dr Chike Obi's former 'Dynamic Party', which professed an African version of 'Kemalism', was a rare and ephemeral exception.<sup>56</sup>) Here again, one has to ask what meanings the term can bear, and what practical objectives it can imply, when used by African parties. Clearly, 'democracy', *démocratie*, *dīmuḳraṭiyya*, in the contemporary African context mean something quite different from the meanings to which twentieth-century European liberal democrats have become accustomed. One common source of confusion is the European belief that, when African nationalist leaders demand 'democracy' for their territories, they are seeking to transplant to Africa modern British, French, or Belgian institutions; criticisms of insincerity are then heard when it becomes evident that African political systems are evolving along other lines. It is equally unreasonable to suppose that, if African nationalists do not use the term 'democracy' in a Western liberal sense, they must be employing it in a Soviet Communist sense.

In fact, a fairly well-defined set of objectives have come to be associated with the term, in the sense in which it is normally used by African parties, and particularly the mass parties. These objectives have much more in common with the aims of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century democratic movements of Europe and North America than they have with the aims of contemporary liberals or Communists.

Just as classic democracy aimed at the erection of a class government of the poorer citizens within the state in opposition to the rich, so did [the eighteenth-century democratic] movements in America and France. Thus the ancient name of democracy justly celebrated its resurrection in both countries. It was ... common in the daily political life of America to designate the adherents of the Republican Party as democrats, and the patriots of Robespierre's group likewise felt themselves to be democrats, since they opposed the rights of the 'people' to the privileges of the aristocracy.<sup>5</sup>

African 'democrats', particularly in former French Africa, are sometimes conscious of themselves as inheritors of this classic democratic tradition, as illustrated by this quotation from a special election issue of the PDG journal, *La Liberté*:

Diallo Saifoulaye [a Fulani aristocrat, and one of the PDG's election candidates], like La Fayette on the night of 4 August 1789, has renounced his privileges in order to join the democratic camp, with a view to relieving the people's misery, supporting them in their struggles for the conquest of their rights.<sup>125</sup>

Thus for the mass party 'democracy' means, in the first place, the transfer of political power from a foreign ruling class – colonial officials or a local European minority may both be regarded as the African equivalent of a 'privileged aristocracy' – to the African *dēmos*, 'the people', 'the masses', the 'peasants, workers, and intellectuals'. Since the *dēmos* in its totality cannot directly govern, power is exercised on its behalf by the party and its leadership, as the most effective organized expression of the aspirations and demands of the *dēmos*. In Sékou Touré's words:

The Democratic Party [PDG], being already identified with the Guinea nation, with the Guinea State, must resolutely affirm that it represents the people of Guinea, the nation and destiny of Guinea.<sup>60</sup>

The mass party seeks to achieve the classic objective of early-nineteenth-century European democratic movements: the establishment of such political institutions as will enable 'the people' to become, effectively, the ruling class. These include a government responsible to a popularly elected assembly; universal adult suffrage, with no discrimination on grounds of race, religion, sex, or educational level, and no special, separate or weighted representation for minorities, communities, or interests; free elections, meaning in practice no interference with the electoral process by the colonial Administration, or its police and military forces, designed to produce electoral results unfavourable to the party. Such institutions are regarded as essentially democratic, since they are a necessary precondition of the transfer of power from the aristocracy to the people and any African party which rejects them – e.g., the NPC in the Northern Region of Nigeria, which has hitherto restricted the franchise to male Northerners – is likely to be labelled 'undemocratic'.

Constitutional reform along these lines is regarded as a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of African liberation. 'Democracy' means also the weakening of traditional loyalties – to kin-group, clan, tribe, chief, *marabout*, and the like – in favour of the new loyalties, to the emergent nation, the new State, the party, the party leader (or leaders), and the wider objectives of African emancipation. To quote Sékou Touré again:

To sum up, we can say that our State is democratic, unitary, and progressive. Its object is to make Guinea a viable national entity. In three or four years no one should remember the tribal, ethnic, and religious rivalries which, in the recent past, have done so much harm to our country and its people.<sup>80</sup>

The masses, as the literature of the mass parties often puts it, have to be liberated, not only from colonialism, but also from 'tribalism' and 'feudalism'. This particular use of terms need not worry us. The word 'tribalism' tends to be used to cover all those types of movement which seek to appeal to ethnic, clan, or kin-group loyalties; 'feudalism' to cover all those types of system in which the power of traditional, or 'modified-traditional', leaders remains effective.

The reasons why 'democracy' involves this dual attack are fairly clear. First, it is a primary aim of the mass parties to develop a sense of solidarity and common citizenship throughout the territories in which they operate, and, less urgently and within a more selective group, a sense of inter-African solidarity. There are certain loyalties based upon pre-colonial groupings and political systems – to Ashanti, to Buganda, to the Bakongo – which have survived through the colonial period, and which, in many cases, have been stimulated, consciously or unconsciously, by the colonial powers. From this point of view, however, they are an obstruction, a nuisance, a source of weakness to the emergent nation, a focus of potential or actual opposition. As Kwame Nkrumah reminded the CPP in his Tenth Anniversary speech:

We must insist that in Ghana, in the higher reaches of our national life, there should be no reference to Fantes, Ashantis, Ewes, Gas, Dagombas, 'strangers', and so further, but that we should call ourselves Ghanaians – all brothers and sisters, members of the same community – the State of Ghana. For, until we ourselves purge from our minds this tribal chauvinism and prejudice of one against the other, we shall not be able to cultivate the wider spirit which our objective of Pan-Africanism calls for.<sup>119</sup>

The motives for the mass party's attack on chiefly power are somewhat more complex, and naturally vary with the local situation. One constant factor is the belief that this kind of power is a survival from an earlier phase of social evolution, and has lost its validity, is *dépassé*:

The old feudal organization, which unquestionably expressed itself through the person of the chief – he was the director of men's moral conscience, and at the same time the political leader, and, in some countries, the religious leader – this old organization has, as a result of the action of the various political parties, given way to new realities; the peasants, that is to say, are grouped from now on on the basis of their political party.<sup>64</sup>

This argument from history is associated with considerations of a more practical kind: the fact that chiefs, seeing in the rise of the new élite of party leaders a challenge to their own authority, have frequently come out in open opposition to them; the fact that during the colonial period, especially in French Africa, chiefs have

collaborated with the Administration to secure the defeat of the mass party at the polls; and the fact that, in revolutionary or near-revolutionary situations, as in Guinea in 1957 or Nyasaland in 1959, there have been spontaneous movements of peasants against their chiefs, which the mass party has followed as much as led.<sup>64, 69</sup> Where a form of genuine feudalism still survives, as in those parts of northern Nigeria which were formerly included in the Fulani Empire, the 'democrats' may, as in early nineteenth-century Europe, attack the land-holding aristocracy on the ground that it is an oppressing and exploiting class. This is the view stated in NEPU's *Declaration of Principles*:

All parties are but the expression of class interests, and as the interest of the 'Talakawa' [commoners] is diametrically opposed to the interest of all sections of the master class, the party seeking the emancipation of the 'Talakawa' must naturally be hostile to the party of the oppressors.<sup>121</sup>

At the level of central government 'democracy' means the replacement of the colonial bureaucracy by a popular assembly, a national Parliament, and a Cabinet responsible thereto; by the same argument, at the level of local government, 'democracy' means the replacement of chiefs, Native Authorities, and European administrators by popularly elected councils. These, like Parliament, the party can normally expect to control; and in both cases it expects to rely on the loyalty of African officials. The actual methods employed by governing parties to weaken or eliminate chiefly power may be gradual, as in Ghana, where the technique of judicial inquiry was successfully used to expose the deficiencies of the Asanteman Council and the State of Akim-Abuakwa;<sup>66, 67</sup> or they may be revolutionary, as in Guinea, where the institution of *chefs de canton* was simply abolished, and *conseils de circonscription*, elected by universal suffrage, were set up in their place.<sup>64</sup>

Hence democracy, in the context of an independent African State, also implies centralization. The mass party, having concentrated its efforts during the colonial period on challenging, attacking, and detaching popular support from the old regime, is faced with the problem of strengthening the power of the new regime. Moreover, it has to undertake this task without being able

to make use of many of the techniques which were available to the old regime. It cannot enjoy the prestige of a conquering minority, and inculcate habits of subordination in the governed, since it preaches equality, and the doctrine of 'the common man' ('*il n'y a pas de surhommes*').<sup>72</sup> It cannot insist that a respectful social distance should be preserved between governors and governed, since it is by its nature a fraternal party. It normally lacks a corps of highly trained civil servants. It cannot rely on a system of alliances with well-disposed pashas, amirs, chiefs, notables, and *marabouts*. If its authority is threatened, there are no large reserves of metropolitan armed forces on which it can draw. Hence, in its efforts to strengthen the central power, the party is bound to depend, to a very large extent, on the effectiveness of its own organization, the main new source of power at its command. Not all mass party leaders would go as far as Sékou Touré, and insist that 'democracy' in newly independent African States necessarily implies a form of 'democratic and popular dictatorship', exercised by the party on behalf of the people.<sup>80</sup> But few, I think, would quarrel with the underlying principle.

There are other reasons why mass parties are inclined to insist that 'democracy implies centralization'. Colonial regimes attempt, unsuccessfully, to maintain some kind of social equilibrium. Mass party governments, on the other hand, are committed to speeding up the processes of economic and social change. Again, this is partly what 'democracy' means in the contemporary African context: opening up new possibilities of satisfaction for 'the people'. As Dr Apter has pointed out, the CPP slogan 'Free-dom' meant, and was understood to mean, in part - 'freedom to enjoy the blessings of Western standards of subsistence'.<sup>8</sup> Hence 'democracy' has to be understood as involving a variety of economic and social objectives: the expansion of national output and national income; a more effective mobilizing of labour; a more rapid development of power, industry, and communications; the elimination of illiteracy and 'backwardness' through mass education; the provision of universal, free, primary education; and, especially in Muslim areas, the emancipation of women. The need to carry out a wide range of new and difficult tasks tends further to stimulate the reinforcement of the central power.

## OBJECTIVES AND IDEOLOGIES

African party ideologies seem to be roughly grouped around two poles – one of which can be labelled ‘radical’, the other ‘conservative’. Ideologies of the former type emphasize the need for a rapid transfer of political power from the colonizers to the colonized; and, after formal independence has been achieved, for the minimum of practical dependence upon the former colonial power in particular and ‘the West’ in general, in administrative, economic, diplomatic, military, and other fields. Hence, in their international aspect, such ideologies tend to be both ‘neutralist’ and Pan-Africanist. Internally, they assert the need for the maximum democratization of the State in the sense already defined: popular assemblies, directly elected by secret ballot on the basis of universal suffrage, as the formal sources of power, with the party itself playing a dominant role at all levels.

Such parties insist upon the need for strengthening the central power of the State, and weakening – or eliminating – traditional, ‘tribal’, or regional authorities and attachments. They are much concerned with ‘progress’, in all its aspects – the expansion of popular education, the modernization of techniques, rapid industrialization, social reform. In principle they are egalitarian, with wide variations in practice, asserting that man’s value depends solely upon his social contribution. Indeed, ‘the people’ are regarded as the source of all value, as well as the source of all power:

‘Go to the people  
Live among them  
Learn from them  
Love them  
Serve them  
Plan with them  
Start with what they know  
Build on what they have.’

Let this wise Chinese advice be a constant guide in our day-to-day Party work among the humble masses.<sup>119</sup>

It is the party’s claim to be the most effective organized expression of the popular will – its supreme embodiment – that provides the moral justification for its control of the machinery of the State, for the foreseeable future.

Ideologies of the latter, 'conservative' type, on the other hand, while in general assuming the inevitability of a transfer of power, argue that it should be orderly and gradual; and that, after independence, ties with the former colonial State should, as far as possible, be retained. In their international aspect they tend to be Western-oriented and particularist. They are sceptical about entrusting excessive power to popular assemblies; they approve institutions such as a Second Chamber which can serve as a check upon tendencies towards a 'popular dictatorship'; and they support, where possible, methods of indirect election and a restricted suffrage. Ideologies of this type may often be associated with a mystique of tribalism, and with opposition to encroachment by the central power on the powers and privileges of traditional authorities. Hence they are normally antipathetic towards centralization, emphasizing the importance of preserving, wherever possible, the integrity and autonomy of regional and local units.

'Democracy' in this context – when the term is used – tends to have the quite different sense of guarding the rights of the great corporate interests of the realm – chiefs, religious organizations, pre-colonial 'nations'. Ideologies of this type take for granted the desirability of a hierarchical ordering of society, in which the distinctions between chief and commoner, patron and dependant, *shaikh* and *ṭālib*, scholar and illiterate, old and young, male and female, are maintained, and in which those who belong to the naturally superior categories exercise due authority and are regarded with due respect. Hence the levelling tendencies of the radical-type democrats are disapproved. It is not 'the people' or the masses who should be the source of power and value, but 'the best people', an élite, whose qualifications will vary according to the social context within which this type of ideology is formulated.

These are, of course, merely ideal types. No actual party ideology conforms exactly to either model. In practice all kinds of deviations and intermediate types can occur. The purpose of outlining these models is merely to indicate a way of answering two questions raised at the beginning of this chapter: What is meant by the terms 'Left' and 'Right' in the contemporary African context? And, in so far as conflicts between and within African

parties involve ideological issues, and not merely opposition between personalities or interests, what kinds of controversy are liable to arise? Since radical ideologies are normally associated with the mass parties, and conservative ideologies with the élite parties, this discussion throws some light also on a third question: How pronounced is the trend towards one-party systems in independent African States?

What actually happens in a particular State at a particular phase in its history depends upon a great variety of factors. But at least one can say that, where a mass party enjoys a position of overwhelming dominance, and conceives of itself as the effective expression of the popular will, from its own standpoint there is nothing undemocratic in the party's enjoying a monopoly of power within the State, as in the case of Neo-Destour in Tunisia or PDG in Guinea. It may indeed claim that, in the existing situation, this is the only valid form which 'democracy' can take.

Three points, which deserve much fuller treatment, are worth making briefly in conclusion. First, there is an obvious parallelism between the ideologies of the mass parties and the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Echoes of *Émile* and the *Social Contract* recur continually in the speeches and writings of the mass party and 'congress' leaders, arising probably less from Rousseau's direct influence than from resemblances in the historical context, and the needs and demands of the time. I have in mind particularly such points as the conception of an undifferentiated (African) people as the legitimate source of power; the emphasis on the moral purposes which government should seek to realize, for example, Sékou Touré's insistence on the restoration of African 'dignity'; the strongly egalitarian, levelling outlook; the notion of the party – and thus of the State, once the party has taken hold of it and remoulded it according to party principles – as the expression of the popular will; the romantic reinterpretation of the pre-colonial, pre-capitalist, collectivist African past; the linking of the two themes of national renaissance and international – particularly inter-African – brotherhood.

This is not the place to discuss the obvious problems which this type of ideology raises. Is 'the people' really undifferentiated? Can the State in practice be identified with the party, government

with party leadership, administration with the party machine? May the party cease to express the popular will, and what are the tests for discovering when this is the case? It is, after all, in the nature of ideologies which have influenced the course of history to raise problems of this kind for political theorists.

However, while one can find interesting parallels between the ideas of Rousseau and the ideologies of the African mass parties, these parallels must not be pushed too far. Two centuries of history lie in between. African mass parties and their leaders belong very consciously to the mid twentieth century, and regard themselves as the inheritors of the entire tradition of democratic thought, not simply of a part of it. In particular they have borrowed heavily from Marxist sources, in circumstances which I have already discussed. The extent of this borrowing varies from party to party and from individual to individual. It may, as in the case of PDG and Sékou Touré, be the Marxist method of approach to history, to society, and to practical political questions that is borrowed, leaving out only its metaphysical and theological presuppositions. Since Marxism is here used as an instrument of social analysis, rather than as a total world-view, good Muslims who are also good party members would appear to be faced with no fundamental conflicts of loyalties.

Other parties have borrowed particular categories of explanation and pieces of theory, with or without acknowledgement: for example, the conception of monopoly capitalism as the 'tap-root' of imperialism, derived from Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, which recurs constantly in the literature of African nationalism; or the Leninist notion of the party as a 'vanguard,' organized on the principle of 'democratic centralism,' which is an essential element of CPP doctrines. Sometimes, on the other hand, these borrowings are primarily linguistic; for example, the concluding sentences of Kwame Nkrumah's early pamphlet, *Towards Colonial Freedom*, contains two echoes from *The Communist Manifesto*:

Thus the goal of the national liberation movement is the realization of complete and unconditional independence, and the building of a society of peoples in which the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all. PEOPLES OF THE COLONIES, UNITE: the working men of all countries are behind you.<sup>64</sup>

The main point to grasp here is that African parties are essentially eclectic. Methods of thoughts, ideas, and terms are taken over, not only from revolutionary democrats and Marxists, but also from Gandhist, Islamic, and Christian, as well as from indigenous African sources. And they are fused together to form a new, nationalist ideology, varying according to local conditions, yet possessing a certain underlying unity.

Finally, the importance of external influences – upon ideologies as upon forms of organization – must not be exaggerated. Just as Lenin has to be understood in a historical context which includes Peter the Great and Ivan the Terrible as well as Marx, so Sékou Touré and Modibo Keita belong to a tradition which includes Muḥammad Askia, the late fifteenth-century ruler of Gao, and Mansa Musa, the early fourteenth-century Emperor of Mali.<sup>21</sup> The revolutionary leaders of the nineteenth century – ‘Uthmān dan Fodio, ‘Abdal-Qādir, Ḥājj ‘Umar, Samory, Ja-Ja of Opobo – are not merely folk heroes; they are also, in a real sense, the political ancestors of the revolutionaries and radicals of this generation. Basic similarities between the problems confronting colonial and former colonial peoples throughout the world naturally imply certain similarities in the ideologies which serve as tools for the resolution of these problems. But the process of African liberation must be understood in the broad context of African history. It has its own specific characteristics, generates its own ideas, and has its own special kind of contribution to make to humanity.

## *Chapter 8*

### CONCLUDING HYPOTHESES

THE following generalizations, offered as a basis for discussion, partly summarize arguments contained in the preceding chapters. Partly they go beyond the evidence offered here, and relate to questions which belong to the study of African political parties, but which it has not been possible to discuss at any length in this book.

(a) Certain common predisposing factors have tended to stimulate the rise of African parties during the period since the Second World War. These include: the existence of a 'colonial situation'; the development of a modern communications network; the decline of chiefly power and the rise of an African middle class; the development of an African press; the existence – usually – of representative institutions and a minimum of civil liberties; and the influence of non-African (European, American, or Asian) organizations and ideas (chapter 2).

(b) While African political parties have originated in a variety of ways, they have, in general, been extra-parliamentary in origin. Frequently they have evolved out of, or been constructed around, existing associations of various types. Given electoral machinery, a reasonably broad franchise, and the possibility of access to a significant degree of political power through representative institutions, there has been a tendency for mass organizations of a 'congress' type to transform themselves into parties. New parties have also emerged as a consequence of splits within or fusion between existing political organizations (chapter 3).

(c) African parties can be roughly classified in various ways: e.g., in respect of their scale, as inter-territorial, territorial, regional-ethnic, and 'dwarf' parties; in relation to structure, as mass or élite parties; and as regards the extent to which they enjoy a legal or illegal existence. While these distinctions are neither rigid nor constant, the contrast between mass parties and élite parties is of fundamental importance, and affects all aspects of

party behaviour. In general there is a tendency for territorial, well-structured, mass parties to assert themselves at the expense of regional-ethnic, loosely structured, élite parties, during the period of decolonization (chapter 4).

(d) In general the most effective and stable parties would seem to be those which have evolved some form of collective leadership; which have succeeded in reconciling a wide range of divergent standpoints, interests, and 'connexions'; and which permit participation in decision-making at a variety of levels – including regional and local *militants*, 'ginger-groups' within the party, leaders of allied organizations, women, youth, trade unions, etc. In so far as this is achieved, parties have been able to counteract to some extent the tendency for power to become concentrated in the hands of the party leader, central committee, parliamentary representatives, party officials (chapter 5).

(e) One characteristic of African mass parties has been the development of a multiplicity of functions – of a judicial, administrative, police, educational, and social welfare type – over and above their conventional electoral and parliamentary functions. In the case of parties in opposition to a colonial regime, this is liable to mean that the party becomes, in effect, a parallel State. In the case of parties in power it may mean a blurring of the distinction between the functions and responsibilities of the party on the one hand and those of the Government and Administration on the other (chapter 6).

(f) Where two or more parties co-exist within a single State, the divisions between them have to be explained in relation to a variety of factors – including ethnic, religious, and cultural differences and oppositions, conflicts of economic interest, the play of external influences, personal antagonisms, and so forth. But conflicts of an ideological kind are seldom entirely absent, and may be a factor of the first importance (chapters 3 and 7).

(g) Ideological conflicts, where they occur, are associated with differences of attitude to the concrete political objectives to be pursued and methods to be employed. They involve also different interpretations of generally approved ideas, e.g. 'independence' or 'self-government' and 'democracy'. It is possible to draw a broad distinction, in terms of objectives and methods, between

ideologies of a radical type (whether reformist or revolutionary) and ideologies of a conservative or traditionalist type. Mass parties tend, on the whole, to be the exponents of radical ideologies, and élite parties of conservative or traditionalist ideologies (chapters 4 and 7).

(h) In some respects, and at certain stages, a 'colonial situation' tends to stimulate a multiplicity of political parties. But it also stimulates a nationalist effort to create a single dominant party, a *parti unique*, as a means of strengthening the power of the colonized 'nation' in relation to the colonial State. From this standpoint, opposition within the 'nation' and the proliferation of parties are regarded as a source of weakness, not only during the colonial period, but also after formal independence has been achieved. Hence there is a tendency towards one-party dominance in newly independent African States. This is reinforced where the dominant party is a powerful mass party, ideologically committed to the doctrine that 'democracy' means the control of the State by a party which effectively expresses the popular will (chapters 2 and 7).

(i) Ideological oppositions within a mass party may be at least as significant as the oppositions existing between parties. Where there is a single dominant party, the oppositions which might otherwise express themselves through inter-party conflict are liable to express themselves, in a modified form, through controversy within the party. Such a party may in fact, during its revolutionary phase, permit a high degree of initiative and liberty of opinion. But once it becomes firmly established as a governing party, the risks of ossification increase: nonconformity tends to be more suspect; the problem of reconciling toleration of divergent standpoints within the party with the maintenance of party discipline and the efficiency of the regime becomes more acute (chapter 5).

(j) The independent and near-independent States of Africa provide examples of various types of system: one-party systems with (i) ruling élite parties (Liberia), (ii) ruling mass parties (Guinea, Tunisia); two-party systems with dominant mass parties (Ghana); multi-party systems (Nigeria, Morocco); systems in which parties have not yet emerged (Ethiopia), or in which they have been formally abolished (Libya, the Sudan). These patterns

are continually changing, and are likely to have changed considerably by the time this book is published. While, as I have indicated, there is evidence of certain broad trends – e.g., for ‘congresses’ to transform themselves into parties, for élite parties to give way to mass parties, for mass parties to seek to achieve a situation of one-party dominance – there is no reason to suppose that any uniform pattern is in process of establishing itself (chapters 3, 4, and 5).

(*k*) Parties have been considered here to some extent in abstraction from other institutions through which political power can be exercised – e.g., the monarchy (where this exists), the army, the civil service, religious organizations, economic institutions. Clearly circumstances can arise in independent African States – as they have arisen in Libya, Egypt, and the Sudan, under quite different conditions in each State – in which groups whose power is based primarily upon political parties are displaced by groups operating through one or more of these other institutions, and parties are declared illegal – though they may in fact carry on some form of existence underground. This process of displacement of parties is probably least likely to occur in territories in which a dominant mass party has carried through a national revolution and is in effective control of the State.

(*l*) African political parties have to be understood as essentially African institutions – as much as lineages, age-sets, or secret societies – and in the context of the particular social systems in which they have emerged. While they have borrowed techniques of organization and propaganda, as well as ideas, from Europe, America, and Asia, they have modified these to suit African purposes, just as they have adapted ‘traditional’ institutions and rituals to meet ‘modern’ party-political needs.

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## APPENDIX

### *The Major African Political Parties, 1945-60*

There follows a list of major (and of some minor) African political organizations – parties, congresses, and fronts – which have existed during the period 1945-60, grouped under an alphabetical list of territories as they existed at the beginning of 1961. The two Federations of French West and French Equatorial Africa (AOF and AEF), which ceased to exist in 1959, have also been included for convenience, as well as their successor states. No account has been taken of political organizations which, by definition or in practice, are essential or predominantly European or Asian. Less defensibly, I have not included the various parties which operated in Egypt before the revolution of July 1952, largely because these seem to me to constitute a separate subject of study. I have only attempted to give a bare minimum of information with regard to each organization.

The following symbols have been used to indicate the role of each organization in early 1961 (the term 'party' in this context should be understood to include congresses and fronts) :

(G) = a governing party:

(O) = an opposition party

(I) = an illegal party

(D) = a defunct party

There are, naturally, some borderline cases – parties of which it is difficult to say whether they are defunct or illegal, governing or in opposition.

A list of this kind is, inevitably, highly selective. More serious, given the extreme fluidity of political systems and organizations in the present phase of African history, it is already out-of-date before it is published. The conscientious reader will, perhaps, constantly correct it in the margin. In preparing this list I have been greatly helped by being allowed to read the proofs of Mr Ronald Segal's much fuller account of parties and other organizations in his *Political Africa* (London, 1961). But for the errors, omissions, and other deficiencies, which are, unfortunately bound to creep into a list of this kind, I alone am responsible.

#### ALGERIA

(D) PPA-MTLD, *Parti du Peuple Algérien-Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques*, territorial party. PPA founded in 1937 under

leadership of Messali Hajj (descendant of Étoile Nord-Africain, founded 1923). After period of illegality re-emerged in 1946 as legal MTL D. Split July 1954. Declared illegal November 1954. Effectively absorbed in FLN.

(D) UDMA, *Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien*, territorial party. Founded in 1946 under leadership of Ferhat Abbas. Declared illegal November 1954. Joined FLN 1956.

(i) PCA, *Parti Communiste Algérien*, territorial party, with connexions with PCF (*Parti Communiste Français*). Founded about 1935. Declared illegal 1955.

(i) FLN, *Front de Libération Nationale*, revolutionary 'front'. Set up 1 November 1954, on the initiative of CRUA (*Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action*), activist wing of PPA-MTL D. Established Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (G.P.R.A.), under Prime Ministership of Ferhat Abbas, September 1958.

(i) MNA, *Mouvement National Algérien*, splinter group. Founded in 1955 by Messali Hajj. Limited influence among rump of PPA-MTL D loyal to Messali, mainly in metropolitan France.

#### ANGOLA

(i) MPLA, *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*, revolutionary 'front'. Founded in 1957 as a merger of existing illegal groups, with Ilidio Machado as President. In January 1960, joined with other nationalist organizations in Portuguese territories in setting up the Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independência Nacional.

(i) UPA, *União das Populações de Angola*, revolutionary 'front'. Formed in 1954. Main basis of support in northern Angola. Headquarters in Leopoldville (Congo). President, Roberto Alvaro Holden.

#### BASUTOLAND

(O) BNC-BCP, *Basutoland National Congress*, territorial congress. Founded 1952-3 under leadership of Ntsu Mokhehle. Reconstituted on the eve of the January 1960 elections (at which it won 73/162 seats on District Councils) as the *Basutoland Congress Party*, territorial party.

#### BECHUANALAND

(O) BPP, *Bechuanaland People's Party*, territorial party. Founded in December 1960, simultaneously with the publication of a new draft

constitution, providing for the election of a Legislative Council. President, Kgalemani Motsete.

(O) BFPF, *Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party*, territorial party. Founded in 1959 by Leetile Disang Raditladi, dissident member of the Bamangwato Royal House.

#### CAMEROONS (formerly Trust Territory of the Cameroons under British Administration)

(D) KNC, *Kamerun National Congress*, regional party. Founded in 1953, after split in *Kamerun United National Congress* (KUNC). Led by E. M. L. Endeley. Connexions with former *Cameroons National Federation* (founded 1949) and *Cameroons Youth League* (founded 1943), also led by Endeley. Merged with KPP in 1960 to form CPNC (see below).

(D) KPP, *Kamerun People's Party*, regional party. Founded in 1953 after split in KUNC and led by N. N. Mbile. Reunited with KNC to form CPNC in 1960.

(G) KNDP, *Kamerun National Democratic Party*, regional party. Founded in 1955, after split within KNC, under leadership of John Foncha. Committed to objective of Cameroons unification. Won 14/26 seats in January 1959 elections.

(O) CPNC, *Cameroon People's National Convention*, regional party. Established May 1960 under presidency of Endeley, through merger of KNC and KPP. Committed to principle of preserving links with Nigeria and Commonwealth. Electoral alliance of KNC and KPP won 12/26 seats in 1959 elections.

#### CAMEROUN, Republic of (formerly Trust Territory of Cameroun under French Administration)

(I) UPC, *Union des Populations du Cameroun*, territorial party, formerly the Cameroun section of the inter-territorial RDA. Founded 1947, under leadership of Ruben Um Nyobé (General Secretary, killed 1958) and Felix Moumié (President, murdered 1960). Committed to objective of Cameroons unification and independence. Declared illegal July 1955; continued to operate underground, and from 1956 *sous maquis*, with headquarters at Cairo, later Conakry.

(O) FPUP, *Front Populaire pour l'Unité et la Paix*, territorial party. Developed from Mayi Matip's Front de Réconciliation, or 'reconciled UPC', organized in 1959 among the UPC in the Sanaga-Maritime area,

formerly *sous maquis*, who accepted the Ahidjo Government's amnesty offer of September 1958. Won c. 22/100 seats in Assembly in first post-Independence elections of April 1960.

(G) MUC, *Mouvement d'Union Camerounaise*, territorial party, with main basis of influence in northern Cameroun. Founded and led by Ahmadou Ahidjo. Won c. 60/100 seats in 1960 elections (including GPC support in southern Cameroun), and became majority party in coalition government, with Ahidjo elected President.

(G) BDC-PDC, *Bloc Démocratique Camerounais*, reconstituted as *Parti des Démocrates Camerounais*, territorial party, mainly influential in southern Cameroun. Founded in 1951, under leadership of Dr Aujoulat, associated on an inter-territorial plane with IOM. Aujoulat succeeded as party leader by André-Marie Mbida, Prime Minister 1957-8; in exile in Cairo and Conakry 1958-60; returned to Cameroun early in 1960. PDC secured c. 11/100 seats in 1960 elections.

(G) GPC, *Groupe des Progressistes du Cameroun*, territorial party, mainly influential in southern Cameroun. Organized 1960 under leadership of Charles Assalé. Continuation of MACNA (*Mouvement d'Action Nationale*), founded March 1957. Supported MUC after 1960 elections, Assalé becoming Prime Minister. Agreed on merger with MUC in January 1961.

CENTRAL AFRICAN FEDERATION, see *Nyasaland*;  
*Rhodesia, Northern*; *Rhodesia, Southern*

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, *République Centrafricaine* (formerly Ubangui-Shari, constituent territory of French Equatorial Africa)

(G) MESAN, *Mouvement pour l'Évolution Sociale de l'Afrique Noire*, territorial party. Founded c. 1946 by Barthélémy Boganda, who led the party until his death in 1959. During this period MESAN remained the dominant, and virtually the only, party in the territory. After Boganda's death divisions began to develop within the leadership, particularly between David Dacké (Prime Minister) and Adabel Goumba. Won 48/50 seats in the Legislative Assembly in April 1959 elections.

(i) MEDAC, *Mouvement pour l'Évolution Démocratique de l'Afrique Centrale*, territorial party. Founded in June 1950, as a consequence of a split within MESAN, under leadership of Adabel Goumba. Won 11/49

seats in September 1960 elections under Goumba's leadership. Banned December 1960.

CHAD, Republic of, *République du Tchad* (formerly constituent territory of French Equatorial Africa)

(G) PPT, *Parti Progressiste Tchadien*, territorial party, with main basis of influence in the non-Muslim south. Founded in 1956 as a section of the inter-territorial RDA, under leadership of Gabriel Lisette (West Indian) – a position which he retained until displaced by François Tombalbaye in 1959. PPT won 57/85 seats in Legislative Assembly elections of May 1959, and formed government with Tombalbaye as Prime Minister.

(G) PNA, *Parti National Africain*, territorial party, with main influence in Muslim north. Organized early in 1960, under leadership of Ahmed Koulamallah, through merger of minor parties, including MSA (*Mouvement Socialiste Africain, Chad section*) and GIRT (*Groupement des Indépendants et Ruraux du Tchad*). President, Jean Baptiste. Joined Tombalbaye's coalition government; March 1961, formed UPT (*Union pour le Progrès du Tchad*), united front with PPT.

CONGO, Republic of, *République du Congo* (formerly Moyen-Congo, constituent territory of French Equatorial Africa)

(G) UDDIA, *Union Démocratique de Défense des Intérêts Africains*, territorial party, drawing main support from Bakongo and related peoples of southern and central Congo. Founded in 1956, under leadership of Abbé Fulbert Youlou. Replaced PPC as Congo section of inter-territorial RDA. Won 51/61 seats in Assembly elections of June 1959, and formed government with Youlou as Prime Minister.

(G) MSA, *Mouvement Socialiste Africain, Congo section*, territorial party, drawing main support from M'Bochi and related peoples of northern Congo. Constituted in 1957, as successor to Congo section of SFIO, under leadership of Jacques Opangault (imprisoned, later released, in 1959). Won 10/61 seats in 1959 elections. Since Opangault joined cabinet in August 1960, represented in coalition government (9 UDDIA, 4 MSA, 1 PPC).

(G) PPC, *Parti Progressiste Congolais*, territorial party. Founded in 1946 as a section of the inter-territorial RDA, under leadership of Felix

Tchicaya. From 1956 on PPC increasingly lost ground to UDDIA, though retaining some support among Vili people of Lower Congo. Won no seats in 1959 elections, but represented in coalition government.

### CONGO REPUBLIC (formerly Belgian Congo)

(G) MNC, *Mouvement National Congolais*, territorial party. Founded in 1958, under leadership of Patrice Lumumba (murdered 1961). In 1959 more conservative wing of MNC, under leadership of Albert Kalonji, seceded, with some support in Kasai, mainly among the Baluba. In the elections of May 1960, MNC emerged as the strongest single party, winning 35 (later increased to 40) seats in a Parliament of 137 members – including some seats in all six provinces, but with its main strength in Orientale. On the eve of Independence (1 July 1960) a coalition government was formed with Lumumba as Prime Minister.

(G) ABAKO, *Alliance des Bakongo*, regional-ethnic party, with its main influence in Leopoldville Province among Bakongo and related peoples. Originally founded by Nzeza-Landu in 1950 as a cultural association, for the ‘unification, conservation, and defence of the Kikongo language’. From 1955, under presidency of Joseph Kasavubu, moved over to political action. Emerged as dominant party in Leopoldville after 1957 municipal elections. Proscribed after Leopoldville rising of January 1959. Won 12/137 seats in 1960 parliamentary elections; subsequently joined Lumumba’s coalition government, with Kasavubu as Head of State. Has maintained close relations with Youlou’s UDDIA.

(G) PSA, *Parti Solidaire Africain*, territorial party, with strong local support in Leopoldville province. Founded in April 1959; led by Antoine Gizenga and Cleophas Kamitatu. Won 13/137 seats in 1960 parliamentary elections, and joined Lumumba’s coalition government.

(O) CONAKAT, *Confédération des Associations Tribales de Katanga*, regional-ethnic party, with main support among the Lunda, expressing ideas of Katanga particularism. Founded July 1959; Moise Tshombe elected president December 1959. Won 25/60 seats in Katanga Provincial Assembly and 7/137 parliamentary seats in 1960 elections. Refused participation in Lumumba’s government, and (July 1960) asserted Katanga’s independence.

(G) BALUBAKAT (or *Parti Progressiste Katangais*), an alliance of three Katanga ethnic organizations, including the Baluba, opposed to CONAKAT and Katanga separatism. Established shortly before the 1960 elections, under leadership of Jason Sendwe. Won 22/60 seats in

Katanga Provincial Assembly and 7/137 parliamentary seats; entered Lumumba's government.

(G) CERE, *Centre de Regroupement Africain*, regional party (with centralizing, Socialist objectives), based on Kivu. Founded August 1958, and led by Anicet Kashamura. Won 10/137 seats in 1960 parliamentary elections and joined Lumumba's government.

(G) PNP, *Parti National du Progrès*, territorial party, with main strength in Leopoldville and Equateur provinces. Founded in November 1959, at Coquilhatville conference, by a merger of 27 tribal and local groupings, under leadership of Paul Bolya. Traditionalist, enjoying support of Belgian Administration. Won 22/137 seats in 1960 parliamentary elections, and initially joined Lumumba's government.

DAHOMÉY, Republic of, *République du Dahomey* (formerly constituent territory of French West Africa)

(D) UPD, *Union Progressiste Dahoméenne*, territorial party. Founded in 1946-7 - under leadership of Sourou Migan Apithy, Emile Zinsou, Hubert Maga - as section of inter-territorial RDA. Transferred to inter-territorial IOM in 1948. Split in 1951 when PRD and GEND broke away.

(D) PRD, *Parti Républicain du Dahomey*, territorial party, with its main basis of support in southern Dahomey. Founded in 1951 under leadership of Apithy. Won 28/75 seats in April 1959 elections. Absorbed in 1960 in PND (*Parti des Nationalistes du Dahomey*).

(D) GEND-MDD-RDD, *Groupeement Ethnique du Nord Dahomey-Mouvement Démocratique du Dahomey-Rassemblement Démocratique Dahoméen*, a regional-ethnic party, based on northern Dahomey, which in course of time acquired some of the characteristics of a territorial party. Dominated throughout its history by its founder, Hubert Maga. GEND, founded in 1951 from dissident wing of UPD, changed its name to MDD in 1952. Reconstituted as RDD in 1957. Won 22/75 seats in 1959 elections. Joined with PND to form PDU in 1960.

(D) UDD, *Union Démocratique Dahoméenne*, territorial party, with main support in southern Dahomey. Founded in November 1955; a section of the inter-territorial RDA from 1957, absorbing the remainder of UPD. Led by Justin Ahomadegbe. Won 20/75 seats in 1959 elections: joined Maga's coalition government, but withdrew and moved into opposition in November 1960. Dissolved by Government decree April 1961.

(G) PDU, *Parti Dahoméen de l'Unité*, territorial party. Established November 1960 by a merger of the two governing parties PND (ex-PRD)

and RDD, under Apithy-Maga leadership. On PDU ticket Maga elected President and Apithy Vice-President of Dahomey Republic, and PDU won all seats in Assembly, December 1960.

EGYPT, see UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

ETHIOPIA, Empire of (including the former Italian colony, Eritrea, which in December 1952 became an autonomous unit within the Ethiopian Federation)

During the period 1945-60 there have been no political parties in Ethiopia proper. The two major parties functioning in Eritrea during the period prior to Federation were:

*Unionist Party*, territorial party. Founded April 1941, though not effectively organized on a legal basis until 1946. Leader, Ato Tedla Bairu. Principal objective, political union of Eritrea with Ethiopia. Supported mainly, but not exclusively by Coptic Christians. Won 34/68 seats in the 1951 elections to the Representative Assembly, Tedla Bairu becoming Chief Executive.

*Muslim League*, territorial-confessional party. Founded December 1946. Major party within the Independence Bloc till c. 1950. Principal objective, independence/autonomy for Eritrea, with some form of association with Sudan. Mainly supported by Muslims. Won 34/68 seats in 1951 elections, Shaikh 'Ali Muḥammad Mūsa Radai (leader of ML, Western Province) becoming Chairman of Assembly Executive Committee.

Former FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA, *Afrique Équatoriale Française* (AEF)

Former FRENCH WEST AFRICA, *Afrique Occidentale Française* (AOF)

These two Federations, which until 1958 were constitutionally part of the French Republic, and which ceased to exist in 1959, are included here, since the inter-territorial parties and party groupings listed below operated, in varying degrees, in both of them.

RDA, *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*. Founded in October 1946, at the Bamako congress. Organized on the basis of *sections* in all the territories of AOF except Mauretania, and AEF except Ubangui-Shari, plus Cameroun. President, Félix Houphouët-Boigny; General Secretary

(to 1950), Gabriel D'Arboussier; later, Ouezzin Coulibaly, Gabriel Lisette. Won 243/474 seats in 1957 Assembly elections in AOF. Split after the Referendum of 28 September 1958 into PDG-RDA (Guinea), US-RDA (Soudan, later Mali), and the RDA-affiliated parties in the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Niger, Chad, Moyen-Congo (later Congo Republic), and Gabon, which continues broadly to accept the leadership of Houphouët.

IOM, *Indépendants d'Outre-Mer*. Initially set up as a 'group' of overseas deputies within the French Parliament, under the leadership of Léopold-Sédar Senghor, in 1948. Attempted, at its Bobo-Dioulasso conference in 1953, to transform itself into an inter-territorial movement. Supported by non-RDA, non-Socialist parties in Senegal, Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey, Guinea, as well as Cameroun.

CAF, *Convention Africaine*. Founded in January 1957 as successor to IOM, under leadership of Senghor, with support in approximately the same territories as IOM. Won 54/474 seats in 1957 Legislative Assembly elections in AOF. Merged with MSA to form PRA in 1958.

MSA, *Mouvement Socialiste Africain*. Founded in January 1957, under leadership of Lamine Gueye, as inter-territorial organization linking (mainly) parties with SFIO (i.e. French Socialist) orientation. Main support in Senegal, Niger, Soudan, Guinea, Chad, Moyen-Congo. Won 62/474 seats in 1957 Assembly elections in AOF. Merged with CAF to form PRA in 1958.

PRA, *Parti du Regroupement Africain*. Founded February/March 1958, through merger of CAF and MSA, with a view to creating a united front of all French African parties. Attempted, but failed, to include RDA in the *regroupement*. President, Senghor; Secretary, Bakary Djibo. Broke up early in 1959, over Referendum-Federation issues. Partially replaced by PFA.

PFA, *Parti de la Fédération Africaine*. Founded March 1959, based on parties committed to principle of reconstituting a French-speaking West African Federation – principally UPS in Senegal and Union Soudanaise in Soudan, but with support also in Niger, Dahomey, Upper Volta. President, Senghor; Secretary, Modibo Keita. Functioned as governing party in Mali Federation until its break-up in August 1960.

GABON, Republic of, *République Gabonaise* (formerly a constituent territory of French Equatorial Africa)

(G) BDG, *Bloc Démocratique Gabonais*, territorial party, section of the inter-territorial RDA. Founded 1946 as the *Mouvement Mixte Gabonais*,

under leadership of Leon M'ba; changed its name to BDG in 1953. Supplanted UDSG as dominant party after winning 31/40 seats in 1957 Legislative Assembly elections; and has remained governing party, with M'ba as Prime Minister since 1959, and President of the Republic since February 1961.

(o) UDSG, *Union Démocratique et Sociale Gabonaise*, territorial party, drawing main support from Fang in northern Gabon; affiliated to CAF, later to PRA. Founded in 1948, under leadership of Jean Aubame. Dominant party until 1957, when it won 9/40 seats in Assembly elections. Ran joint list of candidates with BDG in February 1961 elections and joined coalition government (Aubame, Foreign Minister).

#### GAMBIA

(o) GDP *Gambia Democratic Party*, territorial party, limited in influence to Bathurst and neighbourhood. Founded in 1945 by the Rev. J. C. Faye (Minister 1954–60). In elections of May 1960, formed alliance with GMC, but won no seats.

(o) GMC, *Gambia Muslim Congress*, confessional party, limited in influence to Bathurst and neighbourhood. Founded in 1945 and led by I. M. Garba-Jahumpa (Minister 1954–60). In 1960 elections form alliance with GDP, but won no seats,

(o) UP, *United Party*, territorial party, with its main strength in Bathurst and neighbourhood. Founded in 1951 and led by Pierre N'Jie. In 1960 elections won 5/7 seats in 'the Colony', plus one more there and one in 'the Protectorate' in by-elections. N'Jie appointed Chief Minister.

(o) PPP, *People's Progressive Party*, territorial party, with its main basis of support in 'the Protectorate'. Founded December 1959 (originally under name of *Protectorate People's Party*). Led by D. K. Jawara. In 1960 elections won 12/12 seats in 'the Protectorate'.

#### GHANA, Republic of (formerly Gold Coast and Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration)

(G) CPP, *Convention People's Party*, territorial party. Founded June 1949, as a breakaway from the UGCC. Founder and Life Chairman, Kwame Nkrumah. Major partner in government 1951–4; sole governing party from 1954 (Nkrumah Prime Minister from 1952). Won 72/104 seats in 1956 elections. Nkrumah elected President, and constitution of Republic approved in national referendum, April 1960.

(D) UGCC, *United Gold Coast Convention*, territorial congress. Founded August 1947, under leadership of J. B. Danquah, with Kwame Nkrumah (on return from England) as General Secretary. Much weakened by secession of CPP in 1949. Absorbed by GCP in 1952.

(D) GCP, *Ghana Congress Party*, territorial party, with limited and local support. Founded in 1952, in opposition to CPP, combining former UGCC leadership, former *National Democratic Party*, and some C.P.P. dissidents, under leadership of Kofi Busia. Won 1/104 seats in 1954 election. For all practical purposes merged with NLM in 1954.

(D) MAP, *Moslem Association Party*, confessional party, with main influence among Muslim communities in Accra and Kumasi. Developed out of Moslem Association, founded as a cultural organization in 1932. Organized as a party in 1953, in opposition to CPP, under leadership of Mustapha Awoonor-Renner. Won 1/104 seats in 1954 and 1956 elections. Merged with NLM, etc., to form UP in October 1957.

(D) NPP, *Northern People's Party*, regional party, based in former Northern Territories. Founded April 1954, under leadership of S. D. Dombo (Chairman) and Mumuni Bawumia (Vice-chairman), with support of northern chiefs, in opposition to CPP. Won 15/104 seats in 1956 elections. Merged with NLM, etc., to form UP in October 1957.

(D) TC, *Togoland Congress*, regional-ethnic party, based in Ewe areas of former British Togoland, seeking Togoland unification. Founded in 1951, through amalgamation of Togoland Union (founded 1943) with other Togoland organizations, under leadership of S. G. Antor. Links with CUT and JUVENTO in French Togoland (Togo). Won 2/104 seats in 1956 elections.

(D) NLM, *National Liberation Movement*, regional-ethnic party, based upon Ashanti, drawing main support from cocoa farmers and traditionalists. Founded in September 1954, by Bafuor Osei Akoto. Leadership included Kofi Busia, R. R. Amponsah. Won 12/104 seats in 1956 elections. Merged with GCP, MAP, NPP, etc., to form UP in 1957.

(O) UP, *United Party*, territorial party. Founded in October 1957, through unification of regional-ethnic parties and groups in opposition to CPP, including NLM, NPP, TC, MAP, and *Ga Shifimo Kpee*. Leadership included Dombo, Busia, and Amponsah (General Secretary until imprisoned 1958). Strength of UP in April 1960, approximately reflected in vote of 124,623 for J. B. Danquah (UP candidate) against 1,016,076 for Kwame Nkrumah (CPP) in national referendum for President.

GUINEA, Republic of, *République de Guinée* (formerly constituent territory of French West Africa, AOF)

(G) PDG, *Parti Démocratique de Guinée*, territorial party; until October 1958, a section of the inter-territorial RDA. Founded June 1947, successor to PPG, *Parti Progressiste de Guinée* (founded 1946), under leadership of Madeira Keita (now Mali Minister of Interior). From 1952 Sékou Touré (now President of Guinea) became Secretary-General of PDG and its effective leader. Party won 56/60 seats in 1957 elections for Legislative Assembly. In September 1958 referendum Guinea chose independence and rejected membership of French Community by 1,136,000 votes to 57,500. Thereafter PDG absorbed BAG and DSG, becoming sole party.

(D) BAG, *Bloc Africain de Guinée*, territorial party, based on ethnic and regional groups. Founded 1954, under leadership of Barry Diawadou and Kefta Koumandian. During 1958 associated with inter-territorial PRA. Merged with PDG after Independence.

(D) DSG, *Démocratie Socialiste de Guinée*, regional-ethnic party, with its main influence among Fulani of Futa Jallon. Founded 1954, as partial successor to AGV (*Amicale Gilbert Veillard*, founded c. 1943), under leadership of Ibrahima Barry ('Barry III'). Won 3/60 seats in 1957 Assembly elections. Associated with MSA, 1957-8. Merged with PDG after Independence.

GUINEA, Portuguese

(I) PAIG, *Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine*, revolutionary movement, operating illegally in Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, with offices in Conakry (Republic of Guinea). Founded 1956. Secretary-General, Amilcar Cabral.

IVORY COAST, Republic of, *République de la Côte d'Ivoire*

(G) PDCI, *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire*, territorial party, section of the inter-territorial RDA; since its foundation in 1946 dominant party in the Ivory Coast, under leadership of RDA President, Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Developed out of the 'congress-type' Bloc Africain and the Syndicat Agricole Africain (founded 1944), both also led by Houphouët. Experienced repression by French Administration, 1949-50. Won 60/60 seats in 1957 Assembly elections, and formed government under Auguste Denise as Vice-President (later Prime Minister); succeeded as Prime Minister by Houphouët after April 1959 elections (in which all seats were likewise won by PDCI).

## KENYA

(D) *KAU, Kenya African Union*, territorial congress. Founded, as Kenya African Study Union, in 1944. Adopted name of KAU in 1946. First Presidents, Harry Thuku, James Gichuru; succeeded in 1947 by Jomo Kenyatta (after his return from Europe), KAU leader until his arrest in 1952; succeeded by Walter Odede. KAU declared illegal June 1953.

(O) *KANU, Kenya African National Union*, territorial party. Founded March 1960, with Tom Mboya as General Secretary, Oginga Odinga Vice-President, and James Gichuru acting President (pending release of Jomo Kenyatta). Successor of KIM (*Kenya Independence Movement*), founded August 1959; with links with CEMO (*Constituency Elected Members' Organization*), formed 1958, PCP (*People's Convention Party*), organized in Nairobi 1956, and KAU. Won 18/33 'open seats' in Legislative Council Elections, January/February 1961.

(G) *KADU, Kenya African Democratic Union*, territorial party. Founded June 1960, by a merger of the Kalenjin National Alliance, Masai United Front, Coast African Political Union, Somali National Association, and Kenya African People's Party under leadership of Masinde Muliro. President, Ronald Ngala, Links with KNP (Kenya National Party, inter-racial, 1959-60) and more conservative wing of CEMO. Won 12/33 'open seats' in 1961 Legislative Council elections.

## LIBERIA, Republic of

(G) *True Whig Party*, territorial party, based mainly on ruling and administrative classes. Founded c. 1860 as Whig Party. Governing party since 1870 (except for period 1871-7, when Republican Party formed government). Party leader and National Standard Bearer, and national President since 1943/4, William V. S. Tubman; re-elected by overwhelming majority on 500,000 poll in May 1959.

Other Parties have emerged in the past, usually for brief periods at elections, e.g. People's Party, 1923; Democratic Party, 1943; Reformation Party, supporting Presidential candidature of David Twe, 1951.

LIBYA, United Kingdom of, *Mamlakatu Libiya al-Muttaḥida*

(D) *NCP, National Congress Party*, territorial party, with its main strength in Tripolitania. Founded c. 1947, under the leadership of Bashīr al-Sa'dāwī, opposed to the Idrisid dynasty and British-American influences. Won 8/55 seats in House of Representatives in February 1952 elections.

Bashir al-Sa'dāwī deported and party suppressed after election disturbances.

During the period 1946–51, under the British Military Administration, various minor parties operated, particularly in Tripolitania, e.g. United National Front, Free National Bloc, Nationalist Party, Independence Party, Egypto-Tripolitanian Union Party.

**MALI**, Republic of, *République du Mali* (formerly Soudan Français, until 1959 constituent territory of French West Africa and during 1959–60 of Mali Federation)

(G) **US**, *Union Soudanaise*, territorial party; from 1946 to 1958 Soudan section of the inter-territorial **RDA**; during 1959–60 with **UPS** one of two major partners in inter-territorial **PFA**. Founded in 1946 under leadership of Mamadou Konaté (died 1956); thereafter leadership passed to Modibo Keita, **US** Secretary-General, Prime Minister of Mali Federation 1959–60, and of Mali Republic from August 1960. Won 64/70 seats in 1957 Assembly elections and all seats in 1959 elections; after which **PPS** and other minor parties merged with **US**, which thus became the sole party in Mali.

(D) **PPS**, or **PSP**, *Parti Progressiste Soudanais*, territorial party, during 1957–8 associated with inter-territorial **MSA**. Founded 1946, under leadership of Fily Dabo Sissoko and, later, Hammadoun Dicko, with loose connexions with French **SFIO**, drawing support from chiefs and traditionalist elements. Won 6/70 seats in 1957 Assembly elections. Merged with **US** in 1959.

**MAURETANIA**, Islamic Republic of, *République Islamique de Mauritanie* (until 1959 constituent territory of French West Africa)

(G) **UPM-PRM**, *Union Progressiste Mauritanienne-Parti du Regroupement Mauritanien*, territorial party. Founded in 1947, with support of French Administration, representing traditional Moor ruling classes, secular and religious, in opposition to *Entente Mauritanienne*. Won 33/34 seats in 1957 Assembly elections and formed government under leadership of Mokhtar ould Daddah (Prime Minister from 1958). Re-constituted as **PRM** after absorbing **EM** in 1958. Won 40/40 seats in 1959 elections. Stood for Mauretanian independence (realized in 1960) against Morocco's claim that Shinqit (Mauretania and Spanish Sahara) belonged historically to the Moroccan State.

(D) EM, *Entente Mauritanienne*, territorial party. Founded 1946, under leadership of Horma ould Babana (returned as deputy to French Parliament 1946–51). In opposition from 1951. In 1956 Horma ould Babana went into voluntary exile in Morocco, and supported demand for Moroccan–Mauretanian union. In 1958 remnants of EM fused with UPM to become PRM.

(I) PRNM, *Parti de la Renaissance Nationale Mauritanienne*, *Nahdat al-wataniyya*, territorial party, illegal since October, 1960. Emerged c. 1958 out of groups associated with the Moroccan Istiqlal party and supporting principle of Moroccan–Mauretanian union. Secretary-General Mohammed el-Hanchi. Abstained in 1959 elections. Banned 1960.

(D) UNM, *Union Nationale Mauritanienne*, territorial party, with main support among sedentary *sūdān* (Negro peoples) in southern Mauretania. Founded April 1959. Associated with inter-territorial PFA, seeking closer ties with Mali Federation. After break-up of the Federation accepted united front with PRM.

## MOCAMBIQUE

(I) MANU, *Moçambique African National Union*, revolutionary front. Formed November 1960, from union of former nationalist groups. Offices in Zanzibar, Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam.

(I) UDENAMO, *União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique*, revolutionary front. Founded 1960. President, Adeline Gwambe. Enjoys support among Moçambique migrants in Nyasaland, the Rhodesias, and Tanganyika, as well as in Mozambique.

## MOROCCO, Kingdom of, *Mamlakat al-maghribīya*

(G) *Istiqlal* (Independence Party), territorial party. Founded December 1943; published Independence Manifesto January 1944. Leader, 'Alāl al-Fāsi; General Secretary, Ahmad Balafrej. Successor to earlier 'congress-type' organizations – CAM (Comité d'Action Marocaine, 1934–7) and PN (*Parti National pour la Réalisation du Plan des Réformes*, 1937–9). Major party in post-Independence government, 1956–8; sole governing party, 1958–9. Party split in January 1959 into more conservative wing, under 'Alāl al-Fāsi-Balafrej leadership, and more radical wing under leadership of Mehdi ben Barka (previously acting General Secretary), both parties initially retaining the name Istiqlal. Mehdi ben Barka's party later reconstituted as UNFP. May 1960 Istiqlal (rump) won majority of seats in more traditionalist centres (Fes, Meknes, etc.) in municipal elections, and supported royal government.

(G) PDI, *Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance*, territorial party. Founded 1946, under leadership of Muḥammad Hasan el-Ouezzani and 'Abd al-Qādir Benjelloun, as successor to el-Ouezzani's pre-war Mouvement Populaire. Represented in post-Independence government, 1956-8. Changed its title to PDC (*Parti Démocratique Constitutionnel*). Main influence among bourgeois elements.

(I) PCM, *Parti Communiste Marocain*, territorial party, intermittently illegal. Founded July 1943; with historical connexions with the *région marocaine* of PCF (Parti Communiste Français), operating 1930-9. Early leaders - Léon Sultan, 'Ali Yata, al-Ayashi.

(G) *Mouvement Populaire*, territorial party. Founded September 1957, under leadership of Mahjoubi Aherdane and 'Abd al-Karīm Khatīb, former leaders of the Moroccan Army of Liberation in the Rif. From May 1960 supported royal government. Main influence among rural, and especially Berber, population.

(O) UNFP, *Union Nationale des Forces Populaires*, territorial party. Founded September 1959, under leadership of Mehdi ben Barka, based on Neo-Istiqlal (the radical wing of the former Istiqlal) and breakaway groups from PDI and Mouvement Populaire. Closely associated with UMT (Union Marocaine du Travail). Joined by 'Abdallah Ibrahīm and 'Abd al-Rahīm Bouabid after fall of the former's government in May 1960; in opposition to succeeding royal government. Won majority of seats in Casablanca, Rabat, Tangier, Marrakesh in May 1960 municipal elections.

#### NIGER, Republic of, *République du Niger* (formerly constituent territory of French West Africa)

(D) PPN, *Parti Progressiste Nigérien*, territorial party, section of inter-territorial RDA. Founded 1946. Led by Boubou Hama and Hamani Diori; General Secretary, Bakary Djibo. Split in 1951 over issue of RDA's dissociation from the French Communist Party, when left wing, led by Bakary Djibo, set up UDN. Won 19/60 seats in 1957 Assembly elections. Party reconstituted itself as UCFA in 1958.

(D) BNA, *Bloc Nigérienne d'Action*, territorial party, supported by chiefs. Founded in 1955, after split in earlier chief-sponsored party, UNIS (*Union Nigérienne des Indépendants et Sympathisants*, founded 1948). Led by Issoufouy Seydou Djermakoye and Mahamane Condat. Merged with UDN to form MSN in 1956-7.

(i) UDN-MSN-Sawaba, *Union Démocratique Nigérienne-Mouvement Socialiste Nigérien-Sawaba*, territorial party. Founded 1951, under leadership of Bakary Djibo. Officially expelled from RDA at Conakry Conference of its Comité de Coordination in 1955. Merged with BNA to form MSN in 1956. Won 41/60 seats in 1957 Assembly elections and formed government. Affiliated to MSA, and later to PRA, 1957-8. Campaigned for 'Non' vote in September 1958 Referendum; defeated by 358,496 votes to 98,773 (chiefs having transferred to UCFA). Party (now known as *Sawaba*, meaning 'Freedom') won 5/60 seats in post-Referendum Assembly elections. Associated with inter-territorial PFA, 1959-60. Declared illegal October 1959.

(g) UCFA, *Union pour la Communauté Franco-Africaine*, territorial party, associated with Houphouët-led RDA. Successor to PPN; reconstituted in 1958, with support of chiefs and French Administration, to campaign for 'Oui' vote in September Referendum. Won 49/60 votes in post-Referendum Assembly elections, and formed government with Haman Diori as Prime Minister.

## NIGERIA, Federation of

(g) NCNC, *National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons*, territorial party; main strength in Eastern and Western Regions, in alliance with NEPU in Northern Region. Founded in August 1944, as a 'congress-type' organization, on the initiative of the Nigerian Union of Students, with Herbert Macaulay as President and Nnamdi Azikiwe General Secretary. Azikiwe elected President on death of Macaulay in 1946; has remained party leader since that date. Party won 64/84 seats in 1957 elections for Eastern House of Assembly (governing party); 34/124 seats in 1960 elections for Western House (opposition party); 1/170 seats in 1961 elections for Northern House (in alliance with NEPU); and 89/312 seats in 1959 elections for Federal House of Representatives (partner in coalition government with NPC).

(o) AG, *Action Group*, territorial party; main strength in Western Region. Founded (officially) March 1951. Developed out of Egbe Omo Odu-duwa, Yoruba cultural organization, established in Nigeria in 1948; connected historically with NYM (*Nigerian Youth Movement*), active during 1930s. Founder and President of Action Group, Obafemi Awolowo. Won 4/131 seats in 1956 elections for Northern House of Assembly and 9/170 seats in 1961 elections (opposition party); 13/84 seats in 1957 elections for Eastern House (opposition party); 80/124 seats in 1960

elections for Western House (governing party); 73/312 seats in 1959 elections for Federal House of Representatives (opposition party).

(G) NPC, *Northern People's Congress* (Hausa – *Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa*), regional party, dominant in Northern Region. Founded as Northerners' cultural organization in December 1949 by Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and others. Revived as political party in October 1951, at time of first general election. Led by the Sardauna of Sokoto (Prime Minister, Northern Region) and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Federal Prime Minister), with support of traditionalist ruling classes in former Fulani Empire and Bornu. Won 106/131 seats in 1956 elections and 160/170 seats in 1961 elections (governing party); 142/312 seats in 1959 Federal elections (partner in coalition government with NCNC).

(OG) NEPU, *Northern Elements Progressive Union* (Hausa – *Jam'iyyar Naman Sawaba*), regional party. Founded August 1950, as radical break-away from Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa; connected historically with NEPA (Northern Elements Progressive Association, founded 1945 by H. R. 'Abdallah). Led by Amino Kano; in alliance with BYM (Bornu Youth Movement), led by Ibrahim Imam, 1956–8; allied at Federal level with NCNC. Won (with BYM) 8/131 seats in 1956 Northern elections (opposition party); 8/312 seats in 1959 Federal elections (becoming minor partner in coalition government with NCNC and NPC; Amino Kano appointed Chief Whip).

(O) UMBC, *United Middle Belt Congress*, regional-ethnic party, limited to 'Middle Belt' of Northern Region. Founded 1955, as a result of a merger between MZL (*Middle Zone League*, founded 1950, and led, by David Lot) and MBPP (*Middle Belt People's Party*, founded 1953 and led by Moses Rwang). Later split again into Lot and Rwang factions. Latter, in alliance with Action Group, won 12/131 seats in 1956 Northern elections (opposition party).

(O) UNIP, *United National Independence Party* (formerly NIP), minor territorial party, limited in practice to Eastern Region (mainly Ibibio areas). Founded March 1953, as a result of split within NCNC, under leadership of Eyo Ita and Okoi Arikpo. Allied with Action Group and associated with COR (Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers) State movement. Won 5/84 seats in 1957 Eastern elections.

NYASALAND (constituent territory of Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland)

(D) NAC, *Nyasaland African National Congress*, territorial congress. Founded 1943. Built up popular following on issue of opposition to

Federation (with support of Nyasaland Chiefs' Union), 1952-4. Leadership reconstituted after return of Hastings Banda to Nyasaland in July 1958: Banda elected President, with Chisiza (Secretary-General), Chipembere, and Chiume, as his principal political lieutenants. State of emergency declared and NAC banned March 3 1959. Replaced by MCP.

(o) MCP, *Malawi Congress Party*, territorial party. Founded September 1959, as caretaker party, under temporary leadership of Orton Chirwa, to pursue basic aims of NAC, during detention of Hastings Banda and main NAC leadership. On their release in 1960 Banda became President of MCP, Chisiza Secretary-General, and Chipembere Treasurer. Party demands secession from Federation and democratic constitution for Nyasaland.

(o) CLP, *Congress Liberation Party*, minor territorial party. Founded May 1958, under leadership of T. D. T. Banda, former President of NAC, as conservative opposition to the Congress, and later to MCP. Subsequently joined by Manoah Chirwa and three other members of Legislative Council.

(o) NLDP, *National Liberation Democratic Party*, minor territorial party. Founded December 1960, and led by Clement Kumbikano. Favours Federation and multi-racialism.

#### RHODESIA, NORTHERN (constituent territory of Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland)

(o) ANC, *Northern Rhodesia African National Congress*, territorial congress. Founded 1948, under leadership first of Godwin Lewanika, then of Harry Nkumbula. Secretary-General (from 1953), Kenneth Kaunda. Led struggle against Federation, 1952-4. In October 1958, ANC split on issue of boycotting new Northern Rhodesian constitution, Kaunda and more radical elements moving out to organize ZANC. ANC won one seat (Nkumbula's) in March 1959 Legislative Council elections. Thereafter lost support to ZANC, and later to UNIP.

(o) UNIP, *United National Independence Party*, territorial party. Founded September 1959 as successor to ZANC (*Zambia African National Congress*, founded December 1958 under Kaunda's leadership, after split in ANC; banned March 1959). President, Kaunda; Vice-President, Mainza Chona; Secretary-General, M. Sipalo. Banned on Copperbelt, May 1960.

**RHODESIA, SOUTHERN** (constituent territory of Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland)

(D) **ANC**, *Southern Rhodesian African National Congress*, territorial congress. Founded September 1957, through merger of African Youth League and Bulawayo branch of an earlier, moribund ANC. President, Joshua Nkomo; General Secretary, George Nyandoro. ANC banned and leaders arrested, February 1959.

(O) **NDP**, *National Democratic Party*, territorial party. Organized January 1960, as caretaker party for ANC, with similar objectives and programme. President, Joshua Nkomo; General Secretary, Enos Nkala.

**RUANDA-URUNDI** (U.N. Trust Territory under Belgian Administration)

(O) **UNAR**, *Union Nationale du Ruanda*, regional-ethnic party, mainly supported by the Tutsi (traditional ruling class) of Ruanda. Founded September 1959. Secretary-General, Michel Rwagasana. Won 56/3,126 seats in June-July 1960 local elections.

(G) **PARMEHUTU**, *Parti d'Émancipation des Hutus*, regional-ethnic party, mainly supported by the Hutu (traditional subject class) of Ruanda. Founded October 1959, as a development out of the Mouvement Social Hutu (founded 1957) – both led by Grégoire Kayibanda. Won 2,201/3,126 seats in 1960 local elections plus 190 in association with APROSOMA. Kayibanda became Prime Minister in Ruanda provisional government.

(G) **APROSOMA**, *Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse*, regional-ethnic party, with main support among Ruanda Hutu. Founded November 1959, under leadership of Joseph Gitera Habyarimana. Won 233/3,126 seats in 1960 local elections plus 190 in association with PARMEHUTU. Habyarimana became President of new Ruanda Council.

(G?) **Front Commun**, a political alliance of Burundi regional-ethnic parties, including PDC (*Parti Démocratique Chrétien*, led by Joseph Biroli), Parti du Peuple (led by Joachim Baribwegure), MPB (*Mouvement Progressiste du Burundi*, led by Luc Kayibigi). Founded March 1960.

(O) **UPRONA**, *Parti de l'Unité et du Progrès National du Burundi*, regional-ethnic party, operating in Burundi with support from both Tutsi and Hutu. Founded September 1961, and led by André Ngu. In March 1960, organized, with minor parties, rival united front to Front Commun.

(O) UNARU, *Union Nationale Africaine de Ruanda-Urundi*, minor territorial party, based on Usumbura, with main support from Swahili-speaking people of this region. Founded 1959, and led by Barnabe Ntunguka. Loose associations with UPRONA.

## SENEGAL, Republic of, *République du Sénégal*

(G) BDS-BPS-UPS, *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais-Bloc Populaire Sénégalais-Union Progressiste Sénégalaise*, territorial party, linked with inter-territorial IOM (1948-56), CAF (1957-8), PRA (1958), PFA (1959-60). Founded 1948, under leadership of Léopold-Sédar Senghor and Mamadou Dia, as breakaway from SFIO. Dominant party in Senegal since 1951. Reconstituted as BPS, after fusion with UDS (*Union Démocratique Sénégalaise*, former Senegalese section of RDA), MAC (*Mouvement Autonome de Casamance*), and *Socialistes Unitaires* (breakaway from SFIO), in 1956. Reconstituted as UPS in April 1958, after merger with remaining Socialist parties, PSAS and MSUS. Left wing, led by Abdoulaye Ly, broke away to form PRA-Sénégal at time of September 1958 Referendum. UPS won 80/80 seats in 1959 Assembly elections. After break-up of Mali Federation in August 1960, Senghor became President and Mamadou Dia Prime Minister of Senegalese Republic.

(D) SFIO, *Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière-Fédération du Sénégal*, territorial party, affiliated to French Socialist Party. Founded 1936, under leadership of Lamine Gueye, development from earlier local Senegalese Socialist Party (founded c. 1928). Absorbed Bloc Africain (organized 1944) 1946. Dominant party in Senegal until 1951. Reconstituted as PSAS (*Parti Sénégalais d'Action Socialiste*), associated with MSA - with breakaway group forming MSUS (*Mouvement Socialiste d'Union Sénégalaise*) - in 1957. Merged with BPS to form UPS in 1958.

(O) PRA-Sénégal, *Parti du Regroupement Africain-Sénégal*, territorial party. Founded September 1958, under leadership of Abdoulaye Ly, as left-wing breakaway from UPS, supporting 'Non' vote in Referendum. Won no seats in 1959 Assembly elections. Main opposition party to UPS.

(O) PAI, *Parti Africain de l'Indépendance*, minor territorial party. Founded 1957, under leadership of Mahjemout Diop and Oumar Diallo. Supported 'Non' vote in September 1958 Referendum. Orthodox Marxist in outlook.

(D) PSS, *Parti de la Solidarité Sénégalaise*, minor territorial party, with Muslim-clerical-conservative tendencies. Founded January 1959, as

breakaway from UPS, under leadership of Ibrahima Seydou N'Daw and Tidjane Sy. Reunited with UPS in June 1960.

# SIERRA LEONE

(G) *SLPP, Sierra Leone People's Party*, territorial party. Founded April 1951, under leadership of Milton Margai; connected historically with the Sierra Leone Organization Society (founded 1946, also led by Milton Margai) and the Freetown People's Party (founded 1943). Since 1951 the dominant party, based on support of Protectorate chiefs. Won 26/39 seats in House of Representatives in May 1957 elections. Milton Margai Chief Minister since 1954. In March 1960 formed UNF (United National Front) with UPP, PNP, etc., which became basis of coalition government established prior to Independence (April 1961).

(O) *NCSL, National Council of Sierra Leone*, minor party, limited in influence to Creole population of Freetown and neighbourhood ('the Colony'). Founded 1950 and led by H. C. Bankole-Bright (died 1958); thereafter by C. M. A. Thompson. Won no seats in 1957 elections. Not included in UNF. Moribund.

(G) *UPP, United Progressive Party*, territorial party. Founded 1956, under leadership of Cyril Rogers-Wright. Won 9/39 seats in 1957 elections. Joined UNF and coalition government 1960.

(G) *PNP, People's National Party*, territorial party. Founded September 1958, under leadership of Albert Margai (brother of Milton Margai) and Siaka Stevens, as a result of a split within SLPP. Party included 4/39 members of post-1958 House of Representatives. Joined UNF and coalition government 1960.

(O) *APC, All People's Congress*, territorial party. Formed September 1960 by Siaka Stevens, in association with Wallace Johnson, in opposition to UNF, after Stevens's expulsion from PNP. Developed out of the 'Elections Before Independence Movement'. Main support from younger radicals and Trade Union movement.

**SOMALI REPUBLIC** (till July 1960 formed two distinct territories - U.N. Trust Territory of Somalia under Italian Administration, and British Somaliland)

(G) *SYL, Somali Youth League*, territorial party, dominant in Somalia, with connexions in other territories with Somali minorities. Founded May 1943. Successive Presidents and party leaders, Haji Muhammad

Hussein, Aden Abdullah Osman, Abdullahi Issa. Governing party from 1956. Won 83/90 seats in March 1959 elections. Dominant party in coalition government, under Prime Ministership of Abdirashid Ali Sharmake, with SNL-SUP after reunification of Somalia and British Somaliland and Independence in July 1960 (President, Aden Abdullah Osman).

(G) SNL-SUP, *Somali National League-Somali United Party*, territorial party, dominant in former British Somaliland. SNL (formerly Somali National Society) founded 1935; adopted present name in 1951. Leader, Muḥammad Haji Ibrahim Egal. Won 20/33 seats in February 1960 elections to Somaliland Legislative Council, in electoral alliance with SUP, which won 12/33 seats. Combined party then entered coalition government of unified Somalia Republic in July 1960.

(O) GSL, *Greater Somalia League*, territorial party, based on former Somalia, with connexions with UAR (Egypt). Founded in June 1958, as a radical breakaway from SYL, under leadership of Haji Muḥammad Hussein, after latter's expulsion from SYL. Banned 1959-60 and boycotted 1959 elections.

(O) NUF, *National United Front*, territorial congress, operating in former British Somaliland. Organized 1955. After loss of support of SNL, transformed itself into a political party under leadership of Michael Mariano. Won 1/33 seats (Mariano's) in 1960 elections.

(O) HDMS, *Ḥizbia Digil-Mirifleh, Somali Independent Constitutional Party*, regional-ethnic party, based on semi-settled population of southern Somalia. Founded March 1947. Changed its name to *Ḥizbia Dastuur Muustaqiil* (Independent Constitutional Party) 1950. Won 175/667 seats in 1958 municipal elections, and 5/90 seats in 1959 general elections.

#### SOMALILAND, FRENCH, *Côte Française des Somalis*

(G) DIEST, *Parti de la Défense des Intérêts Économiques et Sociaux du Territoire*, local party, *apparenté* to the French metropolitan UNR (Union Nationale Républicaine, Gaullist party). Founded c. 1957 under leadership of Hassan Gouled, Senator in the French Parliament. Campaigned successfully for 'Oui' vote in September 28 1958 Referendum. Won 10/31 Seats in November 1959 Assembly elections, and formed government with Gouled as Prime Minister.

(I) UR, *Union Républicaine*, local party, with connexions with parties in other territories seeking Somali reunification. Founded c. 1957 under

leadership of Muḥammad Harbi, deputy in the French Parliament (died 1960). Governing party, 1957–8. Campaigned unsuccessfully for 'Non' vote in 1958 Referendum. Thereafter Harbi removed from office and fled to Cairo; party banned and leadership arrested.

**SOUTH WEST AFRICA** (formerly a League of Nations Mandated Territory, administered by the Union of South Africa; later annexed by the Union)

(o) **SWANU**, *South West African National Union*, territorial congress. Founded August 1959, as a development out of the South West African Student Body (founded 1952, reconstituted in 1955 as **SWAPA**, *South West African Progressive Association*), under leadership of Jariretundu Kozonguizi. Support drawn mainly from central and southern areas (Hereros, Damara, and Nama). From 1960 associated with **ANC** and other South African organizations in **SAUF** (*South African United Front*).

(o) **SWAPO**, *South West African People's Organization*, territorial congress, with main support in Ovamboland. Founded January 1960, as a development from **OPC** (*Ovamboland People's Congress*, founded 1958 with Herman Toivo as President), reconstituted as **OPO** (*Ovamboland People's Organization*) in April 1959, under presidency of Sam Nujoma.

**SPANISH GUINEA**, including Rio Muñi, Fernando Po, etc.

No political organizations are known to exist in Spanish Guinea.

**SPANISH WEST AFRICA**, *Africa Occidental Española*, including Ifni and the Spanish Sahara – the latter consisting of Rio de Oro and Saguiet al-Hamra (Tarfaya, formerly the southern zone of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco, having been restored to Morocco in April 1958)

Branches of the Moroccan party, **Istiqlal**, have operated illegally in both Ifni – where for a brief period, during 1956–7, they enjoyed legality – and Spanish Sahara, included with Mauretania in **Shinqit**, claimed by the Moroccan Government as part of the Moroccan State.

**SOUDAN FRANÇAIS**, see **Mali**

SUDAN, Republic of the, *Jumhuriyyat al-Sūdān*

(i) *Ashiqqa-NUP (National Unionist Party)*, territorial party. Founded 1942 as movement within the Graduates' General Congress (founded 1937), under leadership of Isma'il al-Azhari; with links with Khatmiyya, Muslim Sufi Order, led by Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani. Reorganized as NUP, through merger with National Front (founded 1949) in 1952. Governing party, with al-Azhari as Prime Minister, December 1953 to July 1956. Won 45/174 seats in March 1958 parliamentary elections. Suppressed by General Ibrahim Abboud's government after military coup of November 1958, but has continued in practice to function as an opposition to the regime.

(i) *'Umma*, territorial party. Founded February 1945, as a result of split within Graduates' Congress, supporting principle of an independent Sudan in opposition to Ashiqqa's demand for Union with Egypt. Associated with Ansar, Neo-Mahdist Muslim movement, led by the late Sayyid 'Abd al-rahmān al-Mahdi. General Secretary, later President, Abdullah Khalil. From July 1956 to November 1958, major partner in coalition government with PDP and section of Liberal Party. Won 63/174 seats in March 1958 elections. Suppressed November 1958.

(i) *PDP, People's Democratic Party*, territorial party. Founded July 1956, as a result of breakaway of Khatmiyya elements, under leadership of 'Ali 'Abd al-Rahmān and Mirghani Hamza, from main body of NUP. Partner in coalition government with 'Umma, 1956-8. Won 27/174 seats in 1958 elections. From July 1958, increasingly in opposition to policy of Khalil's government. Suppressed November 1958.

(i) *Liberal Party*, regional party, based on predominantly non-Muslim non-Arab southern Sudan. Founded as Southern Party by M.P.s from Southern constituencies after November 1953 parliamentary elections. Reconstituted as Liberal Party, October 1954. President, Benjamin Lwoki; later, Stanislaus Paysama; General Secretary, Buth Diu. Partner in coalition government with 'Umma, 1956-8. Won 20/174 seats in 1958 elections. Stood for Federation and autonomy of Southern Sudan. Suppressed November 1958.

(i) *AIF, Anti-Imperialist Front*, territorial party, representing left-wing standpoint, with close associations with SWTUF (*Sudan Workers' Trade Union Federation*). Founded 1951. Leader, Hasan al-Taher Zarroug. Won 1/174 seats in 1958. In opposition to all governments until, and after, its suppression in November 1958.

(i) *SMNL, Sudan Movement for National Liberation*, territorial party, of Communist type; illegal since its foundation by Sudanese students in

Cairo in 1944. Linked with Egyptian MDLN (*Mouvement Démocratique de Libération Nationale*, Communist-type party). First President, Muḥammad al-Sayyid Salām; Secretary, Sa'id Fādil. Some influence within SWTUF. Since November 1958 has continued to operate underground.

#### SWAZILAND

(O) SPP, *Swaziland Progressive Party*, territorial party. Founded 1960, as a development out of SPA (*Swaziland Progressive Association*, originally formed 1929, under patronage of Resident Commissioner and Swazi Paramount Chief, Sobhuza II). Leader, J. J. Nquku (member of South African Liberal Party).

#### TANGANYIKA

(G) TANU, *Tanganyika African National Union*, territorial party, dominant in Tanganyika since its foundation in 1954. Developed out of TAA (*Tanganyika African Association*), organized as a discussion forum in 1929; became increasingly involved in political activities after Second World War; reorganized as a political party, under presidency of Julius Nyerere, in 1953. Played a leading part in TEMO (*Tanganyika Elected Members' Organization*) 1958–60. Associated with other East African nationalist parties in PAFMECA from 1958. Won 70/71 seats in August 1960 Legislative Council elections (candidates in 58 constituencies being returned unopposed). Thereafter predominantly TANU government formed with Julius Nyerere as Chief Minister.

(O) ANC, *African National Congress*, minor territorial party. Founded late 1957 under leadership of Zubedi Mtemvu (former TANU provincial secretary), who broke with TANU leadership on issue of cooperation with non-African minority groups. Put up three candidates in 1960 elections but won 0/71 seats.

#### TOGO, Republic of, *République du Togo*

(G) CUT, *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise*, territorial party. Constituted a political party in April 1946, under leadership of Sylvanus Olympio, having existed as a discussion forum since its foundation, under French official patronage, in 1941. Most effective party in Togo since 1946 (Olympio President of the Territorial Assembly 1946–52), though in opposition and subject to administrative repression from c. 1950 to

1958. Associated with All-Ewe Conference (founded by Daniel Chapman, Ghanaian Ewe) from June 1946, asserting principle of Ewe unification and/or Togo union and independence. Won 31 (later increased to 33)/43 seats in Assembly elections of April 1958. Formed government with Olympio as Prime Minister (1958), later President (1961). Won 51/51 seats in Assembly elections April 1961.

(O) *JUVENTO, Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise*, territorial party. Founded originally, in September 1951, as youth movement and radical wing of CUT, under leadership of Anani Santos, and Messan Aithson. Finally broke with parent party in July 1959. Leadership includes Abalo Firmin (Secretary-General). Pan-Africanist in outlook and favouring union with Ghana. Allied with UDPT to form *Mouvement Nationaliste Togolais-JUVENTO* in 1961, but disqualified from contesting April elections.

(D) *PNP, Parti Togolais de Progrès*, territorial party. Founded April 1946, under leadership of Nicolas Grunitsky (Prime Minister, 1956-8) and Pedro Olympio (broke away in 1954 to form MPT, *Mouvement Populaire Togolais*). Conservative pro-French party, enjoying support of French Administration, and controlling Assembly 1952-8. Won 3/46 seats in 1958 elections. Merged with UCPN to form UDPT, October 1959.

(B) *UCPN, Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord*, regional party. Founded July 1951; based on support of interests chiefly northern. Cooperated with PNP in opposing CUT. Won 10/46 seats in 1958 elections. Merged with PTP to form UDPT in October 1959.

(O) *UDPT, Union Démocratique des Populations Togolaises*, territorial party. Founded October 1959, by merger of PNP and UCPN, under leadership of Grunitsky. Right-wing opposition to CUT government. Allied with UDP to form MNT-JUVENTO in 1961, but disqualified from contesting April elections.

## TUNISIA, Republic of, *al-Jumhuriyyat al-Tunisīyya*

(G) *Neo-Destour*, territorial party. Founded March 1934, under leadership of Mahmud Materi (President) and Habib Bourguiba (Bu Ruqaiba, Secretary), as a modernist, radical breakaway from the Destour (Constitution) Party (founded 1920, under leadership of Shaikh Thaalibi). (The more traditionalist rump, known as Vieux-Destour, survived into the period after Second World War, but had withered away by the time Tunisia achieved its Independence in 1956.) Since 1934 Neo-Destour has been the dominant party in Tunisia, though banned in 1938, and operating underground 1938-42. Built up close links with the UGTT (*Union*

*Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens*), whose leader, Ferhat Hached (assassinated 1953), played a leading part also in Neo-Destour leadership. On Bourguiba's return from exile (June 1955) to take over party leadership, conflict developed with Salah ben Youssef, General Secretary, over Franco-Tunisian conventions, leading to ben Youssef's defeat, rebellion, and exile to Egypt. Neo-Destour major partner in coalition government 1954-6; sole governing party after March 1956 elections, in which all seats in Constituent Assembly were won by party-sponsored 'National Unity' candidates; thereafter government formed with Bourguiba as Prime Minister (elected President of the Republic after deposition of Bey and abolition of monarchy, July 1957). Party's predominance further confirmed by Legislative Assembly elections of November 1959, in which it won 90/90 seats (unopposed except in two constituencies).

(o) PCT, *Parti Communiste Tunisien*, minor territorial party. Founded 1919. Legal, but not at present significant. Put up candidates unsuccessfully for the Tunis municipal elections (1957), and in two constituencies - Tunis and Gafsa - for the November 1959 Legislative Assembly elections.

## UGANDA

(o) UNC, *Uganda National Congress*, territorial congress. Founded March 1952, under leadership of Ignatius Musazi (President) and Abu Mayanja (General Secretary); connected historically with Uganda African Farmers (also led by Musazi). Acquired a popular following, particularly in Buganda, over agitation against exile of the Kabaka of Buganda in 1953. Recurrent splits - e.g. the split in August 1959, which led to the formation of the UPC - prevented UNC from developing as a major territorial party. Leadership of UNC retained by Joseph Kiwanuka (Chairman) and B. N. Kunuka (Secretary). Won 1/81 seat in March 1961 Legislative Council elections.

(o) UPC, *Uganda People's Congress*, territorial party, with main basis of support outside Buganda (north and east of Uganda). Founded March 1960, through merger of section of UNC led by Apollo Milton Obote with group of non-Buganda Legislative Councillors belonging to UPU (*Uganda People's Union*). President, Obote. Vice-Presidents include A. M. Luande, President of Uganda TUC and Railway African Union. Won 35/81 seats in 1961 elections, though obtaining 200,000 more of the total vote than the Democratic Party.

(g) DP, *Democratic Party*, territorial party, predominantly Catholic in inspiration, leadership, and support. Founded in 1956 under leadership

of M. Mugwanya – succeeded as President by Benedicto Kiwanuka on his return from England in 1958. Won 43/81 seats in 1961 elections, and proceeded to form government with Kiwanuka as Chief Minister.

(o) UNP, *Uganda National Party*, territorial party, mainly based on Buganda. Founded June 1960, under leadership of Apollo Kironde (President), with support of Abu Mayanja, and Y. K. Lule, absorbing minor political groups. Did not contest 1961 elections.

(i) UNM-UFM-UFC-UFU, *Uganda National Movement-Uganda Freedom Movement-Uganda Freedom Convention-Uganda Freedom Union*, predominantly a Buganda political movement, concerned primarily with organization of boycott of non-African goods in 1959. Founded February 1959, by Augustine Kamywa, with support of Musazi (UNC) and E. M. K. Mulira (leader of moribund PP, Progressive Party, founded 1955). Use of successive names for the organization associated with the series of bans imposed by the Administration. Succeeded late in 1960 by Mwayo Gwa Gwanga ('the spirit of the nation') under similar leadership, opposed to Buganda secession.

#### UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

(i) ANC, *African National Congress*, territorial congress. Founded January 1912, as South African NNC (*Native National Congress*). Founding President, John L. Dube; General Secretary, Sol T. Plaatje. Historical connexions with earlier 'Native Congresses' in Natal and Transvaal. In 1943 ANCYL (*ANC Youth League*) organized as radical wing of Congress, which adopted its Programme of Action in 1949. ANC cooperated with SAIC (*South African Indian Congress*) from 1946, and played leading part in Congress of the People, 1955. President (from 1952), Chief A. J. Luthuli; Vice-President, Oliver Tambo; General Secretary, James Hadebe. Congress banned after Sharpeville shootings, April 7 1960. Leaders in exile joined with PAC, SAIC, and SWANU to form SAUF (South African United Front).

(i) PAC, *Pan-Africanist Congress*, territorial congress. Founded April 1959, as activist nationalist breakaway from ANC. President, Robert Sobukwe; Secretary, Potlako Leballo. Historical connexions with ANCYL. Banned April 1960. Leaders in exile joined SAUF.

(o) SACPC, *South African Coloured People's Congress*, quasi-ethnic congress. Founded 1953, with support of radical elements within the moderate CPNU (*Coloured People's National Union*, founded 1944), as SACPO (*South African Coloured People's Organization*). Participated in

1955 Congress of the People; changed its name to reflect membership of Congress Alliance.

(1) CPSA, *Communist Party of South Africa*, illegal territorial party. Founded 1921 under European leadership (S. P. Bunting *et al.*), but came to include Africans among membership and leadership: General Secretary (after Second World War), Moses Kotane. Disbanded after the Suppression of Communism Act in 1955.

#### UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, Egypt

Political parties have been banned in Egypt since early in 1953, and the Ikhwan al-Muslimin, Muslim Brothers, since January 1954 – though both the Ikhwan and the Egyptian Communist Party have carried on underground activity since that date. The only officially approved political organizations since the July 1952 Revolution have been the Liberation Rally (Hay'at al-tahrir), succeeded c. 1957 by the National Union (Ittihad al-qawmi) – both State-sponsored 'fronts'.

#### UPPER VOLTA, Republic of, *République de la Haute-Volta*

(D) PDV, *Parti Démocratique Voltaïque*, territorial party, with main strength in the Bobo-Dioulasso area, Haute-Volta section of the inter-territorial RDA. Founded 1948, under leadership of Djibril Vinama and Ali Barraud. In 1956 merged with PSEMA to form PDU.

(D) PSEMA, *Parti Social d'Éducation des Masses Africaines*, territorial party, with main strength among Moshi in the Wagadugu area, affiliated to inter-territorial IOM. Founded 1954, under leadership of Joseph Conombo and Henri Guissou. Connected with earlier *Union Voltaïque* (emerged in 1945). In 1956 merged with PDV to form PDU.

(G) PDU-UDV, *Parti Démocratique Unifié–Union Démocratique Voltaïque*, territorial party, section of the inter-territorial RDA. Established November 1956, by merger of PDV and PSEMA, under honorary presidency of the Mogho Naba (Moshi ruler). Leaders: Ouezzin Coulibaly (died 1958), Guissou, Vinama, Ousmane Ba. Governing party since March 1957, winning 64/75 seats in April 1959 Assembly elections. In 1958 Maurice Yameogo succeeded Coulibaly as party leader and Prime Minister, becoming in December 1959 President of the Republic.

(I) MPEA-PNV-PRL, *Mouvement Populaire d'Évolution Africaine–Parti National Voltaïque–Parti Républicain de la Liberté*, territorial party, with

main support (initially) in the Bobo-Dioulasso area, affiliated to inter-territorial IOM-PRA-PFA. Founded 1954 under leadership of Nazi Boni. Connected with earlier Union Voltaïque. December 1958, joined for a brief period coalition government with PDU-RDA, supporting Upper Volta's entry into Mali Federation. After Federation had been rejected in the constitutional referendum of March 1959, PNV, under leadership of Nazi Boni and Joseph Conombo, continued in opposition, and won 11/75 seats in April 1959 elections. After banning of PNV in October 1959, PRL was organized in its place, and itself banned in January 1960. PRL continued to operate underground; leaders arrested July 1960.

#### ZANZIBAR

(G) ZNP, *Zanzibar Nationalist Party*, territorial party. Founded December 1955, under predominantly Arab leadership. President, 'Ali Mushin Bahwani; General Secretary, 'Abd al-Rahmān Muḥammad. Connexions with earlier Arab Association. Associated with PAFMECA. Won 9/22 seats in January 1961 Legislative Council elections. After constitutional deadlock nominated two representatives to coalition caretaker government.

(G) *Afro-Shirazi Party*, territorial party. Formed in 1957 from a merger of the African and Shirazi Associations, representing predominantly non-Arab interests, under leadership of Abeid Amani Karume. Associations with TANU and PAFMECA. Won 10/22 seats in January 1961 elections. Nominated two representatives to coalition caretaker government.

(G) ZPPP, *Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party*, territorial party. Organized March 1960, as the result of a split within the Afro-Shirazi Party, under leadership of Ameer Tajo and Bibi Pili Khamisi (woman chairman). Won 3/22 seats in January 1961 elections, two of its members in Legislative Council supporting ZNP and one the Afro-Shirazi Party. Represented in coalition caretaker government.

## INDEX TO POLITICAL PARTIES

This is primarily an index to the parties, congresses, and fronts listed in the Appendix, indicating in each case the territory under which a given party is to be found in the Appendix. Where a party is also mentioned in the text, there follows a reference to the pages on which it appears. The index follows a simple alphabetical order, whether (as is normally the case) a party is listed under its initials, or (where initials are not in practice used) under its full name.

- ABAKO, Alliance des Bakongo, *Congo Republic (ex-Belgian)*, 49, 152  
 Afro-Shirazi Party, *Zanzibar*  
 AG, Action Group, *Nigeria*, 20, 26, 36, 46, 49-50, 66, 77, 84-5, 155  
 AGV, Amicale Gilbert Veillard, *Guinea*  
 AIF, Anti-Imperialist Front, *Sudan*  
 ANC, African National Congress, *Northern Rhodesia*, 100  
 ANC, African National Congress, *Southern Rhodesia*  
 ANC, African National Congress, *Tanganyika*  
 ANC African National Congress, *Union of South Africa*  
 ANCYL, African National Congress Youth League, *Union of South Africa*  
 APC, All People's Congress, *Sierra Leone*  
 APROSOMA, Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse, *Ruanda-Urundi*  
 Ashiqqa, *Sudan*, 21, 50, 57, 75
- BAG, Bloc Africain de Guinée, *Guinea*, 22  
 BALUBAKAT, Parti Progressiste Katangais, *Congo Republic (ex-Belgian)*  
 BCP, Basutoland Congress Party, *Basutoland*  
 BDC, Bloc Démocratique Camerounais, *Cameroun*  
 BDG, Bloc Démocratique Gabonais, *Gabon*  
 BDS, Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais, *Senegal*, 45, 48, 54, 57, 82, 87, 90, 97, 99, 101, 114, 116-17  
 BNA, Bloc Nigérien d'Action, *Niger*  
 BNC, Basutoland National Congress, *Basutoland*  
 BFPF, Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party, *Bechuanaland*  
 BPP, Bechuanaland People's Party, *Bechuanaland*  
 BPS, Bloc Populaire Sénégalais, *Senegal*, 57, 82, 90, 94, 97-103, 114, 117  
 BYM, Bornu Youth Movement, *Nigeria*

CAF, Convention Africaine, *French West/Equatorial Africa*, 58, 62  
 CAM, Comité d'Action Marocaine, *Morocco*, 33, 39, 52  
 CEMO, Constituency Members' Elected Organization, *Kenya*  
 CERE, Centre de Regroupement Africain, *Congo Republic (ex-Belgian)*  
 CLP, Congress Liberation Party, *Nyasaland*  
 CNF, Cameroons National Federation, *Cameroons (ex-British)*  
 CONAKAT, Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga, *Congo Republic (ex-Belgian)*  
 CPNC, Cameroon People's National Convention, *Cameroons (ex-British)*  
 CPNU, Coloured People's National Union, *Union of South Africa*  
 CPP, Convention People's Party, *Ghana*, 21-2, 27, 31, 34, 36, 38, 45, 47, 54, 56, 64-5, 70-1, 74, 76-7, 82, 87-8, 91-5, 97-9, 109-14, 118-20, 123, 132, 134, 136-7, 139-41, 145, 147, 153-5, 158, 160, 164  
 CPSA, Communist Party of South Africa, *Union of South Africa*  
 CRUA, Comité Revolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action, *Algeria*  
 CUT, Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, *Togo*, 20, 55  
 CYL, Cameroons Youth League, *Cameroons (ex-British)*

Destour, *Tunisia*, 33

DIEST, Parti de la Défense des Intérêts Économiques et Sociaux du Territoire, *French Somaliland*

DP, Democratic Party, *Uganda*, 60, 67

DSG, Démocratie Socialiste de Guinée, *Guinea*

EM, Entente Mauritanienne, *Mauretania*

FLN, Front de Libération Nationale, *Algeria*, 22, 51, 78, 86, 99-100, 116, 153

FPUP, Front Populaire pour l'Unité et la Paix, *Cameroun*

Front Commun, *Ruanda-Urundi*

Ga Shifimo Kpee, *Ghana*, 68

GCP, Ghana Congress Party, *Ghana*, 56

GDP, Gambia Democratic Party, *Gambia*

GEND, Groupement Ethnique du Nord Dahomey, *Dahomey*

General Graduates' Congress, *Sudan*, 39, 54

GIRT, Groupement des Indépendants et Ruraux du Tchad, *Chad*

GMC, Gambia Muslim Congress, *Gambia*, 67

GPC, Groupe des Progressistes du Cameroun, *Cameroun*

GSL, Greater Somalia League, *Somalia*

HDMS, Hizbia Digil-Mirifleh, *Somalia* 64, 66

Independence Bloc, *Ethiopia-Eritrea*

IOM, Indépendants d'Outre-Mer, *French West/Equatorial Africa*, 62

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Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa, *see* NPC

Jam'iyyar Naman Sawaba, *see* NEPU

JUVENTO, Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise, *Togo*, 55

KADU, Kenya African Democratic Union, *Kenya*

KANU, Kenya African National Union, *Kenya*, 119

KAU, Kenya African Union, *Kenya*, 41, 66, 77

KIM, Kenya Independence Movement, *Kenya*

KNC, Kamerun National Congress, *Cameroons (ex-British)*

KNDP, Kamerun National Democratic Party, *Cameroons (ex-British)*

KUNC, Kamerun United National Congress, *Cameroons (ex-British)*

Liberal Party, *Sudan*, 23, 61, 66, 132

Liberation Rally, *United Arab Republic*

MAC, Mouvement Autonome de Casamance, *Senegal*, 57

MACNA, Mouvement d'Action Nationale, *Cameroun*

MANU, Moçambique African National Union, *Moçambique*

MAP, Moslem Association Party, *Ghana*, 23, 56, 67, 124

MBPP, Middle Belt People's Party, *Nigeria*, 56

MCP, Malawi Congress Party, *Nyasaland*

MDD, Mouvement Démocratique du Dahomey, *Dahomey*

MEDAC, Mouvement pour l'Évolution Démocratique en Afrique Centrale, *Central African Republic*

MESAN, Mouvement pour l'Évolution Sociale de l'Afrique Noire, *Central African Republic*

MMG, Mouvement [Comité] Mixte Gabonais, *Gabon*, 20

MNA, Mouvement National Algérien, *Algeria*, 22

MNC, Mouvement National Congolais, *Congo Republic (ex Belgian)*

Mouvement Populaire (pre-war), *Morocco*

Mouvement Populaire, *Morocco*

MPB, Mouvement Progressiste du Burundi, *Ruanda-Urundi*

MPEA, Mouvement Populaire d'Évolution Africaine, *Upper Volta*

MPLA, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, *Angola*

MPT, Mouvement Populaire Togolais, *Togo*

MSA, Mouvement Socialiste Africain, *Chad*

MSA, Mouvement Socialiste Africain, *Congo (ex-French)*, 132

- MSA, Mouvement Socialiste Africain, *French West/Equatorial Africa*, 58, 62, 119
- MSN, Mouvement Socialiste Nigérien, *Niger*
- MSUS, Mouvement Socialiste d'Union Sénégalaise, *Senegal*
- MTLD, Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques, *Algeria*, 77, 98, 114, 116
- MUC, Mouvement d'Union Camerounaise, *Cameroun*
- Muslim League, *Ethiopia-Eritrea*
- MZL, Middle Zone League, *Nigeria*, 56
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- NAC, Nyasaland African National Congress, *Nyasaland*, 137, 139
- Naḥdat al-waṭaniyya, *Mauretania*
- National Union, *United Arab Republic*
- NCNC, National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, *Nigeria*, 22, 34, 36-7, 45, 47, 53-4, 56, 66, 77, 84-5, 91, 97, 105-8, 110, 114, 118, 136, 138-9, 152, 155
- NCP, National Congress Party, *Libya*
- NCSL, National Council of Sierra Leone, *Sierra Leone*
- NDP, National Democratic Party, *Southern Rhodesia*
- Neo-Destour, *Tunisia*, 22, 33, 35, 52, 64, 70, 76, 82-3, 85, 88-9, 92-3, 110-11, 113, 117-18, 120, 123, 130, 139-42, 146, 153, 163
- NEPA, Northern Elements Progressive Association, *Nigeria*
- NEPU, Northern Elements Progressive Union, *Nigeria*, 23, 46, 56, 60, 133, 136-7, 159
- NIP, National Independence Party, *Nigeria*
- NLDP, National Liberation Democratic Party, *Nyasaland*
- NLM, National Liberation Movement, *Ghana*, 23, 54, 56, 64, 66, 72, 92, 132
- NNC, Native National Congress, *Union of South Africa*
- NPC, Northern People's Congress, *Nigeria*, 19, 22, 46, 48-9, 56, 60, 64, 66, 104, 127, 133, 152, 155, 157
- NPP, Northern People's Party, *Ghana*, 23, 46, 56, 60
- NUF, National United Front, *Somalia*
- NUP, National Unionist Party, *Sudan*, 21, 36, 50, 57, 75, 132
- NYM, Nigerian Youth Movement, *Nigeria*
- 
- OPC, Ovamboland People's Congress, *South West Africa*
- OPO, Ovamboland People's Organization, *South West Africa*
- 
- PAC, Pan-Africanist Congress, *Union of South Africa*
- PAI, Parti Africain de l'Indépendance, *Senegal*

- PAIG, Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné, *Portuguese Guinea*  
 PARMEHUTU, Parti d'Émancipation des Hutus, *Ruanda-Urundi*  
 Parti du Peuple, *Ruanda-Urundi*  
 PCA, Parti Communiste Algérien, *Algeria*  
 PCF, Parti Communiste Français (Région Marocaine), *Morocco*  
 PCM, Parti Communiste Marocain, *Morocco*, 76  
 PCP, People's Convention Party, *Kenya*  
 PCT, Parti Communiste Tunisien, *Tunisia*  
 PDC, Parti des Démocrates Camerounais, *Cameroun*  
 PDC, Parti Démocratique Constitutionnel, *Morocco*  
 PDC, Parti Démocratique Chrétien, *Ruanda-Urundi*  
 PDCI, Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire, *Ivory Coast*, 47, 82. *See also RDA*  
 PDG, Parti Démocratique de Guinée, *Guinea*, 18, 36, 47, 55, 65, 67, 70, 76, 87, 97, 103, 107, 109, 123, 138-40, 146, 153, 155-6, 163-4  
 PDI, Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance, *Morocco*, 70  
 PDP, People's Democratic Party, *Sudan*  
 PDU, Parti Dahoméen de l'Unité, *Dahomey*  
 PDU, Parti Démocratique Unifié, *Upper Volta*, 27  
 PDV, Parti Démocratique Voltaïque, *Upper Volta*, 49 (1), p. 26  
 PFA, Parti de la Fédération Africaine, *French West|Equatorial Africa*, 13/14, 55  
 PN, Parti National pour la Réalisation du Plan des Réformes, *Morocco*, 52  
 PNA, Parti National Africain, *Chad*  
 PND, Parti des Nationalistes du Dahomey, *Dahomey*  
 PNP, Parti National du Progrès, *Congo Republic (ex-Belgian)*  
 PNP, People's National Party, *Sierra Leone*  
 PNV, Parti National Voltaïque, *Upper Volta*  
 PP, Progressive Party, *Uganda*  
 PPA, Parti du Peuple Algérien, *Algeria*, 65, 77, 98  
 PPC, Parti Progressiste Congolais, *Congo (ex-French)*  
 PPG, Parti Progressiste de Guinée, *Guinea*  
 PPK, Parti Progressiste Katangais, *see BALUBAKAT*  
 PPN, Parti Progressiste Nigérien, *Niger*  
 PPS, Parti Progressiste Soudanais, *Mali*, 69, 96  
 PPT, Parti Progressiste Tchadien, *Chad*  
 PRA, Parti du Regroupement Africain, *French West|Equatorial Africa*, 58  
 PRA-Sénégal, Parti du Regroupement Africain-Sénégal, *Senegal*, 57  
 PRD, Parti Républicain du Dahomey, *Dahomey*  
 PRL, Parti Républicain de la Liberté, *Upper Volta*

- PRM, Parti du Regroupement Mauritanien, *Mauretania*  
PRNM, Parti de la Renaissance Nationale Mauritanienne, *see* Naḥdat al-waṭaniyya  
PSA, Parti Solidaire Africain, *Congo Republic (ex-Belgian)*  
PSAS, Parti Sénégalais d'Action Socialiste, *Senegal*  
PSEMA, Parti Social d'Éducation des Masses Africaines, *Upper Volta*, 27, 150  
PSS, Parti de la Solidarité Sénégalaise, *Senegal*, 91  
PTP, Parti Togolais du Progrès, *Togo*, 22
- RDA, Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, *French West/Equatorial Africa*, 22, 26, 31, 36, 44-5, 47, 52-3, 55, 58, 60-5, 70-1, 74, 76, 79-80, 82-3, 86-8, 92, 94, 97, 101, 103, 104-6, 108, 110-14, 117, 119, 121, 123, 131, 134, 140, 142-6, 151-2, 155  
RDD, Rassemblement Démocratique Dahoméen, *Dahomey*
- SACPC, South African Coloured People's Congress, *Union of South Africa*  
SACPO, South African Coloured People's Organization, *Union of South Africa*  
Sawaba, *Niger*, 75, 119  
SFIO, Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière, *Congo (ex-French)*  
SFIO, Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière, *Senegal*, 39, 54, 57, 61, 96, 99  
SICP, Somali Independent Constitutional Party, *Somalia*  
SLPP, Sierra Leone People's Party, *Sierra Leone*, 55  
SMNL, Sudan Movement for National Liberation, *Sudan*, 75  
SNL, Somali National League, *Somalia*  
Socialistes Unitaires, *Senegal*, 57  
Southern Party, *Sudan*  
SPA, Swaziland Progressive Association, *Swaziland*  
SPP, Swaziland Progressive Party, *Swaziland*  
SUP, Somali United Party, *Somalia*  
SWANU, South West African National Union, *South West Africa*  
SWAPA, South West African Progressive Association, *South West Africa*  
SWAPO, South West African People's Organization, *South West Africa*  
SYL, Somali Youth League, *Somalia*, 36, 64, 67, 70, 77, 84, 86, 120, 135, 152
- TAA, Tanganyika African Association, *Tanganyika*  
TANU, Tanganyika African National Union, *Tanganyika*, 61, 64

TC, Togoland Congress, *Ghana*, 20, 152

TEMO, Tanganyika Elected Members' Organization, *Tanganyika*

True Whig Party, *Liberia*, 155

UCFA, Union pour la Communauté Franco-Africaine, *Niger*

UCPN, Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo, *Togo*, 22

UDD, Union Démocratique Dahoméenne, *Dahomey*

UDDIA, Union Démocratique de Défense des Intérêts Africains, *Congo (ex-French)*, 20, 65-6, 132

UDENAMO, União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique, *Moçambique*

UDMA, Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien, *Algeria*

UDN, Union Démocratique Nigérienne, *Niger*, 36

UDPT, Union Démocratique des Populations Togolaises, *Togo*

UDS, Union Démocratique Sénégalaise, *Senegal*, 57

UDSG, Union Démocratique et Sociale Gabonaise, *Gabon*, 20

UDV, Union Démocratique Voltaïque, *Upper Volta*

UFC, Uganda Freedom Convention, *Uganda*

UFM, Uganda Freedom Movement, *Uganda*

UFU, Uganda Freedom Union, *Uganda*

UGCC, United Gold Coast Convention, *Ghana*, 56, 70

UMBC, United Middle Belt Congress, *Nigeria*, 56, 66

'Umma, *Sudan*, 20-1, 54, 127

UNAR, Union Nationale du Ruanda, *Ruanda-Urundi*

UNARU, Union Nationale Africaine de Ruanda-Urundi, *Ruanda-Urundi*

UNC, Uganda National Congress, *Uganda*, 26, 67

UNFP, Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, *Morocco*, 54, 70, 117  
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Unionist Party, *Ethiopia-Eritrea*

Union Voltaïque, *Upper Volta*

UNIP, United National Independence Party, *Nigeria*, 55

UNIP, United National Independence Party, *Northern Rhodesia*

UNIS, Union Nigérienne des Indépendants et Sympathisants, *Niger*

UNM, Union Nationale Mauritanienne, *Mauretania*

UNM, Uganda National Movement, *Uganda*

UNP, Uganda National Party, *Uganda*

UP, United Party, *Gambia*

UP, United Party, *Ghana*, 56, 76, 155

UPA, União das Populações de Angola, *Angola*

UPC, Union des Populations du Cameroun, *Cameroun*, 22, 25, 75, 83,  
117, 127, 132, 140, 152

- UPC, Uganda People's Congress, *Uganda*  
UPD, Union Progressiste Dahoméenne, *Dahomey*  
UPM, Union Progressiste Mauritanienne, *Mauretania*, 19, 22  
UPP, United Progressive Party, *Sierra Leone*, 55  
UPRONA, Parti de l'Unité et du Progrès National du Burundi, *Ruanda-Urundi*  
UPS, Union Progressiste Sénégalaise, *Senegal*, 57, 65, 82, 90, 91, 97, 117  
UPU, Uganda People's Union, *Uganda*  
UR, Union Républicaine, *French Somaliland*  
US, Union Soudanaise, *Mali*, 18, 36, 55, 67, 111, 139  
  
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ZANC, Zambia African National Congress, *Northern Rhodesia*, 100  
ZNP, Zanzibar Nationalist Party, *Zanzibar*  
ZPPP, Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party, *Zanzibar*



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WA 8

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Nevertheless, as Rousseau observed, men are everywhere in chains. *Persecution 1961*, written by Peter Benenson, a founder-member of Justice, an all-party organization of lawyers to uphold the Rule of Law, simply presents the facts of nine cases of modern persecution, whether for racial, religious, or political reasons. Such cases as the disappearance of Maurice Audin in Algeria, the fate of Olga Ivinskaya in Russia, or the living crucifixion of the Reverend Jones in the Deep South of America are fully documented. Under such blows our idea of civilization rings with a hollow note.



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WA 11

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African political parties have developed at a startling rate during the period of 'decolonization'. This is the first comparative study of such parties over a very large area, extending from Morocco to Moyen-Congo, from Senegal to Somalia. Thomas Hodgkin has been able to draw upon many years of study, travel, and friendships in Africa to provide a clear guide-book to current political developments.

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The book is primarily addressed to those Africans 'whose interest in political parties is practical as well as academic', though it will also assist all who are trying to understand Africa from outside or from within.

This is another in the Penguin African Series, especially designed to provide background information and front-rank comment concerning this increasingly important continent. A variety of topics are dealt with, including politics, economics, science, social problems, literature, and history. Some books deal with Africa as a whole, others with particular regions; they may present new material on African affairs or traditional subjects viewed from an African rather than a European standpoint.

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